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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Cavell’s Philosophical Biography  
 
 Stanley Cavell’s philosophical methodology and biography begins with J.L. 
Austin, whose work revealed to Cavell the depth and contingency of embedded practical 
commitments and activities within ordinary language, and in the work of the later 
Wittgenstein. In a lifelong, evolving, and well-known set of readings of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, Cavell claimed that the Investigation’s main theme was an 
encounter with temptations toward skepticism or metaphysics; and that the voices or 
interlocutors which comprise the chorus of the Investigations are in various stages of 
yielding to that skeptical temptation, including acquiescing to paradox. And then there 
is Wittgenstein’s voice, Cavell thinks, which stands out above the rest. It is not a voice 
which defeats skepticism, but one which, over the course of that text, exemplifies a 
responsiveness to each particular temptation toward skepticism when and as it emerges 
from a human being, seeking “to discover the specific plight of mind and circumstance 
within which a human being gives voice to his condition.”1 
Throughout his work, as Cavell’s philosophical writings progressed away from 
traditional scholarship on Wittgenstein, Austin, and ordinary language philosophy, and 
into deeply original philosophical essays on themes and figures unfamiliar to most 
philosophers, Cavell continued to foreground a Wittgensteinian responsiveness to 
particular skeptical or metaphysical temptations as a particular human being gives voice 
to them. And in this vein, Cavell gradually became frustrated, even despairing, of what 
                                                        
1 Stanley Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” in Must We Mean What We Say (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 238-266.  
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he perceived to be the tendency of academic philosophers to engage in what he came to 
call a chronic “flight from the ordinary.” By the late 1970s and certainly by the mid 
1980s, Cavell had begun to suggest that apparently different but interrelated “areas” of 
philosophy such as philosophy of language, mind, and perception were permeated with 
what he called skepticism; and so Cavell, like Rorty, turned away from many 
recognizable philosophical problems. In a sense, this dissertation is an attempt to 
understand Cavell’s turn away from the sort of problems he thought were hopelessly 
entangled with skepticism, but also to understand Cavell’s return to something he 
thought was worth calling philosophy, a way of (philosophical) thinking that 
acknowledged the inescapable threat of skepticism.  
So, what is skepticism, for Cavell? As is well known, in the process of tackling 
traditional skeptical problems of other mind and external world skepticism, the concept 
of skepticism undergoes extensive redefinition in Cavell’s work – most famously in The 
Claim of Reason. Skepticism is an extremely broad category of analysis, for Cavell, a 
category which “take[s] the very raising of the question of knowledge in a certain form, 
or spirit, to constitute” it.2 Skepticism as Cavell understands it, and as I explore in more 
detail in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, is not just the denial that we can achieve 
knowledge, but a “dialectical space” of philosophical questioning that, across different 
areas of philosophy, is marked by an inchoate attempt to escape or “flee” from the finite, 
practical, and social agreements, activities, and “forms of life” in which linguistic 
meanings are interwoven. This includes the social and finite agreements and activities in 
                                                        
2 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 46.  
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which we can meaningfully assess our assertions and claims. Skepticism is the bump we 
get, as Wittgenstein might put it, when running up against the limits of language.  
What, more specifically, does that mean? Before giving an example, in this 
introduction, of a Cavellian diagnosis of skepticism of other minds (a bump we get from 
unearthing the fact that we are separate creatures, Cavell thinks) it will be useful to say 
one more general thing about Cavell’s responsiveness to the dialectic between 
skepticism and the ordinary mind. For Cavell, the nature of our finite and fallible use of 
language entails that skepticism will remain a standing threat. There is no exit from this 
conflict between skepticism and the felt life of the ordinary mind; that conflict is itself 
constitutive of our finitude; and finitude, as Stephen Mulhall has written, is Cavell’s 
central theme.3 In a word, Cavell’s interpretations of finitude rework the Cartesian 
conclusion that there is something we would like to, but cannot know (about whether 
what seems most apparent to us is in fact the case) and advocate instead for a Kantian 
interpretation of finitude whereby those “appearances” become conditions for the 
possibility of knowledge rather than barriers for knowledge. But for Cavell and for 
Cavell’s Wittgenstein, who were after all part of the so-called “linguistic turn” in 20th 
Century Anglo-American Philosophy, Wittgensteinian conditions are not mediated by 
pure concepts of the understanding but by the social, historically specific, and practical 
                                                        
3 Stephen Mulhall begins his introduction to The Cavell Reader with this: “The burden of Stanley Cavell’s 
philosophy is an acknowledgement of human finitude” (1). And later on in the introduction, Mulhall 
writes: “…as Cavell finds himself having to remind us, nothing is more human than the desire to deny the 
human, to interpret limits as limitations and to repudiate the human condition of conditonedness or 
finitude in the name of the unconditioned, the transcendent, the inhuman” (9). See Stephen Mulhall, 
introduction to The Cavell Reader, ed. Mulhall (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 1-21. See also Mulhall, 
Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 
130, 132, for further discussions by Mulhall of the role of finitude in Cavell’s work. One can also see the 
influence of Cavell’s thinking about finitude in Mulhall’s Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 48, for example.  
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activities in which language use is interwoven.4 In this vein, Cavell argues for something 
that has now become standard fare in Wittgenstein scholarship, namely, that the 
Investigations mounts broadly speaking a Kantian project, in the sense that 
Wittgenstein seeks to show that the fallibility and finitude of language use requires 
reconceptualizing apparent limitations as conditions for wording the world, for making 
sense of the world at all. 
To understand these points better, it is worth offering one central example of the 
way linguistic conditions can suddenly appear to function as limitations when entangled 
with a skeptical or metaphysical problematic – an example from Cavell’s engagement 
with skepticism of other minds in The Claim of Reason. It is no more than a particularly 
provocative example; I intend it to be exemplary of a structure or form of what I call, 
throughout this dissertation, following Jim Conant, the “dialectical space of 
skepticism,”5 as well as exemplary of Cavell’s responsiveness to the human being who 
has become entangled in that space. It goes, roughly, like this.  
 
 
                                                        
4 Cavell puts this thought – that the understanding is transcendentally conditioned by language -- in a 
variety of different ways as his work evolves. One of the most famous comes from Cavell’s interpretation 
of the Wittgensteinian concept of “criteria” in the first chapter of The Claim of Reason, where Cavell 
writes: “Wittgenstein’s insight, or implied claim, seems to be….that all of our knowledge, everything we 
assert or question (or doubt or wonder about…) is governed not merely by what we understand as 
“evidence” or “truth conditions,” but by criteria…Without the control of criteria in applying concept, we 
would not know what counts as evidence for any claim, nor for what claims evidence is needed” (14). See 
Cavell, The Claim of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 14. The precise nature of Cavell’s 
concept of criteria and their relation to skepticism continues to be a matter of scholarly debate. On my 
view, criteria are there; they just don’t matter to us until we become entangled in a skeptical problematic. 
And yet the force or relevance of this distinction– between criteria being there and their mattering to us – 
is itself understood best through the confrontation with skepticism. It’s a complicated, very “meta,” region 
of Cavell’s thinking and one which I discuss, in part, in chapter four.  
5 For Conant’s use of this phrase, see James Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 2012, 3. Accessed at: 
https://humstatic.uchicago.edu/philosophy/conant/Conant%202012%20Two%20Varieties%20of%20Sk
epticism.pdf. A shorter version of this chapter appears in Denis McManus, ed., Wittgenstein and 
Skepticism (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 97–136.  
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The Knowledge of Pain and Skepticism of Other Minds  
When gripped by a certain skeptical “spirit,” we are prone to conclude, merely 
based on another’s behavior, that we can never really “know” they are in pain. A person 
may, for all the world, be screaming in pain; I may accept this identification for 
“practical purposes” and concede that that scream is a scream of pain. But for 
“theoretical purposes” I cannot grant that that scream and that writhing is sufficient to 
establish the existence of pain. After all, all I see it pain behavior! It seems that, at best, 
I must infer the existence or presence of “pain” – now construed as a mental state or 
inner condition of some kind -- from that pain behavior. Varieties of this argument in 
philosophy are referred to, as is well-known, as “skepticism of other minds.” And rather 
than dismissing them, Cavell seeks to show that the skeptic about other minds has got 
their hands on something interesting – namely, the conditions for our ascribing mental 
or animated concepts to another – and interpreted those conditions as constraints. But 
how does Cavell show this?  
Setting aside the more direct critique of asking what sort of “inner state” the 
concept of behavior is in contrast to here, one thing the skeptic has discovered is, Cavell 
argues, that we retain the concept of pain across cases of feigning, imitating, or 
performing.6 That is, the skeptic has captured the insight that what we perform, 
pretend, and watch is pain. In the grip of what Cavell calls skepticism, this may feel 
deeply dissatisfying. Surely the cases of merely performing or feigning pain -- the cases 
                                                        
6 I have in mind here a climactic moment that appears early on in The Claim of Reason: the argument that 
satisfying criteria for ‘being in’ pain does not guarantee the existence of pain, that criteria for pain can be 
satisfied (on the movie screen, in the theatre, when faking, etc.) without there being pain. Cavell writes 
that such circumstances “are ones in appealing to which, in describing which, we retain the concept (here, 
of pain) whose application these criteria determine. And this means to me: In all such circumstances he 
has satisfied the criteria we use for applying the concept of pain to others” (Stanley Cavell, The Claim of 
Reason [New York:  Oxford University Press, 1999], 45).  
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of seeing a body in pain on a movie screen, for example -- are lacking something which 
exists or is present in real instances of pain. Thus far, Cavell wouldn’t disagree: of 
course there is a difference between an actor’s pain on the movie screen and your pain, 
right here and now. But what is that difference? 
 The descent into what Cavell calls skepticism hinges, in this particular case, on 
imposing a philosophical requirement that misconstrues the nature of conceptual 
differences between various instances (on screen, in the case of just pretending, and the 
real case) of the concept of pain. For it may appear obligatory, even natural, to want to 
explain the priority of a “real” case of pain over a case of merely pretending, acting, and 
so forth. To do this, we might try to isolate the “mental state” or “inner sensation” of 
pain itself, or appeal, instead, not to anything “inner,” but to a supranatural Entity or 
Platonic Form of pain, or perhaps to a rule or concept whose applications run along an 
independently existing track extending indefinitely into the future.7 Although these are 
certainly distinct conceptual moves to make, and there may be an indefinite number of 
moves of this sort, Cavell is attuned to something these efforts have in common, a 
peculiar drive to distinguish the “real” case from the others in a particular way. In all of 
these cases, what pain is cannot be merely this “appearance,” but this appearance plus 
something else, whether a special kind of “mental state” of pain, the satisfaction of a rule 
whose application is fixed in advance, or a Platonic entity whose presence guarantees 
the presence of “genuine” pain. The appearance/reality or seeming/being distinction 
takes on a particular shape here: the body becomes a veil rather than a picture or 
expression of the mind. If I have done enough to encourage these thoughts, then 
                                                        
7 See John McDowell, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following,” in The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and 
Rupert Read, 38–53 (New York: Routledge, 2000).  
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perhaps I can now say: under skepticism an apparently natural and (what can even 
feel) obligatory philosophical problematic is opened up, a form of problematic that, 
throughout this dissertation, I call a “dialectical space of skepticism.” And once such a 
space appears in our thinking, it seems, to the skeptic in us, necessary to engage with it.  
 For Cavell – as for other Wittgensteinians – the philosophical work to be done 
from this juncture is not to provide an answer to the skeptical spirit – that which seeks 
to determine what, once and for all, differentiates real (pain) from the mere appearance 
(of pain) – that has been set in motion. As such, Cavell will deny that we require a 
Platonic Form, inner entity, or something of the sort, to explain the conceptual 
differences between real pain and the feigning or performance of pain. To understand 
Cavell’s delicate thinking here, however, it is important to understand the role that this 
anti-metaphysical denial of essences or private mental states plays; i.e., it is not as an 
answer to the skeptical question – leaving us thinking that there is still something we 
cannot know – but part of a broader Cavellian strategy of acknowledging finitude. More 
specifically, Cavell aims to “make intelligible” the inchoate worry or anxiety which is at 
stake and around which skepticism hovers. What Cavell wants to do is to show that the 
metaphysical problematic in our philosophy deflects – to use the Cavellian term that 
Cora Diamond has made famous8 – a real, human difficulty that is still unrecognizable, 
preconscious, and unintelligible in the skeptic’s procedure.  
                                                        
8 For Diamond’s famous use of Cavell’s concept, see Cora Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality and the 
Difficulty of Philosophy,” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas 1, no. 2 (2003), 
11-12. Cavell uses the term “deflection” twice in his essay “Knowing and Acknowledging” to describe the 
sense in which, as I understand it, the skeptic turns a human form of life into an intellectual riddle, poses 
an intellectual question when, at best, what can be provided is a form of description of a natural capacity.  
See Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” in Must We Mean What We Say, 238–66 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), and especially p. 247 and p. 260. 
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Let us see what this Cavellian procedure looks like, briefly, in the above case, the 
classic case of “other minds skepticism.” Again, the skeptic questions whether “pain 
behavior” is sufficient to establish knowledge that another is in pain. Cavell thinks that 
the skeptic of other minds has grasped something difficult about the reality constraining 
our application of the concept of pain, a constraint which he calls “human separateness,” 
a stand-in for the form of life in which, we might say, we are separate beings with a 
shared language. I do not have (your) pain the way you do, of course; this is just the way 
it is for me as a creature who is not you, who is me (this much the skeptic has got right, 
Cavell thinks, but its significance she has got wrong). Furthermore, to say that “this is 
just the way it is for me” is not to say that I can’t wish or even imagine that things could 
be different, that we might possess and be constrained by a different form of life, one 
which allowed for ascriptions of pain to one other in different ways. We can easily 
imagine a machine that reads the brain’s electromagnetic pulses in order to know 
whether someone who cannot express pain is in pain, for example.9 Yet, given the 
contingent but natural fact or form of life10 that we are separate, in ascribing the 
concept of pain to you I must, as it were, passively read the lines of your face as a 
                                                        
9 There are deep and unexplored connections between Cavell’s discussions of the way in which mental 
concepts apply to bodily expressions – fallibly but inescapability, insofar as we are to have mental 
concepts at all – and the study of autism and disability. Some severely autistic people, for example, lack 
the capacity to manifest emotion, feeling, states of mind, and so forth in bodily expressions. Their mind 
cannot be read with their body, and their body is thus not the best picture of their soul. What consequence 
this has for Cavell’s Wittgenstein and the discussion of mental states – aside from limiting this discussion 
to the able-bodied and statistically more common language-user – is something that merits future 
analysis. 
10 One of Cavell’s most widely-used conceptual contributions is his distinction between vertical (or more 
‘biological’) and horizontal (or more ‘conventional’) forms of life. Eating with one’s hands or with a fork 
and knife would be an example of the vertical or biological; eating as opposed to pecking or pawing at 
one’s food would be an example of the horizontal or conventional. For one of the primary places where 
Cavell analyzes this distinction – and I believe the first place he uses these specific concepts – see Stanley 
Cavell, “Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures and After Emerson 
After Wittgenstein: the 1987 Frederick Ives Carpenter Lectures at the University of Chicago  (New 
Mexico: Living Batch Press, 1989), especially 41–43.  
 9 
 
grimace, let those lines be expressive of a grimace. This involves allowing your grimace 
to make a claim on me.  
In one sense, then, what the skeptic of other minds shows us is not that I cannot 
“know” you are in pain but that, to know you are in pain, I must acknowledge the claim 
your pain has made on me, a conceptual act which goes beyond mere “identification” of 
the fact that you are in pain. Skepticism reveals, for Cavell, not those aspects of our 
condition which cannot be known, but those aspects of our cognitive life which require a 
different kind of knowing in order to be known, a different kind of methodology, a 
category of cognitive response Cavell calls “acknowledgement.” Achieving full 
knowledge of another’s pain requires acknowledging that pain; i.e., finding a way to do 
justice to the fact that, for creatures like us, I cannot relieve you of your pain just as I 
cannot have your pain.11  
But the skeptic’s problem, Cavell finds, is that the skeptic (in us) harbors an 
unexamined wish to transcend or evade the fact of our separateness. The skeptic finds 
that the priority of acknowledgement is not a reality she wishes to face and subsequently 
denies that knowledge – here pictured as something which could overcome these 
constraints and allow me to “know” your pain -- is possible. In doing so, according to 
Cavell, the skeptic has grasped a constraint, the fact that you are you and I am me, on 
applications of the concept of pain, but as it were preconsciously rejected it. For Cavell, 
metaphysics – in any of its forms, as a rule on infinitely extending tracks, as a special 
sort of mental state, as Platonic Essence -- is a deflection of the need to come to terms, 
                                                        
11 One under-read and little known but revealing essay by Cavell in which he discusses these topics is his  
“Comments on Veena Das’s Essay ‘Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain,” 
Daedalus 125, no. 1 (1996), 93-98. 
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to suffer, this aspect of our finite condition. So the proper response to metaphysics or 
skepticism is not anti-metaphysical theorizing but a “suffering” and acceptance of that 
condition.12 
Cavell’s task is therefore not to directly refute the skeptic and show that we, in 
fact, can “know” someone is in pain in the sense of “knowing” that the traditional 
philosopher takes for granted, as this would share in the skeptic’s poor understanding of 
what she has, at some level, grasped. Cavell’s task is rather to retrace the skeptic’s steps, 
reformulate the issue that the skeptic has inexplicitly encountered, and make this 
experience intelligible. “A formidable criticism of skepticism – as of any serious 
philosophy – will have to discover and alter its understanding of itself.”13 Once 
reframed, reexamined, and accepted as irrefutable, skepticism appears very differently: 
in a word, as a confused effort to cope with or face the constraints and the difficulties of 
our condition, difficulties which in other artistic forms – such as literature and drama – 
we find more explicitly acknowledged; i.e., addressed and suffered.14 So, for Cavell, in 
philosophy we have a knack for turning the contingent but inescapable facts of our 
finitude, the forms of life around which our concepts hover, into an “intellectual lack.”15  
                                                        
12 By understanding Cavell as wanting to reckon with human finitude through a transformed relation to 
the finite constraints within our use of language, we can make better sense of why, over the course of the 
skeptical problematic, the skeptic (in us) becomes dissatisfied with the ordinary conditions of applying the 
concept of pain to bodily expressions. If ordinary linguistic attributions of pain take for granted as a 
natural fact the “form of life” of our separateness from each other – as would be entirely natural for 
linguistic creatures like us – then the skeptic seeks to transcend these ordinary attributions as part of the 
general attempt to transcend the natural fact of our separateness.  
13. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 38. This is a point, and a passage, I return to in much more detail in 
chapter four. 
14 As I read his philosophical trajectory, it was with the publication of Cavell’s 1970 Senses of Walden that 
he first discovers in the work of the American Transcendentalists a procedure of writing philosophically 
which engages with and centers the urge to escape from our finitude; later, as is well known, Cavell will 
criticize his own dismissal of Emerson, re-read Emerson’s text and, in the process, fashion a 
reimagination of American Philosophy.   
15 Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” 263.  
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Skepticism as a Human Difficulty  
Moving outward from skepticism of other minds to skepticism in general, then, 
we can start to get into view the general form of Cavell’s way of understanding 
skepticism as a response to a human difficulty. With the claim the skeptic has in effect 
not understood the philosophical problem they have encountered, Cavell argues that 
skepticism finds expression in questions of whether knowledge of the existence of the 
external world, knowledge of other minds, or knowledge of the meaning of signs is 
possible (all questions which take on a similar shape under the threat of skepticism), but 
that this expression is inadequate; we need a better conception of the question that 
skepticism poses for us.16 As many interpreters of Cavell have noted, nearly all of the 
major and now famous concepts Cavell employs and explores in his texts – 
acknowledgement, finitude, criteria, the ordinary, use, among many others – are 
insights that the philosophical skeptic’s questions and procedures have in a sense both 
revealed and concealed. That there is a (genuine) philosophical issue is revealed by the 
very presence of a skeptical problematic (which as I argue throughout this dissertation is 
a much broader and wide-reaching phenomenon than it is typically understood to be). 
But at the same time, the skeptical problematic also conceals the key concepts and 
insights through an effort to transcend or evade the “experience” which gave rise to it in 
the first place. This dual structure of revelation and concealment, of disguised, pre-
                                                        
16 Cavell shares this general insight, not only with Hume, but also with several of his contemporaries who 
are perhaps more squarely in the analytic epistemology tradition, figures like Barry Stroud and Thompson 
Clarke. Both Clarke and Stroud argued that the question skepticism awakens for us should not be: “do I 
really know I am here, in a dressing gown, sitting by the fire” but rather how I know I am here, in a 
dressing gown, sitting by the fire. Clark’s” The Legacy of Skepticism” in The Journal of Philosophy 69, no. 
20: 754-769; and Stroud’s The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984).  
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conscious insight, is what in the third chapter I describe as the mixed legacy of 
skepticism, and I argue that it is a useful orienting frame to think of Cavell’s philosophy 
as itself part of the mixed legacy of skepticism.  
If we retrace our steps and return to the desire to grasp an inner essence or 
Platonic entity of pain, we can also see how irrelevant this metaphysical desire is to 
what Cavell understands as the underlying issue with skepticism. For Cavell, when 
gripped by skepticism, by the skeptic in ourselves, we end up searching for something 
which even if we were to grasp “it” – though for Cavell there really is no “it” here – it 
would not help us better understand our question. We seek to know something which -- 
to use a phrase of Cora Diamond that will be central to this dissertation -- “could make 
no difference to us in any case.”17 And once we have obtained clarity about what kind of 
experience had awakened the metaphysical difficulties, we will stop, by our own accord, 
asking those questions. And that would be the end of the Cavellian Wittgenstein’s 
intervention, until the next skeptical problem arises.  
 
Cavell and the Limits of Philosophical Authority  
At this point an objection might arise. It would go like this: “how does Cavell 
know the skeptic’s experience better than the skeptic does?” If it is true that the skeptic 
“deflects the truth to which he is responding,”18 as Cavell’s now-famous formulation of 
                                                        
17 Diamond, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit” in Realism and the Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, 
Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 42. The full passage reads like this: “We have a 
picture here of the philosophical ‘realist’ as someone misled by phantoms, by what appears to make sense 
but is really nonsense, by what could make no different to us in any case” (42.) 
18 Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” in Must We Mean What We Say (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 260.  
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the origin of metaphysics has it, how does Cavell know that? Can he see inside the 
skeptic’s mind?  
Here we encounter Cavell’s thinking about the limits of philosophical authority. 
The argumentative or logical inferences which propel Cavell’s philosophical 
methodology forward are rooted in Cavell’s own “experience” (construed as the rich, 
thick, “felt life of the mind”19). These inferences are thus not deductive in the familiar 
sense, that is, they are not contained in the concepts which Cavell is using; nor are they 
“pure” in anything like the rationalist’s sense, as innate or internal to the mind prior to 
experience. Instead something almost entirely opposite is true: Cavellian concepts arise 
from Cavell’s own experience and serve specific aims and purposes in his philosophy. 
They thus do not seek to have deductive or universal validity, but to – as he famously 
puts it – find and found a community that shares his sense of the way things seem to 
him, and which will not include everyone. In doing philosophy in this way, Cavell puts 
his own experience forward as -- hopefully -- exemplary, arrogates his experience and 
seeks to share it. In other words, to understand Cavell’s confrontation with skepticism, 
one cannot (just) follow his arguments; one must also lend Cavell’s prose the possibility 
of showing or revealing new aspects of experience which we -- you! -- may have missed. 
Like a work of literature, drama, or fiction, and arguably like many other truly original 
philosophies, to read Cavell’s engagement with skepticism most fully we have to “get 
inside” the world opened up by his prose.20 We have to trust that the obscurity and 
                                                        
19 The phrase is Marilyn Robinson’s. See her Absence of Mind: The Dispelling of Inwardness from  
the Modern Myth of the Self: The Terry Lectures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 35. 
20 Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging, 240. 
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difficulty of that prose is not a mist or haze, to paraphrase what Cavell says of Emerson’s 
prose, but a function of the difficulty of what he is trying to express. 
In an odd way, then, by going deeper into his own experience and noticing what 
was true for him, Cavell also made room for plurality. “In every work of genius we 
recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain alienated 
majesty,” Cavell was fond of writing, renewing a quote from Emerson.21 Especially in his 
work after The Claim of Reason, Cavell often wrote in such a way as to explicitly make 
room for what another sensibility or another mood might say or do at a specific juncture 
in his argument, writing in such a way that exemplifies a plurality of interpretation and 
knowledge and clearing ground for disagreement rooted in the possibility of agreement. 
Cavell is in effect inviting us to share his experience, to “dig as he digs,” as he puts it 
while still stuck in the 60s. This presents, for Cavell’s readers or interpreters, many 
difficulties. How do we honor Cavell’s claims, which are, in the end, based off of his 
experience, without creating mere followers? On what grounds do we disagree with 
him? There will be more to say about these important questions in the conclusion, 
questions which I think ought to be more explicit in any possible future of Cavell 
scholarship, but for now I just want to mark them as an important issue for readers of 
Cavell, an issue made even more palpable, of course, by his death in summer 2018, and 
thus his resounding silence regarding whatever it is we have to say about him.  
 
 
                                                        
21 For the Emerson quote, see Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” in Essays: First Series. Cavell returns to the 
passage in Emerson’s essay for insight into his own method beginning in the 1980s, including in what I 
take to be perhaps Cavell’s most painstakingly composed essay, “Something out of the Ordinary,” his 
address to the American Philosophical Society in 1996. See Cavell, “Something out of the Ordinary,” in 
Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 7-27.  
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Cavell and “The New Wittgenstein” (in America) 
 Cavell is the principal but not the only Wittgensteinian on whom I draw in this 
dissertation. In contemporary scholarship on Wittgenstein, Cavell has often been put 
into conversation with Cora Diamond and Jim Conant, who have put forth a “Resolute” 
reading of Wittgenstein’s work which is deeply compatible with, though also in some 
ways different from, Cavell’s evolving set of interpretations of Wittgenstein. Although 
this dissertation does not engage in the “Resolute” debate at all, it may be worth saying a 
few things about the Resolute reading here, as I do often draw on the work of Diamond 
and Conant while working through a Cavellian response to skepticism.  
 In a word, the “Resolute” reading of the later Wittgenstein, closely allied with 
what has been called “the New Wittgenstein” which emerged in the early 2000s22, also 
takes the Investigations to constitute a series of confrontations with the temptation 
toward skepticism or metaphysics. But beginning with Cora Diamond’s 1989 essay 
“Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus”23 and more generally in her 
wonderful and now quite famous Realism and the Realistic Spirit24, these readers of 
Wittgenstein argue, in flat contradistinction to a tradition of philosophy that elevates 
the role of proposition or assertion above all other forms of human communication, 
that, strictly speaking, Wittgenstein’s work contains no propositions, declarative 
statements, or “assertions” of any kind. Every move Wittgenstein makes is either an 
interlocutor advancing a position from within the temptation(s) to metaphysics or 
                                                        
22 The first text most influential text remains the anthology, The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and 
Rubert Read, (New York: Routledge, 2001). That text aims to show similarities in the influence and 
inheritance of Wittgenstein in the work of Cavell, John McDowell, and Cora Diamond.  
23 Diamond, “Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus” in Realism and the Realistic 
Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 179-205. 
24 Diamond, “in Realism and the Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2001.  
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skepticism, giving voice to the temptation, or else responding to that temptation in some 
way. Ultimately, what Conant has recently called “the Wittgensteinian way”25 with 
skepticism involves trying to retrace the initial steps that lead us into skepticism, a 
procedure which at this level of generality would also include Cavell’s procedure. But 
more controversially, for the world of Wittgenstein interpretation at any rate, Diamond 
and Conant take this description of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – to not advance theses, 
to continually and dynamically respond to the insurmountable temptation toward 
skepticism and metaphysics in philosophy – to be true of the Tractatus as well as the 
Investigations.  
I do not take a stance on that claim in this dissertation. What I do take on from 
the Resolute reading is a claim about the fact that and the way in which philosophy of 
language is the hinge of the Wittgensteinian approach. New Wittgensteinians, including 
Cavell, do not read the Investigations as equipping us with a kind of “philosophical 
expertise” we did not already possess for determining the “meaning” of terms, signs, or 
sentences, or for giving an account of how such meaning is possible.  According to 
Wittgenstein and Cavell, philosophers do not have a unique body or sub-discipline of 
knowledge about “meanings” – at bottom they have nothing more than the knowledge 
that comes from being raised or socialized in a particular culture and language. And yet 
they also hold that skepticism or metaphysics distorts or loses track of the meaning of 
words, and that this distortion in language leads to nothing short of epistemological 
“fantasies” of what knowledge and objectivity might be like.26 Put otherwise, the “New 
                                                        
25 See Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism” (2012), p. 63. 
26 Diamond, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” in Realism and the Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2001), 50-51. In these passages Diamond speaks of “fantasies of how words work” (an idea I take 
up in the first chapter) and of “unrealism in discussing some philosophical question having its source in 
unrealism about language or meaning” (51).  
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Wittgensteinian” idea is not that philosophy legislates what we can and cannot say 
according to rules of sense which Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides – as if 
Wittgenstein was in the business of telling people what they can and cannot say.27 For 
the New Wittgensteinians, philosophy draws on a substratum or untapped well of 
knowledge that all of us cannot fail to possess to some extent. This is quite different 
from a large body of work on Wittgenstein which focuses on Wittgenstein’s concepts of 
“rules,” “grammar,” and “criteria” to develop a conception of sense and nonsense.28  
This also puts Cavell and “the New Wittgenstein” in an odd and aversive position 
with respect, not only to many other interpreters of Wittgenstein, but also to much of 
contemporary philosophy of language. Much of contemporary philosophy of language is 
devoted to giving an account either: (1) of what the “semantic meaning” of ordinary 
expressions really is (sometimes referred to as a “semantic theory” of meaning); or (2) 
of the foundations of meaning, that is, establishing the basis, or in virtue of what, 
expressions in a language come to have the meaning they do (sometimes referred to as a 
“foundational theory” of meaning.). These tasks are obviously related, but from a New 
Wittgensteinian perspective, these kinds of philosophical investigations of language 
begin with a sense of words as meaningless text or as meaningless signposts standing in 
need of interpretation, as dead signs needing to be brought to life and interpreted. 
Whereas, for Wittgenstein, as Alva Noe puts it, “our relation to the world is not that of a 
                                                        
27 The idea is rather that certain forms of metaphysical philosophizing, cut off from ordinary, human 
practices and interests, amounts to a “fantasy of how words work.” C.F. Diamond, Realism and the 
Realistic Spirit, 50-1.  
28 It is difficult to say anything here that won’t be contentious. For Conant in particular, the work of 
P.M.S. Hacker has been a target of criticism. The difference in interpretation between Conant Hacker lies, 
as Hacker himself paraphrases things, partially in the question of whether “Wittgenstein sought to expose 
metaphysical utterances as nonsense on the ground that they transgress specific rules of logical syntax 
(according to the Tractatus) or grammar (according to the later philosophy).” See P.M.S. Hacker, 
“Wittgenstein, Carnap, and the New American Wittgensteinians,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53: 
210 (2003), p. 2.   
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creator. The world is bigger than we are; what we are able to do is be open to it – that is, 
we are able to find our way around in it.”29 The idea that we are not “creators” of the 
world of meaning and that, instead, we are born into a social, partially shared, already 
meaningful world, accounts, I think, for part of the sense of ineluctable finitude which 
pervades both Cavell and Wittgenstein’s writing. If skepticism deals with words and 
signs as lifeless thing needing to be brought to life, to successfully confront skepticism is 
to return, for Cavell’s Wittgenstein, to the already-present social space of meaning, into 
the ordinary use and circulation of words in a particular time and place – but to return 
transfigured and more conscious of the threat of skepticism.   
Like Cavell’s various readings of the Investigations, then, the “Resolute” reading 
of Wittgenstein not only takes Wittgenstein’s philosophy to be a fervent and existential 
confrontation with skepticism, in nearly every sentence of his work, but also takes 
skepticism to be a shape or space of philosophical questioning that we can feel both 
compelled to engage with, and which cannot be defeated. For Cavell as for the resolute 
readers, skepticism does not advance human or humanistic interests or values and may 
even deny space for a role of those interests and values, as chapter two of this 
dissertation argues. And yet for these readers, too, including Cavell, to put it bluntly: 
these dialectical spaces of skepticism still pervade the professional pursuit of 
philosophy, a claim I defend in some detail in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, but 
about which I should also say something here.  
 
 
                                                        
29 Alva Noe, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 184. 
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Framing of the Dissertation  
 Returning now to Cavell’s work in particular, and to the limited scope of this 
dissertation, the main “skeptical” problem I engage with in different ways throughout 
this dissertation is what, in philosophy, we describe as the problem of ‘how language 
hooks onto the world,’ how what we say corresponds with or accurately represents the 
world. It can seem that we are faced with a “medium” of representation – language – 
and a set of objects to be represented – “the world.” The problem is whether or not 
language represents the world; in other words, a metaphysical gap has been opened up 
which requires that we account for the relation between words and world. And from this 
point forward it can seem pressing that we find a way to close that gap.  
This “skeptical” drive to assess the accuracy or veridicality of language against the 
world takes – I argue, following Cavell and Jim Conant – a similar shape across various 
areas of philosophy. We can ask the same form of question about the veridicality of our 
“perceptions,” “ideas” or “representations” as we can about our language – we can feel 
that realism requires that we compare their correspondence with or resemblance to 
“reality” or “the world.” These questions, across apparently different problems in 
philosophy balloon into parallel and structurally similar forms across different areas of 
philosophy. 
Direct responses to this problematic, which insist on the “non-representational” 
nature of language, for example, can leave us thinking that there is something “more” 
which language could do – represent reality. But Cavell aims to show us that rational 
constraints do not require this two-world picture of language/thought, on the one hand, 
and reality/world on the other.  Cavell does not aim to “answer” the metaphysical 
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question, but to show us that language’s being answerable to the world does not require 
such a picture.   
 My Cavellian argument is that this form or space of skeptical questioning – 
regardless of whether we are asking about the veridicality of the appearance of another’s 
pain, about the veridicality of the meaning of a word or phrase, about the veridicality of 
a perception, etc. -- leaves behind the ordinary, finite, and social activities and practices 
which make meaningful language use possible. But I do not mean “left behind” in the 
sense that returning to these finite and social practices of language use will defeat 
skepticism. As we saw, Cavell thinks that the direct attempt to defeat skepticism has still 
not adequately understood what the appearance of a skeptical problem has deflected. 
Rather, in Cavell’s philosophy, if we return to the everyday use of language after working 
through the threat of skepticism and after coming to terms with what lead us into 
skeptical thinking, what we find is a renewed (linguistic) relation to the felt life of the 
ordinary mind, one which acknowledges those “unhandsome” elements of our condition 
which skepticism would seek to deny. In later work, Cavell will describe the proper 
response to skepticism as a transformation of the “actual everyday” into the “eventual 
everyday.” With respect to the question of how language corresponds to or represents 
the world, I suggest, throughout this dissertation, that this question is a confused 
response to the fact of our inheritance of language and culture, the fact that we are born 
into a social, already-made system of meanings over which in many ways we have 
astonishingly little freedom. And that conclusion, I argue – the conclusion that a 
particular form of skepticism deflects – is yet another starting point for Cavell’s 
philosophy, an insight brought out through an engagement with skepticism.   
 
 21 
 
Brief Outline of the Chapters  
One might hold out hope that at the end of a project like this one I would come to 
understand the subject matter better than I did at the start. And that is happily the case 
here; but it also makes the road map of the dissertation which follows different than the 
one I would have drawn at the start. 
In the first chapter, I try, perhaps a bit paradoxically, to give a conceptual 
argument for the necessity of the individual human voice in philosophy. I draw on the 
work of James Conant and give an initial litmus test for “metaphysical”/“skeptical” uses 
of language versus “everyday” uses of language; the test concerns the difference between 
(1) asking after the meaning of expressions “in isolation from their concrete uses” and 
(2) asking after the meaning of an expression when a human being has an interest in 
meaning or saying something by that expression. I try to show that skeptical or 
metaphysical uses of language are not just devoid of “context” – Wittgenstein is far more 
than just a contextualist about meaning – but that furthermore they empty out any 
interest or purpose we might have for an utterance. I then try to argue that specific, 
finite, purposes and interests are necessary for the achievement of semantic meaning. 
And I suggest, following Cavell, that skepticism seems to harbor a drive to avoid 
precisely these finite dimensions of meaning: to empty out our own contributions, 
values, interests from human speech, to as it were get beyond shifting and contingent 
human interests and purposes and make language work “all by itself,” without the need 
for a human voice behind them. I suggest but do not by any means prove that such a 
drive will ultimately end in paradox.  
The second chapter takes a more indirect route to identifying and confronting 
skepticism in a Wittgensteinian spirit. I try to give an account of the source, for 
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Wittgenstein, of a confused idea of meaning as correspondence between words and the 
world. I argue that, considered as an abstract correspondence or relation between ideas 
and reality, such an idea is an example of the sort of fantasy, the sort of attempt to 
surpass the human and escape from finitude, that Cavell labels “skepticism” and that 
Wittgenstein aims to diagnose. But at the same time, we do have several techniques of 
evaluating “resemblance or correspondence to reality.” These techniques, however, are 
internal to our practices and to our “use” of words; they are established through and 
internal to practical activity. It is from these practical activities which house or contain 
“correspondences with reality,” Wittgenstein thinks, that we get our philosophical idea 
of “Correspondence with Reality.” Once we see the home of the philosophical idea in 
technique and ordinary activity, we are supposed to see that such a philosophical idea 
could make no difference for us in any case – that neither affirming nor denying it 
makes a difference to objectivity – and thus that such an idea turns an “idle wheel.”  
In the third chapter, I return to one of the main themes of this introduction and 
argue that skepticism’s drive to deny (or transcend) the human is not just a curse, in 
Cavell’s philosophy. The confrontation with skepticism, in short, throws us back upon 
what it is about ourselves and our words which we wish to deny or escape from: 
elements of our finite condition; the fact that we are born into an already established 
network of meanings, the fact that other persons are separate from us even though we 
share a language, and so on. I argue that just one of the many things which Cavell 
thought were difficult to accept about being human, and difficult to live well in relation 
to, is the idea that not all of what we take to be a “matter of fact” is independent from 
what sort of ethical stance we take toward that fact. This has been well documented with 
respect to skepticism of other minds: namely that Cavell thinks at bottom that “other 
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mindedness” is an ethical question. However, in this chapter, I concentrate on the 
perception or reception of what is “animate,” in Cavell’s philosophy, as opposed to 
“inanimate,” and argue that there is an ineluctable ethical decision or posture involved 
in determining that boundary – not just in other minds, but in terms of living beings 
more generally. Skepticism in Cavell’s philosophy can thus be further understood as the 
drive to escape from the responsibility involved in recognizing the role of the ethical 
stance in determining certain factual boundaries.  
 Finally, in the fourth chapter, I try to think with Cavell by showing the role of the 
threat of skepticism in Early Modern European philosophy and in Thomas Hobbes in 
particular. I take up Cavell’s suggestion that modern “skepticism” – as Cavell 
understood it – undergoes a particular intensification in the early modern period in 
Europe, and I seek to identify the role that the threat of skepticism played, in shaping 
the questions asked and the possible range of satisfactory answers, in Hobbes’s thinking 
in particular. As in the second chapter, I critique the idea of “the resemblance or 
correspondence between our ideas and reality” as a model of objectivity, but instead of 
showing the humble home of such an idea in “practices” or techniques, as in the second 
chapter, in this chapter I allow this idea to reach it’s paradoxical conclusion in Hobbes’s 
philosophy. I show how well Hobbes’s attempt to link ideas to reality through the 
cause/effect relation maps onto James Conant’s framework for identifying the marks 
and features of a skeptical space. I show that Hobbes represents an especially interesting 
case for thinking about skepticism. And the chapter is also the first detailed attempt, 
among those who write on Cavell, to apply Conant’s framework for Cavellian skepticism 
to a canonical figure in the history of philosophy.  
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 There is only so much introducing one can do to writing that is also an activity, a 
movement, of thinking. So, with that much said, let’s begin.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Cavell, Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use 
 
 
 
For Stanley Cavell, to use a Heideggerian phrase that becomes important in 
Cavell’s later thought, human beings are “beings for whom things matter.”30 A recurring 
theme of Cavell’s philosophy, showing up differently in different regions of his work, is 
that there is no intelligible realm of human (conceptual) life which is free from human 
questions about what counts for us, what matters to us, and what is (humanly) 
important. In fact, Cavell, like Heidegger, will go so far as to identify “indifference,” the 
condition in which some things do not matter to us more than others, as both cause and 
effect of (what he calls) “skepticism.”31 For Cavell, “value-laden” cares and commitments 
providing direction in a human life are not in conflict with the commitment to 
objectivity, but are rather constitutive of that commitment. But the way in which those 
cares are “constitutive” of objectivity does not negate the fact that those cares are both 
fallible and revisable. These claims about the nature of objectivity and the role of 
human values continues to go against the grain of much of modern philosophy and 
modern culture’s dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, between valueless fact 
and “factless” value.  
                                                        
30 “We are beings who have ‘outlooks, or prospects, something in view – in short, beings for whom things 
matter (unlike matter); the beings, I keep putting it, for whom things and beings count” (Stanley Cavell, 
“Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson After 
Wittgenstein [Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989], 14). There is much work to be done continuing to 
understand Cavell’s engagement with Heidegger’s Being and Time, but in this essay I want to understand 
this thread – that we are beings for whom things matter – as it connects to questions of meaning in 
philosophical of language.  
31 Ibid., 46. In full, Cavell writes: “Philosophy (as ascent) shows the violence that is to be refused 
(disobeyed), that has left everything not as it is, indifferent to me, as if there are things in themselves.” 
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In this chapter, rooted in recent scholarship on Cavell and “the New 
Wittgenstein,” I take up Cavell’s above claim and analyze it at the level of language and 
meaning. I show that, for Cavell, the absence of concrete, human cares and 
commitments – what Cavell calls the point of an utterance – leads to the absence of a 
determinate meaning for an expression and, accordingly, into what Cavell calls 
“skepticism.” I start from Cavell’s reading or inheritance of Wittgenstein’s claim that 
“the meaning of a word is its use in our language”32 before turning to a distinction 
suggested by Jim Conant in his work on Cavell. Conant differentiates between (1) asking 
after the meaning of expressions “in isolation from their concrete uses,”33 and (2) asking 
after the meaning of an expression when a human being has an interest or care in 
meaning or saying something by that expression. At first glance, this distinction is not so 
complex – it is nothing more than the difference between “the meaning of a sentence 
itself” and the meaning of a sentence when we understand what a particular person is 
trying to say with it. I argue, however, that on a Cavellian vision of language and (at least 
sentential) meaning, the absence of a particular person’s care and commitment does not 
amount to objectivity, but rather a loss of accountability to (human) reality, to 
emptiness in our use of language. If this right, then the very thing that we might think of 
as an impediment to objectivity – our value-laden cares and commitments, our 
investments to one thing rather than another – is in fact a condition for it. And, on 
                                                        
32 The relevant passage is cited below, p. 5: “In a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we 
employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Shulte, 4th ed. [UK: Blackwell, 2009], §43). 
33 The phrasing is Jim Conant’s. See James F. Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” The Harvard 
Review of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005), 51–65.  
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Cavell’s reading, this is precisely to say that the skeptic interprets constraints on our 
linguistic life as barriers or limitations.  
Moreover, I interpret Cavell to be saying that there is a sense, perhaps especially 
true in philosophizing, in which we are actively drawn toward the emptiness of 
assertions in order to arrive at a conception of objectivity which seeks to cancel out the 
role of human care and commitment. “I find the motive to skepticism in this emptiness 
itself,” Cavell writes, such that “I must empty out my contributions to words, so that 
language itself, as if beyond me, exclusively takes over the responsibility for meaning.”34 
For Cavell, however, neither is the skeptic (in us) unmotivated to empty out care and 
commitments from our assertions: these cares and commitments may be conditioned by 
our inheritance of language and culture, the acceptance of which threatens to define or 
even dominate us, a threat that later Cavell will mark by the concept of “conformity.” 
But rather than a wholesale rejection (or acceptance) of the role of cares and 
commitments in human life – a rejection which Cavell thinks can propel us literally into 
an emptiness of our life with words, an acceptance of which reduces us to conformity – 
we can gradually, in a piecemeal, intersubjective way, revise, clarify, and prioritize those 
cares and commitments. Or to sum this up in Cavell’s dramatic, dense prose: “the 
ordinary alone has the power to move the ordinary.”35 Such a project of piecemeal, finite 
conversation about our cares and commitments is the core of what Cavell has famously 
called Emersonian perfectionism.  
 
 
                                                        
34 Cavell, “Declining Decline,” 57.  
35 Ibid., 47. 
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Words and Tools 
The successful transmission of what philosophers of language call “semantic 
meaning,” or what we communicate when we do in fact communicate to one another, is 
a mysterious thing. Among other questions, it asks how it is that a sound or sign – a 
mere mark on paper, a moment of noise – comes to matter or mean something 
communicable and determinate, comes to mean even something more or less “the same 
thing” for two communicators. Does ‘meaning’ lie buried in words, like a core or a 
kernel, or does meaning lie above words, in another realm that words somehow 
“participate” in, as Plato has Parmenides assert in the dialogue that bears his name?  
In an increasingly famous passage from The Claim of Reason, Cavell connects the 
possibility and achievement of semantic meaning – and a reading of Wittgenstein’s so-
called “use-theory of meaning”  – to an acceptance of human finitude, where finitude is 
parsed in terms of “what an expression mean[s] or say[s] on specific occasions by 
human beings”: 
“The meaning is the use” calls attention to the fact that what an expression means 
is a function of what it is used to mean or say on specific occasions by human 
beings … And to trace the intellectual history of philosophy’s concentration on 
the meaning of particular words and sentences, in isolation from a systematic 
attention to their concrete uses would be a worthwhile undertaking. It is a 
concentration one of whose consequences is the traditional search for the 
meaning of a word in various realms of objects … A fitting title for this history 
would be: Philosophy and the Rejection of the Human.36   
 
This passage calls attention to key features of the Cavellian-Wittgensteinian vision of 
semantic meaning. We can see that there are at least two different emphases: (1) on the 
specificity and contextual nature of the expression; and (2) on the fact that a human 
                                                        
36 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 206-207.  
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being has meant or said something by that expression. Both emphases or requirements 
will be important in what follows, but unfurling their significance for Cavell, as we’ll see, 
proves difficult, in part because their significance, like so much of Cavell’s thought, is 
best brought out through a confrontation with skepticism. A good starting place for 
understanding the passage, however, is the later Wittgenstein’s claim that “the meaning 
is the use.” 
Perhaps the most famous passage of the Investigations, in which Wittgenstein 
actually says something like “meaning is use,” is section 43:  
In a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word 
‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.37 
 
It is tempting to read passages like this one as reducing language use to a form of 
instrumentality, as a means to a given end. Although there are an indefinite number of 
ways of construing what this “means-end” relationship might amount to, one would be 
to understand words as instruments or tools for the goal of achieving determinate 
semantic meaning. Meaning thus becomes a kind of entity which is fundamentally 
connected to words and yet also separable from them; or as Wittgenstein puts it, we 
have a conception of meaning here which is “of the same kind as the word, even though 
different from the word.”38 On this view, words must be similar enough to “meanings” to 
be able to signify and somehow “connect” with them, yet different enough to be 
separable from them.39 However, although understanding words as mere instruments 
for meaning might, after all, seem to provide us with the specificity and contextual 
                                                        
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §43. 
38 Ibid., §120. 
39  In response to something like this conception of meaning, Plato has Parmenides suggest that words 
“participate” in a separate realm of entities called meanings in the dialogue Parmenides. 
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requirements of Cavell’s interpretation – since instruments are both individually 
specific and their use is tied to contextual aims and purposes – Cavell complicates this 
picture significantly, as we will see.  
In any case, we do find an acknowledgement of the instrumentality of language in 
the later Wittgenstein’s work. One example would be the famous metaphor of the 
“toolbox”:  
Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a 
rule a glue-pot, glue nails and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse 
[different, vershieden] as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there 
are similarities.)40 
 
There is some sort of analogy between language and tools being made here. But if we 
pay close attention to the specific wording of this carefully written passage, we find that 
Wittgenstein is not quite saying that words are like tools; he is saying, rather, that the 
functions of words are as different or heterogeneous (verschieden) as the functions of 
tools. The difference in the analogies is significant: on the one hand, words are a set of 
heterogeneous instruments and, thus, reduced to a form of instrument; on the other, 
words are as different from each other as a set of heterogeneous instruments. 
Additionally, on this second view, if words are as different from each other as tools are 
different from each other, then the focus is not on instrumentality, but on difference – 
and on difference within sameness, within the same linguistic concept (of being a 
“word.”) If this is right, then while Wittgenstein’s famous comparison of language with 
the toolbox is supposed to suggest how much difference or heterogeneity is in the 
                                                        
40 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §11. 
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concept of “words” – just like the different uses to which we can put tools – he is not 
reducing words to a merely instrumental function.  
We can now begin to understand what Cavell will mean by calling attention to the 
variety of practical activities in which language use is interwoven. Before unpacking this 
idea further, however, there is another, much more seductive and perhaps common 
reading of Wittgenstein’s claim that “the meaning is the use” that should be addressed 
before turning to Cavell’s reading of it.  
 
What Is the ‘Is’ in “Meaning is Use?” 
On one particularly seductive interpretation of “the meaning is the use,” the 
meaning of a word or phrase is just its meaning on any given use – and not necessarily a 
reductively instrumental use – of that word or phrase by a speaker of the language. This 
would, once again, seem to both give us (1) the specificity or contextual nature of 
Cavell’s reading, and (2) the presence of a human being in contributing to the meaning 
of an expression on that occasion of use.   
Yet there is a significant problem with this reading as well. On one interpretation 
of it, for any empirical occasion of use in which a speaker has “used” or employed a word 
or phrase the meaning of the word or phrase is identical with that use. That is, any time 
any speaker of English employs a word – “apple,” “slab,” “blue,” “pain” – the meaning of 
that word is identical to that use. But this is deeply ambiguous, particularly concerning 
what notion of identity is at work here; i.e., what it means to say that the meaning of a 
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word is identical to its use.41 In order to get the identity relation between “meaning” and 
“use” that this simplistic reading relies on, we need to be able to say that, whatever the 
use is here, “it” is identical to the meaning. We need, in other words, to adapt the 
external position of someone watching or observing the use of language and assume that 
we already know what the meaning is. Consequently, if we do not have the “entire” 
meaning in view here, then we are left with an empty identity relation between meaning 
and use without being able to specify what either – the meaning or the use – actually 
amounts to. It is like saying that whatever I eat for breakfast tomorrow will be what I 
will eat for breakfast tomorrow. True as this may be in some sense, it doesn’t tell us 
anything. 
One way to better understand the difficulty here is by noting that the external, 
empirical position of any use of a word – in which we identify the “meaning” of a word 
with any given empirical “use” of a word – seems initially plausible. There must, after 
all, be something that the “meaning” is identical with, and “use” sounds reasonable 
enough. As soon as we step “inside” of language use and try to specify what the “use” 
actually amounts to, however, it is no longer obvious what the meaning must be 
identical with. Let us take any specific, concrete occasion of employing an any ordinary 
word and ask ourselves where, exactly, the boundaries of the concept lie. Do we have, for 
example, the entire meaning of the “words” ‘I,’ ‘slab’ ‘pain,’, etc., present to mind when 
we use them? In other words, do we already know in advance exactly where the 
                                                        
41 That Wittgenstein is not using a special or technical sense of “use,” but is instead trying to get us to 
change our patterns of attention to something already there but difficult to get into view,  is clear from the 
variety of synonymous words he uses throughout the Investigations which are translated by the English 
word “use.” The German nouns Benutzung, Gebrauch, and Anwendung are all sometimes translated as 
“use,” sometimes as “employment,” and sometimes in other ways. I think what this shows is that there is 
nothing special about the word “use” – that the perspective on language which Wittgenstein is trying to 
have us adapt is not tied to any particular word.   
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contours of our concepts are, such that if x or y feature of that concept were to turn out 
to be false, we would have to concede that we don’t actually have a grasp of that 
concept? If not – and here the (metaphysical) anxiety quickly creeps in – then what is 
there for “use” to be identical with?42  
A famous Wittensteininian example – perhaps a bit misleading if taken out of 
context43, but relevant for this particular point – is the meaning of the word “Moses.”  
Let’s say that, by using the word ‘Moses’ we mean to “refer” to the leader of the 
Israelites. So far there doesn’t seem to be any problem. But, Wittgenstein writes, as if 
giving voice to the philosophical perplexity:  
If I make a statement about Moses, am I always ready to substitute some 
one…description… for “Moses?” I shall perhaps say: By “Moses” I mean the man 
who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or any rate much of it. But how much? 
Have I decided how much must turn out to be false for me to give up my 
proposition as false? So is my use of the term “Moses” fixed and determined for 
all possible cases?44 
 
Wittgenstein is bringing out a peculiar kind of anxiety that, to know what I mean when I 
“use” the word ‘Moses,’ I must have a fixed and precisely determined concept, with clear 
boundaries, the exact content of which I have made apparent to myself. Am I prepared 
to recognize, for example, just what portion of the set of my knowledge of Moses’s life 
must remain in place in order to say – if something changes in the future – that I still 
understand who or what ‘Moses’ means? When I use the word ‘Moses,’ do I have the 
entire list of associated and relevant facts before my mind and, not only that, but those 
                                                        
42 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §79. A further thought: if we do not have the whole 
meaning of a word present to mind while we use the word, then “should it be said,” as Wittgenstein writes 
at a similar juncture of mind, “that I’m using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am talking 
nonsense?”  
43 More specifically, the context of this section in Wittgenstein is a critique of Bertrand Russell’s theory of 
definite descriptions  
44 Ibid., §78. 
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which I would be prepared to forgo while still claiming that I understand who or what 
‘Moses’ means?  
 It seems uncontroversial to assert that we don’t have these kinds of “meanings” in 
mind when we use words. If so, however, then we seem to find ourselves in a bind: if in 
using words I do not have a hold on a fixed and determinate concept, then it seems that 
the skeptic, in denying that I know the meanings of my words, has won; but if I affirm 
that the term I use is fixed and determinate in this way, then I seem to be affirming 
something which I don’t (in any obvious sense at least) possess, while nonetheless 
having to affirm it given the alternative. Consequently, I find myself trapped in a 
dialectical space of metaphysical questioning about whether I do in fact “know” the 
meanings of the words I use, where skepticism and metaphysics appear as the only 
horns of the dilemma.  
Cavell seeks to show us that we have a way out which endorses neither 
metaphysics nor skepticism. Cavell’s destructive project, in short, is to show us that 
what the skeptic (in us) denies that we “know” here is not even a possibility and, 
therefore, too, that what the skeptic might affirm is not even a possibility. If this 
interpretation is correct, then Cavell’s constructive project is to show that the very 
appearance of this dialectical space of skepticism – where affirmation leads to 
metaphysics, denial to skepticism – is a mark or sign that the skeptic has encountered a 
constraint on our use of concepts that she has interpreted as a barrier or limitation. (It is 
far from clear, nonetheless, what precisely this [misinterpreted] constraint, in this case 
as in any case, amounts to.)  
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In short, Cavell’s objective is to find a way of conceding that the meaningful and 
successful use of words does not require a certain philosophical notion of fixed and 
precisely determined concepts, to show that this philosophical requirement is not a 
requirement at all. But he needs to find a way of doing this without thereby denying that 
we ever know or understand the “meaning” of a word. The Cavellian problem is how to 
characterize the kind of “meaning” appropriate to a finite linguistic creature whose 
inherited language is constantly undergoing change but who is nevertheless able to 
operate with words successfully – to characterize this finite capacity for meaning 
without implying, as Stephen Mulhall puts it, that “there is something we cannot do.”45  
We will table the question about the kind of “meaning” appropriate to finite 
linguistic creatures until the final section of this chapter, which examines Cavell’s 
concept of “projecting words into new contexts.” For now, the point is that “use” – as in 
“meaning is use” – is for Cavell as well as “the New Wittgenstein” not so much a 
function of instrumentality (as in a broken hammer, unable to accomplish the task we 
need it to) but rather prompts a deeper question about the source and nature of the 
meaning of our concepts. In the next two sections, I will describe one possible way of 
grounding the concept of meaning in ‘ordinary,’ finite use by expanding on the Cavellian 
idea that the role of human care or commitment in the achievement of semantic 
meaning is a seeming constraint on the meaningfulness of our assertions that the 
skeptic has run against and sought to evade or transcend.   
 
 
 
                                                        
45 Stephen Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in 
Philosophical Investigations §243-315 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12.  
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Conant’s Cavell on Meaning and Use 
 
In two related papers on Cavell and Wittgenstein,46 Jim Conant is concerned with 
showing, on my reading, that the use of a word by a master of that language possesses a 
certain kind of practical unity that philosophical analysis – or breaking into parts – 
threatens to distort. It is worth restating the relevant part of Cavell’s claim: 
‘The meaning is the use’ calls attention to the fact that what an expression means 
is a function of what it is used to mean or say on specific occasions by human 
being.47 
 
As Conant writes, many interpreters of Cavell have read him48 as suggesting that there is 
a difference between meaning and use while stressing the role of “use.” On this (for 
Conant, mistaken) view, Cavell is saying that an expression already has a meaning 
before we specify the concrete occasion of its use, but that we don’t fully know what an 
expression means until we specify the use. One way this can be worked out is by 
distinguishing between sentence’s meaning (the meaning of the combined string of 
words which make up an expression) and speaker’s meaning, a distinction very close to 
what we find in Grice.49 Conant expresses this (mistaken) view of Wittgenstein’s view as 
follows:  
… whereas Grice might have supposed that what the words of a sentence mean 
very nearly specifies what would be said on any speaking of them, Wittgenstein 
teaches us that – although the words do specify what is ‘meant’ in one sense of 
‘meaning’ – there are two ‘distinct notions of meaning’, and thus what it ‘meant’ 
                                                        
46 I am drawing here on two particular essays written by Conant: James F. Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005), 51–65; and James F. Conant, 
“Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” Philosophical Investigations 21, no. 3, (1998), 222–50.  
47 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 207. 
48 I have written “Cavell” after this point rather than “Cavell’s Wittgenstein” (which is at one level more 
accurate) for the sake of simplicity and readability. If it becomes necessary to distinguish the two later on 
in the chapter, I will return to “Cavell’s Wittgenstein” when discussing a reading or interpretation of 
Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein. 
49 I mean the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning. See Paul Grice, Studies in the 
Way With Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).  
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still remains to be settled…for [meaning] turns on something further: on the 
point of saying it, on one’s reasons for so speaking.50  
 
This understanding of “meaning is use,” although it does help us see something 
important, is problematic because it splits meaning into two ‘levels’ of which meaning 
becomes the sum. This generates a kind of theoretical ‘gap’ between the sum of those 
two parts or levels and the whole. These levels are: (1) the meaning of the sentence itself; 
and (2) the intelligibility of the speaker’s use of that sentence on any one occasion. Put 
otherwise, we might understand full well what a sentence means (insofar as the words 
have meaning), yet something additional is missing if we haven’t also identified the 
occasion in which these words have been uttered, if we haven’t also understood the 
words as uttered by a particular person. Consequently, as Conant writes, 
“meaningfulness has to do with sentences [the meaning of the sentence ‘itself’] and 
intelligibility has to do with context-embedded speech acts [the role of the speaker].”51 
We thus have a gap between the meaningfulness of the string of words and the 
intelligibility of the particular speech act insofar as meaning becomes the composite of 
both. 
To show that (1) is an idea we seem forced to affirm only after a theoretical 
distortion of the practical use of concepts in ordinary circulation, we might take an 
ordinary expression like “there is a lot of coffee on the table,” as Conant says, drawing 
from Hilary Putnam, and supply “concrete occasions of use” for it.52 What difference 
                                                        
50 Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” 227. 
51 Ibid., 228; the emphasis is added.  
52 Conant understands this technique to follow from Wittgenstein’s claim that “how a sentence is meant 
can be expressed by an expansion of it” (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §349). Though this example appears 
at the end of his papers, I find that it serves as a persuasive test-claim. See Conant, “Wittgenstein on 
Meaning and Use,” 243. The text he draws from here is Hilary Putnam’s “Skepticism and Transcendental 
Argument,” an apparently unpublished manuscript.  
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does imagining a particular time, place, or even person mean for the semantic content of 
the expression?53 Well, imagine that we’re in the kitchen together and you’ve just spilled 
coffee and haven’t realized it; I point to the mess and say: “there is a lot of coffee on the 
table.” Here, I might be using this string of words to suggest that you should clean up 
your mess. Perhaps in another context you typically pour coffee for me, your surly boss, 
and it has just arrived; in a dry and pointed tone I inform you that “there is a lot of 
coffee on the table.” Here, I’m using this string of words to order you around. Finally, 
imagine that we’re at home, it’s early morning, and I know you like coffee when you 
wake up; I smile and say, “there is a lot of coffee on the table.” In this case I’m using this 
same string of words to inform you that there is coffee available for you. The point is, as 
Conant writes, that: 
This sentence may, on one occasion of speaking or another, say any number of 
indefinitely many distinct things – it may express indefinitely many distinct 
thoughts…If you wished to expand on what you meant in having said, “There is a 
lot of coffee on the table,” depending on what you meant, a different would be 
required.54 
 
Each of the “distinct thoughts” which the string of words “there is coffee on the table” 
can mean,55 as we have seen, is made up of the same words: “There,” “is,” “coffee,” “on,” 
                                                        
53 Although in Conant’s papers the example actually comes at the end, to illustrate the point he is making 
that “the meaning of the words” and the “intelligibility of the speaker’s meaning” can’t come apart in the 
way interpreters of Cavell have wanted them to, I have found that this example serves not only as an 
example, but also as a kind of test of the claim. For according to the view or theory we have just sketched, 
“the sentence itself” does not have a determinate content, does not express a determinant thought, before 
a concrete occasion of use has been sketched for it.   
54 Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” 60.  
55 The nature of this modal force is obviously a tricky question. But it will be important, later, in the 
section on “projection,” that on this view the full scope of this modal force cannot be fully specified in 
advance. That is, on this view there is in principle an indefinite number of thoughts that an ordinary 
sentence like “there is a lot of coffee on the table” can mean.  
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and so forth.56 Accordingly, the “thought” or meaning which is expressed must be 
coming from somewhere other than the words themselves.  
This is just to reiterate the point we’ve already made: that the sense or meaning 
of an expression cannot be grasped by analyzing the constituent parts of that expression. 
But does this example show or prove that the ‘sentence itself’ does not mean anything 
before a concrete occasion of use has been sketched for it? Whatever “there is coffee on 
the table” means before its use by a particular human being in a particular time and 
place is not determinate but, at best, hovers between various meanings. Further, it does 
not become reduced to one of the various things we might take it to mean after 
identifying an occasion of its employment, but neither does it determinatively signify 
any of the other of meanings. It is in this sense “indeterminate.” To make it determinate 
would be to sketch an occasion of use for it, to provide an “expansion” of the sentence in 
the way Conant does above.57  
 As is well-known among Wittgensteinians, Conant and other “resolute” readers of 
Wittgenstein hold an “austere” view of nonsense in which, put briefly, the absence of 
determinant meaning for an expression ultimately amounts to plain gibberish. As such, 
a sentence whose meaning is “indeterminate,” like the context-less and disembodied 
utterance described above, is no more meaningful than more straightforward instances 
                                                        
56 As Conant writes: “In the sense in which it makes sense to speak of “the meanings of words” (that is, 
what the dictionary says their meaning us), the same “meaning of the word” is being drawn on for each of 
these words (“there,” “coffee,” “a lot,” “is,” “on,” “the,” “table”) in each of these distinct uses of the 
sentence” (Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” 61).  
57 It might be tempting to think that Conant and Cavell have just shown that ordinary language 
expressions are ambiguous. But in each of the concrete occasion of use, the expression isn’t vague or 
ambiguous: on each concrete occasion of speech we have sketched, a determinate set of thoughts has been 
expressed, assuming we are the kind of creatures who can register orders, demands, and loving gestures. 
A capacity for multiplicity of meaning is ambiguous only if it’s not clear which of these things an 
expression has meant.  
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of nonsense, sentences like “Caesar is a prime number” or “John is a jabberwocky.”58 In 
other words, Conant – who I take to be drawing on Cora Diamond as well as  Cavell here 
– thinks that, for Cavell, there is no such thing as a positive view of nonsense, meaning, 
a thought which we can think, even if indeterminately, which amounts to nonsense. 
Nonsense is just nonsense : the absence of a determinate meaning of an expression; at 
one point, Diamond calls this view a “negative” view of nonsense.59 A sentence which 
fails to achieve the requisite specificity and concreteness for meaning something 
determinate, therefore, doesn’t retain a kind of sense from its individual parts (retained 
from analytic or dictionary definitions, let’s say) but fails to have any “parts” (of 
meaning) at all; it is idle, like gears turning nothing.  
Here, the component words of a sentence would not yet count as “parts” in the 
relevant sense. For Conant and Conant’s Cavell, what is meant by any determinate 
expression cannot be “given by, or derived from, the meanings of the words…used.”60 
Only an understanding of the “whole” meaning which the sentence has, on a particular 
occasion of use, can lead to an understanding of the role which the particular words 
have played in achieving that sense, thereby providing a context which turns patterns of 
words into “parts” of the expression. The difference between words and “parts” of an 
expression can be illustrated in part by the simple observation, given above, that on each 
determinate meaning of “there is coffee on the table,” the words stay the same, and yet 
                                                        
58 See especially Cora Diamond, “What Nonsense Might Be,” Philosophy 56, no. 215 (1981), 5–22. On page 
15, Diamond uses the terms “positive” and “negative” to describe the contrast between two ways of 
thinking about nonsense, and I have drawn on that way of characterizing it here.  
59 Conant writes: “Nonsense, according to the view that Cavell attributes to Wittgenstein, arises when 
there is an absence of sense. The view that Williams and McGinn attribute to Cavell takes philosophical 
nonsense to be due to an appropriate kind of presence of sense…” (Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein,” 62). 
60 The wording comes from Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 208. 
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the meaning of the expression changes. For Cavell and Conant, meaning is grasped (by 
us and by creatures like us) from an expression only when it’s used to say or mean 
something: until then, there are no parts in the relevant sense to analyze, for there are 
no working parts (of meaning) at all.  
On this view of what makes linguistic-conceptual life possible, our separating an 
expression with determinate meaning into its component parts is liable to undermine 
the meaning as a whole, like unraveling a handmade sweater and ending up with mere 
thread.61 A mistake we make in thinking about meaning is asking what contribution 
words make to the meaning of a sentence and aggregating those words to construct the 
thought expressed by the sentence. Instead, we should first ask what the whole meaning 
or thought62 behind an expression is, for it is the determinate thought(s) that is 
expressed which breathes life into the words which compose it; the “words themselves” 
are not yet “part” of anything. Only after an expression has acquired a determinate 
thought can we ask what contribution to that thought the words make. “What we want 
to discover is thus not to be seen at all,” Conant summarizes, “if we look at the mere 
isolated word rather than…the proposition in action.”63   
A way of reading what Conant has begun to argue here is that, for Cavell, the 
successful use of a word by a speaker of a language conveys a certain kind of practical 
unity that philosophical breaking into parts threatens to distort, leaving us with pieces 
                                                        
61 As Conant puts it: “The ‘parts’ of a thought are only the sorts of parts that they are by virtue of the 
combination they make to the sense of the whole” (Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” 232). 
62 For Conant and Cavell’s purpose, which are not all purposes, I don’t think it makes much of a difference 
which one of these terms we use. The point is to look at the whole meaning(s), or the thought(s), which an 
expression puts forth. The emphasis as I take it is with the difference between signs and meanings, or 
signs and “symbols” in early Wittgenstein’s terminology, and so any word which gets this difference across 
will be acceptable for those purposes.  
63 Conant, “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” 233.  
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out of which we cannot (re)construct the whole. Differentiating between (1) the meaning 
of a sentence itself and (2) the intelligibility of a speaker’s use of that sentence is both 
misguided and distorts Cavell and Wittgenstein’s claim that “meaning is use.” And while 
there are many questions one might raise here about the “resolute” reading – both as in 
interpretation of early and late Wittgenstein as well as  the role Cavell’s texts play in that 
reading – the point, for our purposes, is the following: Each expansion of an expression 
into a concrete occasion of use offers (us, creatures like us) a clear sense of what the 
expression means; but the “expression itself,” without any such occasion of use, says 
nothing determinate but rather hovers between various meanings until there emerges a 
context for its deployment. Whether or not we want to take the further step and call 
such indeterminate meanings “plain nonsense” is not something we need to take a 
stance on here.  
Before moving onto the next section, it is worth addressing a possible objection. 
It might be said that there is something unique about Conant’s (or Putnam’s) example 
("there is a lot of coffee on the table") which distinguishes it from other possible 
expressions, such as those which we believe can only entertain a single meaning. If 
Conant’s thought holds, however, we should be able to find multiple determinate 
meanings for even these expressions; if we believe the expression has just one meaning, 
that is because we have one context and one context only in mind (thus illustrating what 
Cavell would call conformity, which is both conformity of thought and of language use).  
Let’s take as an example the banal phrase “cash or credit.” The immediate 
connotation suggests a monetary exchange of services: “will you be paying by cash or 
credit card?” However, let’s imagine two friends preparing for a weekend trip, and, busy 
packing side-by-side, one says to the other, “cash or credit?” Here, the thought which is 
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expressed might be: “what kind of currency should we take?” Or perhaps there is an 
expressly non-monetary exchange of services, like a son or daughter caring for a sick, 
aging parent. In jest, the father asks the son, after being served a meal, “cash or credit?” 
Here the expressed thought may be a declaration of gratitude and a purposeful, joking 
contrast between care for family and the monetary exchange of goods. Finally, as Cora 
Diamond points out, the determinate things we can say or mean with a string of words 
also increases drastically if we allow “cash or credit” to form part of a sentence rather 
than the whole: “I thought it might be a good idea to bring either cash or credit, but it 
turns out they didn’t ask for any money!” As such, Wittgenstein’s suggestion that “how a 
sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it”64 holds up even under some of 
what I think would be the most unfavorable conditions: an expression whose meaning 
seems to be entirely fixed, independent of use.   
In sum, we have aimed to differentiate, in Conant’s reading of Cavell, between (1) 
asking after the meaning of particular words or sentences “in isolation from their 
concrete uses,” and (2) asking after the meaning of an expression when a human being 
has meant or said something by that expression. The next section furthers the inquiry of 
this chapter by asking, more specifically, what difference does this distinction make? By 
way of response, I suggest that, for Cavell and Conant, the difference hinges on the 
presence or absence of the language-user’s reasons for using language; or, in other 
words her finite, value-laden cares or commitments.65 
 
 
                                                        
64 Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein,” 61. Quoting Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §349. 
65 See Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging.”  
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Conant and Cavell on Language Idling and “Metaphysical” Uses of Language 
 
 Let’s return, once more, to Cavell’s famous passage from The Claim of Reason. In 
its full iteration, Cavell not only connects Wittgenstein’s claim that “meaning is use” to 
the specific occasion of use of an expression by a language-user, but also to what he calls 
the point of an expression:   
The meaning is the use” calls attention to the fact that what an expression means 
is a function of what it is used to mean or say on specific occasions by human 
being. That such an obvious fact should assume the importance it does is itself 
surprising. And to trace the intellectual history of philosophy’s concentration on 
the meaning of particular words and sentences, in isolation from a systematic 
attention to their concrete uses would be a worthwhile undertaking. It is a 
concentration one of whose consequences is the traditional search for the 
meaning of a word in various realms of objects…A fitting title for this history 
would be: Philosophy and the Rejection of the Human. 
 
Wittgenstein’s motive…is to put the human animal back into language and 
therewith back into philosophy…He undertook, as I read him, to trace the 
mechanisms of this rejection in the ways in which, in investigating ourselves, we 
are led to speak ‘outside language games,’ consider expressions apart from, and 
in opposition to, the natural forms of life which give those expressions the force 
they have…What is left out of an expression if it is used ‘outside its ordinary 
language game’ is not necessarily what the words mean (they may mean what 
they always did, what a good dictionary says they mean), but what we mean in 
using them when and where we do. The point of saying them is lost. 
 
…What we lose is a full realization of what we are saying; we no longer know what 
we mean.66   
 
What does it mean to have a point for an expression? In many ways Cavell has already 
answered the question: “What is left out of an expression if it is used ‘outside its ordinary 
language game’ is not necessarily what the words mean…but what we mean in using them 
when and where we do.”67 The way Conant interprets the difference – between (1) what 
the words mean, and (2) what we mean by them – is in part by showing that the meaning 
                                                        
66 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 206-207.  
67 Ibid., 207 
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of (1) is indeterminate while the meaning of (2) is determinate. How he does so is another 
question.  
If we link this passage with section one of this chapter, we can say that the 
difference which Conant elaborates on (between (1) The meaning of the string of 
individual words which compose the sentence and (2) the meaning supplied on a concrete 
occasion of speaking) are not just expansions of the meaning of an expression. The 
determinate meanings supplied by expansions of expressions also reveal the kind of 
constraints that Cavell’s Wittgenstein takes (human) understanding to be subject to – 
namely, that in each case there is a point to the determinate expression, a voicing of care 
and commitment. If we go back to the expansions of the sentence “there is coffee on the 
table” we might now notice that, in each expansion, there is a particular, human, point for 
saying each of the things we said: a demand that you pour me coffee, a loving cue that 
there’s coffee ready, a helpful or neutral letting-you-know you’ve spilled coffee, and so 
forth. Each of these “points” gives voice to a particular language user’s interpersonal cares 
and commitments – to command someone else to do something, to offer a loving gesture, 
to direct the listener’s attention to something, etc. – at a particular time and place. By 
“expanding” an expression and offering a determinate meaning, then, we have also shown 
that an expression without a particular human point hovers indeterminately between 
meanings while an expression with a particular human point achieves determinate 
meaning. 
I am trying to bring out the sense in which what Cavell calls the “point” for an 
expression is not a limitation but a limit, not a barrier but a constraint. On Cavell’s 
reading, Wittgenstein ultimately wants to ask what “understanding” or “meaning” is in 
the absence of human reasons for bringing a string of words to life. Each of the indefinite 
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number of determinate meanings which a sentence can take up – each point it can achieve 
in an indefinite number of contexts spoken by a particular language-user – is a limitation 
but also a condition, and insofar as we can’t transcend those conditions (or in many cases, 
change them) they must be accepted. Accordingly, analyzing semantic expressions 
outside of concrete occasions of their use now seems to amount to a rejection of those 
ordinary forms of human life in which an expression gains significance – the ways in 
which do find things interesting or abhorrent or amusing, care one another, and so forth, 
in and through our relation to and use of words. If we accept this, then the very thing that 
we are inclined to think of as an impediment to meaning – our value-laden cares and 
commitments, our investments to one thing rather than another, as manifested in the 
“point” of an expression – is in fact necessary for it. 
In the same paper on Wittgenstein we have just been analyzing, Conant, reading 
Cavell, links the effort to understand the meaning of an expression absent any concrete 
occasion of use with Wittgenstein’s notion of “language idling”:  
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes what is happening when 
we “speak outside language games” as cases of language ‘idling’ or ‘being on 
holiday’ because he takes the words we call upon in such cases to fail to engage – 
and thus fail to be at work in – any actual circumstances of use.68  
 
Language idles, Conant writes, when it fails to be at work in “any actual circumstance of 
use”: without specific contexts like those provided for the sentence “there is a lot of coffee 
on the table,” language hovers idly, means nothing determinate.. As we’ve seen, there is 
nothing determinate that the expression “there is coffee on the table” could mean on its 
own, in isolation from any concrete occasion of its utterance. There is no content (no 
                                                        
68 Conant, “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” 248. 
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“what” as in “what did you say?”) before the whole sense of the expression has been 
provided.  
The metaphor of language-idling returns us to the distinction formulated at the 
start of this chapter: to the absence of any sense at all, rather than to the failure of 
instrumental use. One way of reading Cavell’s view of the “metaphysical” is that it is a 
product of examining these non-functional uses of language, or of examining language 
when it is in this non-functional state. Sketching a concrete occasion of use for an 
expression is more than just expanding on what is meant: it is also a reminder, a rough 
method, for transfiguring a sentence from metaphysical allure to ordinary use.  
If Cavell is right, then Wittgenstein is not equating “language-idling” and 
“metaphysical” uses of language, but rather is suggesting that the enticement of 
metaphysics is to a significant degree the product of looking at sentences external to the 
meaningful, concrete, occasions of their use. This may be why Wittgenstein thinks a way 
of eliding the urge to the “metaphysical” is a return to ordinary language. This is not to 
say that all instances of language idling or speaking outside language games are 
metaphysical or vice versa, but it does suggest that expanding a sentence into a concrete 
use is one method of returning words “from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” 
 Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the Cavellian problem concerns 
characterizing the kind of ‘meaning’ appropriate to finite linguistic creatures who have 
inherited a language which is constantly undergoing change but who are nevertheless able 
to operate with words successfully.  With some idea now in place about what an 
inappropriate conception of meaning might be, I want to say a few things now about what 
an appropriate conception would be, on Cavell’s view, of concept-use and determinant 
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meaning for a finite creature who has inherited language. As we will see, the use or 
“projection” of a word into a new context is both constrained and open-ended; the 
constraint and the open-endedness are interlinked aspects of the same finite capacity. 
 
Projection and Intersubjectivity 
 In a well-known passage from The Claim of Reason, Cavell writes: 
…any form of life and every concept integral to it has an indefinite number of 
instances and directions of projection; and…this variation is not arbitrary. Both the 
“outer” variance and the “inner” constancy are necessary if a concept is to 
accomplish its tasks – of meaning, understanding, communication, etc., and in 
general, guiding us through the world, and relating thought and action and feeling 
to the world…. 
 
… to say that a word or concept has a (stable) meaning is to say that new and the 
most various instances can be recognized as falling under or failing to fall under 
that concept; to say that a concept must be tolerant is to say that were we to assign 
a new word to “every” new instances, no word would have the kind of meaning or 
power a word [has]. Or: there would be no instances, and hence no concepts 
either.69  
 
If we can understand what Cavell is trying to say here about the fact that and the way in 
which concept-use is both constrained and open-ended, we will have some idea of the 
kind of ‘meaning’ appropriate to language-users who have inherited language, but who 
nevertheless have room to negotiate the boundaries of the linguistic concepts which 
preexist the life of any individual person.   
 Stephen Mulhall has analyzed this passage both in his book-length study on Cavell 
(a book which still sets the terms of much Cavell scholarship) as well as a chapter in a 
                                                        
69 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 185–86. 
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more recent edited volume.70 Without doing justice, by any means, to Mulhall’s treatment 
of it, I do want to begin from Mulhall’s thought that for Cavell it is a mistake to think about 
the twin aspects of concept use described in the passage – ‘outer’ variance and ‘inner’ 
constancy – as separate or even separable “fundamental facts” which are in tension with 
one another, 71 Mulhall posits instead that both the internal constancy and the outward 
variance of a concept are, for Cavell, “two aspects of a single or singular fact”72 – that 
understanding Cavell’s view “is a matter of showing that and how the kind of normativity 
[concepts] exemplify enables or rather constitutes…freedom of judgement.”73 
 To better understand this radical idea, let’s take Cavell’s well-known example of 
the concept of “feed.” Cavell wants to show that both (a) the use of feed in just any context, 
and (b) the use of feed in just one kind of context would strangle the differences – and the 
similarities – between “feeding a kitty,” “feeding a lion,” “feeding your pride,” and so 
forth, ultimately leading to a total disintegration of the concept: 
We learn the use of ‘feed the kitty’, ‘feed the lion’, ‘feed the swans’, and one day 
one of us says ‘feed the meter’, or ‘feed in the film’, or ‘feed the machine’, or ‘feed 
his pride’, or ‘feed wire’, and we understand, we are not troubled. Of course we 
could, in most of these cases, use a different word, not attempt to project or 
transfer "feed" from contexts like "feed the monkey" into contexts like "feed the 
machine". But what should be gained if we did? And what would be lost?74  
 
                                                        
70 I have in mind both Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Stephen Mulhall, “Inner Constancy, Outer Variation: Stanley 
Cavell on Grammar, Criteria, and Rules” in Varieties of Skepticism: Chapters After Kant, Wittgenstein, 
and Cavell, eds. James Conant and Andrea Kern, 291–311 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014).  
71 Mulhall, “Inner Constancy, Outer Variation,” 304. 
72 Ibid., 304 
73 Ibid., 310. Or as Jose Medina puts the same point, with a slightly different emphasis, in a paper on 
Wittgenstein: “normative authority is always subject to contestation,” since it is part of the very nature of 
regularizable conceptual activity to be open to new instances of that activity. See Jose Medina, 
“Wittgenstein as a Rebel: Dissidence and Contestation in Discursive Practices,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 18, no. 1 (2010), 1–29. “Normative practices,” Medina writes, “are always in 
principle open to the contestation and renegotiation of standards” (ibid., 2). 
74 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 81.  
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The question is what constrains – while simultaneously leaving open – the employment 
or use of the word. One response might be that, in learning the use of a word like “feed,” 
what we learn is a rule or definition, and we then apply this rule to each potential 
instance of its expression: if the possible instance (of x) fits the rule or concept (of x), 
then we can say it is an instance of the concept.75 
 However, to understand Cavell we must understand that this approach does not 
in fact do any explaining; the concept of a “rule” can at best be an afterthought, a 
description of a “natural capacity” that proceeds in precisely this way.76 In other words, 
the “rule” does not answer the question of what “it” is which allows us to see and attach 
similarities between “feeding the kitty” and “feeding his pride.” The explanatory appeal 
to a rule here does nothing more than describe the phenomena, insofar as the rule 
merely restates the fact that these (different) instances are counted under the same 
concept.  Indeed, the turn toward rules to explain the projection of words into new 
contexts bears similarities to the appeal, described earlier, to look to any given empirical 
use of a word to explain what its “meaning” is (following Wittgenstein’s claim that “the 
meaning is the use”). In both cases, there is an identity relation between two entities (in 
the one case “meaning” and “use” and in the second case a rule and its application) 
whose content has not yet been established. At best, both explanations are unsatisfying; 
at worst, I suggest, they cover over something.  
 If this is right, then what is being covered over? The question puts us in a region 
of Cavell’s philosophy which seems both deceptively simple and terrifyingly difficult; 
                                                        
75 The language of “instance of the concept” or “instance of a concept” is Cavell’s, for example, in The 
Claim of Reason, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language.” 
76 Cf. Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 37. 
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namely, that what allows us to go on with both constancy and variance in using concepts 
is not grasping rules but sharing – or the potential for sharing – intersubjective 
practices and forms of life into which we are initiated. To illustrate this point, Cavell 
describes a child learning language and suggests, famously, that there is no guarantee 
that she will be initiated into language successfully. There is no guarantee, in other 
words, that in learning language will find the same things worth doing and noticing and 
eating and smelling and talking about and listening to and sharing with others: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and 
expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures 
that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals 
nor the grasping of books of rules) just as nothing insures that we will make, and 
understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our 
sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of 
significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what 
else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when 
an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism that Wittgenstein 
calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon 
nothing more, but nothing less, than this.77  
 
Perhaps the most striking philosophical claim here is that, for Cavell, ordinary 
meaningful concept use depends neither on a relation to reality nor on the grasping of a 
concept or universal, but rather on something like the acceptance of and participation in 
shared activities or practices (finding the same things worth doing and taking about, 
sharing “routes of interest and feeling”).78 Commenting on this passage, and specifically 
on Cavell’s claim that neither “the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of 
rules” will help us understand what allows to go on or project a concept into new 
contexts, John McDowell describes a sense of “vertigo” we may feel: 
                                                        
77 Stanley Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” in Must We Mean What We Say?, 
44–72 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 52.  
78 Ibid., 52. 
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… there is nothing that keeps our practices in line except the reactions and 
responses we learn in learning them. The ground seems to have been removed 
from under our feet…What Cavell offers looks, rather, like a congruence of 
subjectivities, not grounded as it would need to be to amount to the sort of 
objectivity we want if we are to be convinced that we are really going on in the 
same way.79  
 
These shared practices form a ground, but they do not form a ground in the same way 
that a staunch realist would purport to ground our propositions, say, in a relation of 
correspondence with reality. The Cavellian ground of meaning is an ungrounded 
ground, a “thin net over an abyss.”80 If what keeps our linguistic and conceptual 
practices in line is neither the grasping of a rule under which we “fit” individuals or 
particular instances nor “an agreement with reality,” but rather a congruence of 
individual subjectivities, then, as McDowell notes, this will amount to a transformation, 
but not abandonment, of the concept of “objectivity.” Cavellian/Wittgensteinian 
intersubjective practices are “objective” in the sense that they are binding on meaningful 
language use – they are constraints on the kinds of things we might use a string of words 
to say, for example – but they are not objective in the scientific realist’s sense; they are 
objective in a way which incorporates and does not discount particular subjectivities.  
 Nonetheless, we are liable here, too, to fall into a misunderstanding: To say that 
objectivity is grounded in intersubjective shared practices may imply that we decide 
what is true or false, as if meaning were a function of mere conventionality. That such a 
conception of “conventionality” does not do the work we need it to is clear, since I do not 
“decide” that leaving a bunch of carrots in my brother’s room does not count as feeding 
him just as I do not “decide” that flattering him does count as “feeding his pride,” even if 
                                                        
79 McDowell, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following,” 44.  
80 See Lee Braver, Groundless Grounds (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).  
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the first involves food and the second involves words. “Since we cannot assume that the 
words we are given have their meaning by nature, we are led to assume they take it from 
convention; and yet no current idea of ‘convention’ could seem to do the work that 
words do…We cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be necessary,” Cavell 
writes.81 “This means,” as Sandra Laugier puts it, “that we are not agents of the 
agreement, that language precedes this agreement as much as it is produced by it.”82 
Rather, in learning a language, we both make use of and develop a capacity to be 
attuned to these social agreements.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 As I have explored in this chapter, there are two senses or extensions of the 
driving claim – that our subjective, value-laden cares and commitments are a condition 
for objectivity – under discussion here. The first is that, in order for a disembodied and 
context-less string of words to become a determinant meaningful expression, there has 
to be a point to the expression, a reason why we take up those words and use them as we 
do: to point something out to another, to instruct, chastise, praise, pick on, and so forth. 
The second, and perhaps more conceptually difficult but no less significant, is that the 
successful employment or use of words for finite creatures like us in fact rests on the 
‘subjective’ qualities of our nature: our “routes of interest and feeling,” our sense of 
“what is outrageous…what a rebuke, what forgiveness” is.83 By recognizing both, we 
arrive at the possibility – by no means the guarantee – of forming intersubjective 
communities, whose shared practices and shared senses of what is worth maintaining 
                                                        
81 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 31. 
82 Sandra Laugier, “The Ethics of Care as Politics of the Ordinary,” New Literary History 46, no. 2 (2015), 
230.  
83 Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” 52. 
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are the only promise that we have for the continued use and significance of a concept in 
the future. Cavell’s world is a world of radical contingency, and “[h]uman speech and 
activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this.”84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
84 Ibid., 52. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Towards Leading the Correspondence Theory of Meaning Back to Earth: Cavell at 
Criticism 
 
In this chapter I apply what I take to be a program of Cavellian criticism to the 
view, as expressed by Augustine in the opening to the Investigations, that the meaning 
of a word is the object in the world for which that word stands. By a “Cavellian program 
of criticism” I mean Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum that “what we do 
is lead words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”85 Applied to the idea 
that the meaning of a word is the object which corresponds to it, Cavell’s criticism shows 
us, not that such an idea is false, impractical, or even “overly general,” but that it is a 
confusion. As a confusion, as a kind of “fantasy” of the way concepts work, it cannot be 
fully described or defined, as there is no “it” to fully define. When in the grip of such a 
picture of language, we must be led, guided, out from it, as if out of Plato’s Cave.  
It is tempting, in my case at least, when thinking of the correspondence relation, 
to think that: 
(1) either a use of language is governed by the correspondence relation, or it is 
not.  
This seems to be a straightforward application of the law of excluded middle. How could 
things, logically, be otherwise? But I will ultimately defend the claim that (1) is, in fact, 
false. If we fully think through what it means to inherit language as a set of social 
                                                        
85 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §116. This sentence, especially in Cavell’s later work, 
becomes something of a methodological shorthand for the indirect process necessary to show the skeptic 
(in us) that their philosophical reflection has lost touch with the world he set out to start reflecting on, and 
appears unable to get back into view.  
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practices and activities, then, following Cavell, it becomes clear that the correspondence 
theory of meaning is neither a true nor a false theory, but a confusion, an obfuscation of 
our ordinary life with concepts. And if this is true then (1) is false. The possibilities (1) 
envisions are not, in fact, possibilities at all.   
 Neither Wittgenstein nor Cavell deny that we can word the world successfully; 
the problem occurs when we acquire a misleading idea of what it means to do this. The 
correspondence relation misconstrues the constraints that reality places on our life with 
concepts, locating them “outside” of linguistic use, as if we were looking upon our life 
with language from a position outside of that life, when in fact the constraints are 
internal to that use. If we understand Wittgenstein’s claim that correspondence between 
word and world has a home in various practices and activities with words, then this 
pluralizes and makes the correspondence relation so heterogeneous that, we find, the 
apparent inevitability of the logical law has lost its grip.  
 Oddly enough, I start by talking about the way rules function in tennis.  
 
Language (and) Games 
  In learning a competitive game, in being initiated into the practice of playing a 
competitive game, we learn a body of predefined rules. There are referees and officials, 
trained by an international tennis organization, who are experts in those rules. To learn 
tennis, for example, to be initiated into the “social practice” of tennis, one has to learn a 
body of rules for the game, rules which for the most part existed prior to our 
participation in them.86  
                                                        
86 It may also be important, for a professional player at least, to have knowledge of the way in which those 
rules can be changed. But the point is that those rules, the rules for changing the rules, are also, with some 
 57 
 
From a Wittgensteinian perspective, it is important to see the sense in which 
those rules, which we inherit as players of the game, both constrain what can and cannot 
be done in the game and leave room for freedom and spontaneity of action. If, in tennis, 
there weren’t an indefinite number of shots one could hit which did not violate the rules, 
then there would not be enough variation to make it an interesting or competitive game. 
Conversely, if every shot were allowed, then there would be nothing which we’d count as 
tennis: if doubles lines were indiscriminately used for singles and doubles, there would 
be nothing which would count as singles, for example. In tennis, then, there is much the 
rules allow for and much they do not.87  Without proscribing some things and allowing 
others, there would be nothing that would be (called) singles in tennis, or doubles in 
tennis. Without something which would count as breaking the rule, we lose hold on 
what it means to say there’s a “rule” operating at all. 
So, in a sense, the constraints actually make freedom possible. The rules of a 
game are indeterminate but not, by any means, completely so.88 They are open-ended 
but not, by any means, entirely so. The constraints are what make room not only for 
innovation, but also for there being such a thing as playing that game as opposed to 
playing another game. We might say: the actions of a game like tennis are bounded, but 
not always determined by rules. And in this vein, we can think about the interplay of 
constraint and freedom – or what we might call the determinacy of rules – on a 
                                                        
exceptions, predefined – they exist already, too. In the philosophy of law, such a notion of laws or rules for 
changing the rules are often called “secondary rules,” after, I believe, H.L.A.’s formulation of such an idea 
of “primary and secondary rules.” See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
87 Martin Gustaffson’s work has been invaluable for clarifying this point for me. See, in particular, Martin 
Gustaffson, “Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples,” Inquiry 48, no. 4 (2005), 356–89. 
88 Again, see Gustaffson’s work on Cavell, including “Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples,” for a 
particularly clear clarification of this point.  
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spectrum. Sometimes, a rule may be very “strict”: we may find it nearly impossible to do 
more than one thing which is in accord with the rule. In other cases, rules are looser, 
such that if a great variety of things were not allowed by the rule, then the game would 
lose its point or purpose. We might call this latter case, where indeterminacy is part of 
what it means to follow a rule, a case of circumscribing a field of actions by a rule. 
For Wittgenstein, as for Cavell, there is much to be gained from an analogy 
between the “social practice” of games and language use. Indeed, a significant part of 
book one of the Investigations — the only book Wittgenstein had in any meaningful 
sense completed before his death — is devoted to the notion of language-games. These 
passages weave in and out of a discussion of language and a discussion of games, leading 
to the coining of Wittgenstein’s famous concept of “language-games.”  
 One thing that the analogy between games and linguistic concepts is supposed to 
highlight is the role and nature of rules. For games as for linguistic concepts, there is the 
sense of both constraint and freedom that the rules of the practice make possible. In the 
case of tennis, again, the game would certainly not be worth watching or competing in if 
rules were so determinate as to compel or demand that each action was dictated by the 
rules – there would no room for the players to play, as opposed to merely following 
orders. Yet neither does the “looseness” of the rules mean that any action will result in 
winning points; if anything could count here, then we would again lose hold of 
necessary concepts such as “aces,” “scoring,” “singles” and “doubles,” etc.  Thus, even in 
these “looser” cases, even on the indeterminate end of the spectrum, there must also be 
constraint, or else there is nothing to distinguish one concept from another. In other 
words, if everything counted as playing tennis, then nothing would count as “playing 
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tennis” – as opposed to playing backgammon or hitting a ball against the wall or calling 
up my brother in Santa Fe. 
Rules in a game, then, like linguistic concepts, must walk a delicate tightrope 
between constraint, on the one hand, and spontaneity and freedom, on the other hand. 
But somewhat counterintuitively, this is the case also for rules which circumscribe a 
broad field of actions. For Wittgenstein, it is easy to lose track of the way in which rules 
form a kind of tightrope that we walk between constraint and freedom. And for Cavell, I 
think, we actively rebel against these constraints; there is a part of us that actively seeks 
to transcend or avoid them. And if one can get a sense for the difficulty of this reality—if 
one can acquire a sense of how easy it might be to lose track of this idea—then one can 
get a sense of the difficulty of doing Cavellian philosophy.   
In this vein, while discussing some of the connections between games and rules, 
Wittgenstein imagines what I take to be a children’s recess:  
We can easily imagine people amusing ourselves in a field by playing with a ball 
like this: starting various existing games, but playing several without finishing 
them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one 
another with the ball…throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on.89 
 
If Wittgenstein is in fact describing children here, then the children have not yet been 
fully initiated into the rules of the game in which they are playing. (Or perhaps some 
could fully play the ball games, in other contexts, say with adults around, but around 
other children they would prefer to just run around, screaming, laughing, playing – as 
kids do). In cases of children playing, imitating, amusing, etc., the constraints which 
make possible full participation in the game have not yet been fully grasped. There is a 
sense in which the adult question of what the children are doing – what they are doing 
                                                        
89 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §83.  
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in a more specific sense, of course, than “playing with balls” – is not a very good 
question, perhaps not even a coherent one. The children may be bouncing tennis balls, 
going through motions they watched their parents perform, and even trying to hit a 
forehand past an opponent on the other side of the net; but they may lack, for example, 
the capacity to keep score or an understanding of the relevant activities and concepts. 
But of course there is a sense in which we could count the children’s’ activities as 
“playing a game.” The Wittgensteinian point here is not to legislate what counts as 
playing a game or not, but to call attention to the conceptual difference between what an 
adult, as a master of language use, would call playing basketball, playing tennis, and so 
forth, and the child’s “in-between space” of playing. 
 In other words, the children are not yet successful initiates – to use Cavell’s 
concept – into the rules of the games they are playing; they do not yet have the required 
experience with concepts which would make what they are doing count – or not count – 
as playing basketball or tennis, backgammon – or as the negation, as not doing so. The 
thought is that the children are neither “playing basketball,” as we adults say, nor not 
“playing basketball” (assuming that by the latter we still mean the negation of the 
former). It is not false to say of the children that they are “playing basketball,” but it is 
not true, either. The children have a different concept, and a strange one for us adults, of 
playing these games.  
 For the moment I will put aside the question of children and turn instead to how 
this discussion of games, concepts, and language use, can relatedly be applied to 
skepticism. On the one hand, both the child and the skeptic act as if they were not 
initiated into the relevant social practices and activities which make meaningful 
language use possible. On the other hand, the skeptic and the child do so for different 
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reasons: The children are playing, they are in between the adult world and the 
children’s world, and so the adult concepts are not quite yet the right ones to use. But 
the skeptic is very much not playing – he is, for example, “examining our most deeply 
held beliefs” – and yet here, too, the adult concepts do not quite seem to be the right 
ones to use. For the skeptic, I will suggest below, the constraints guiding concept use, 
guiding linguistic meaning, and making meaning possible, have been run up against, 
like a bump on the head, and rejected. The consequence for the skeptic is not 
unconstrained freedom, but conceptual life without internal constraint which, as we saw 
above, is nothingness, meaninglessness, since there would be nothing to distinguish one 
action from another.  
 In the next section, I want to compare the rough schematic of language 
acquisition just articulated –that learning language is being initiated into social 
practices and activities – with the famous “Augustinian” theory of language and 
language acquisition that opens the Investigations. Once the distinction between the 
two has been examined, we can better understand Cavell’s claim, that the skeptic needs 
to be led back to the ordinary constraints guiding (but not determining) fields of concept 
use, but this is not a function of claiming that something the skeptic says is false.  
 
The Augustinian Picture of the Essence of Language 
In the opening passage of the Investigations, St. Augustine, in many ways the 
most important Church father for Christian metaphysical doctrine, famously describes 
what he takes to be a memory of his learning his native language. Every philosopher for 
whom Wittgenstein’s text has meant a great deal has felt the need to interpret this 
passage, and I am no exception.  
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 Augustine says that, in learning language, he “learned to understand what things 
the words” signified by the adults who were using them represented, learned to “grasp 
that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered.”90 In other words, Augustine says 
that in learning language he learned the names of particular objects in the world 
signified by the sounds the adults made.  
This seems simple enough. We might not even pause at it while reading The 
Confessions. But according to Cavell, it will take Wittgenstein much of the rest of the 
text to show why this way of thinking about language as correspondence between word 
and world is so distorting. For Wittgenstein, the Augustinian “picture of the essence of 
human language” looks like this: 
…the words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such 
names. In this picture [Bild] of language we find the roots of the following idea: 
Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the 
object for which the word stands.”91  
 
In a word, this makes the basis of language a correspondence or reference relation 
between language (“sounds”) and the world (“objects”). For the Augustinian, language is 
a system built upon correspondence between words and their meanings; “meanings” are 
the objects in the world. Language is thus a system of reference, where a word’s referent 
is the object in the world to which it corresponds.  
The very first response Wittgenstein gives to the Augustinian is that someone in 
the grip of such a picture must be thinking “primarily of nouns like ‘table,’ ‘chair,’ 
‘bread,’ and people’s names.”92 If meanings are objects in the world, then nouns are a 
good candidate. But, Wittgenstein continues, the Augustinian must be thinking “only 
                                                        
90 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §1. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds 
of word as something that will take care of itself.”93 The question of reference with 
regard to adjectives, verbs, pronouns, etc., is much more obscure. Importantly, 
Wittgenstein seems to make this remark in passing – he brings it up only to immediately 
drop it – in order to show that, even for nouns the question of correspondence between 
words and world needs to be reframed. As Cavell writes: 
Augustine’s description, it emerges, is not ‘all right as far as it goes,’ even about 
nouns and proper names. It contains assumptions or pictures about teaching, 
learning, pointing, naming – say these are modes of establishing a connection 
between language and the world – which prove to be empty, that is, which give us 
the illusion of providing explanations. 94 
 
This is typically murky and apparently obscure Cavellian language, but in what follows I 
will try and unpack Cavell’s claim here, that the idea that learning language is learning a 
correspondence relation between word and objects “give[s] us the illusion of providing 
explanations.”  
The immediate force of the concept of illusion is that we are in some sense 
satisfied with explaining language acquisition in the Augustinian way, as mastering a 
kind of correspondence relation. After all, this is a very intuitive way to think about 
language, perhaps especially for philosophers. But Wittgenstein, Cavell writes, wants to 
show us that our apparent satisfaction is mistaken, and he does so by asking us, 
indirectly, what would exemplify such a picture. This is a key methodological principle 
for Wittgenstein and for Cavell. To quote the second part of the epigraph of this 
                                                        
93 Ibid. 
94 Cf. Stanley Cavell, “Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of the Philosophical Investigations” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, eds. Hans Sluga and David G. Stern, 245–80 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 266. “Augustine’s description, it emerges, is not ‘all right as far as it 
goes,’ even about nouns and proper names. It contains assumptions or pictures about teaching, learning, 
pointing, naming – say these are modes of establishing a connection between language and the world – 
which prove to be empty, that is, which give us the illusion of providing explanations.”  
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dissertation: “the best I can propose,” Wittgenstein writes, “is that we yield to the 
temptation to use this picture, but then investigate what the application of the picture 
looks like.”95 Wittgenstein aims to show us that our apparent conviction in the 
explanation provided by the Augustinian picture of language acquisition is illusory – 
such a picture does not explain language at all. In a word, as I will make clearer a bit 
later on, what’s at stake here is the Cavellian idea that something – a “philosophical 
idea” – is at home somewhere, somewhere other than where the Augustinian thinks it is. 
So, Cavellian philosophy is a way of leading (back) to a new home, a place we have never 
been.  
In this sense it is significant, though still often missed by commentators, that 
Wittgenstein first offers one description or anecdote that is supposed to exemplify the 
Augustinian theory of language, only, in the next section, to retract it, replacing it with 
another. The first description Wittgenstein offers is often called the “five red apples” 
story and the second is called “the builders,” both of which are examined below in 
turn.96  
1. Now think of the following use [Verwendung] of language: I send someone 
shopping. I give him a slip of paper marked “five red apples.” He takes the slip 
to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up 
the word “red” in a chart and finds a colour sample next to it; then he says the 
series of elementary number-words – I assume he knows them by heart – up 
to the word “five”, and for each number-word he takes an apple of the same 
colour as the sample out of the drawer.97 
 
                                                        
95 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §374,  
96 The fact that there are two different stories or descriptions offered which are supposed to exemplify the 
Augustinian picture is often missed by Wittgenstein’s commentators, though it is not missed by Cavell. If 
we think about the Investigations as what Cavell calls a “perfectionist” text – a text the reader is supposed 
to wrestle with and work through, sympathize with the claims put forth even by the skeptical 
interlocutors, and come away having understood things a little differently – then it will be important to 
understand why Wittgenstein first offers us one description (the five red apples story) which is supposed 
to exemplify the Augustinian picture, and then offers us another (the builders story).  
97 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §1.  
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Notice, first, that this banal example – someone has sent someone else shopping – 
immediately throws us into what we called in the last chapter a concrete occasion of use 
for the words “five red apples” – a specific occasion of use in which one human being is 
saying something with these words. Notice, too, that what’s in question are the 
meanings of three words (nouns) – “five red apples.” Insofar as the passage is about the 
meanings of these three nouns, it is supposed to be exactly the kind of thing that the 
person in the grips of the Augustinian picture was thinking about: that for each noun 
there is a corresponding meaning which is also its object in the world.  
 Yet, in carrying out the order and in understanding these three words, the 
shopkeeper is following some sort of rule, comparing each word against something else, 
as in a table or chart. Wittgenstein’s overly explicit and weird little story is supposed to 
prompt a question: The shopkeeper does not open just any drawer, but the drawer 
marked “apples.” So, the shopkeeper had to “look” somewhere to know what apples 
“meant.” But here, too, he doesn’t take out just any kind of apples, but only red apples, 
the correct kind. And to know what red “means,” too, he had to “look somewhere” – 
didn’t he? Where did he look? Wittgenstein mentions a “chart” or a “table” (einer 
Tabelle), but what kind of chart? Did the shopkeeper momentarily forget what red 
meant and have to consult a chart hanging up at the register? (If so, that would make 
him a pretty poor choice for a shopkeeper.) Or was the chart inside his head, so that he 
had a kind of private ostensive definition of red against which he compared the word 
“red”? And as for the last word – “five” – the shopkeeper doesn’t take out just any 
number of red apples, but only five red apples. How does he know how many five are, 
what “five” means? Where is the chart, the table, the standard – where is the rule – 
according to which the shopkeeper can assess whether he takes out the right number of 
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apples? With these questions, perhaps, we can start to understand Cavell’s claim that, in 
Wittgenstein’s great work of philosophy, the very opening passage contains the entire 
“flowering of concepts” of the text as a whole.  
 Having brought us to the place where he can raise these difficulties, Wittgenstein 
does not make things any easier for us. Instead, immediately following the “five red 
apples” story, he gives voice to numerous different responses to it, with numerous 
interlocutors, each of which seems to be in conversation with the others, without 
specifying which one is “himself.” 
 – It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. – “But how does he 
know when and he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word 
‘five’?” – Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an 
end somewhere. – But what is he meaning of the word ‘five”? No such thing was 
in question here, only how the word “five” is used.98  
 
As Toril Moi has recently written99, it may be something of a joke that Wittgenstein 
would tell his readers, in the very first section of the book, that “explanations come to an 
end somewhere.”100 If Wittgenstein is not going to offer an explanation of how the 
shopkeeper knew what these words mean, of the table or rule with which the shopkeeper 
compared the words to the objects, then what will the rest of the Investigations offer?  
The point is: if this story is supposed to exemplify, or be an application of, the 
Augustinian picture of language acquisition, then it in fact raises more questions than it 
answers. Nouns were supposed to be the easy case, but against what does the 
                                                        
98 Ibid., § 1 
99 See Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), Part 1: Wittgenstein. Moi’s discussion of Cavell’s reading of 
Wittgenstein is very much in the background of this discussion, as is Stephen Mulhall’s in his Stanley 
Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
100 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 1.  
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shopkeeper check the meaning of words? How does he know that these words refer to 
these objects, and not others?  
  Wittgenstein doesn’t answer these questions. Instead, as if performing the 
realization that these questions are suddenly too complex for the apparently simple idea 
that the Augustinian theory proposes, Wittgenstein corrects himself, as it were, 
replacing the five red apples story with a completely different one. In other words, 
Wittgenstein says that the “five red apples” story, actually, isn’t the best way to capture 
the representational theory of language which Augustine describes. 
2. That [Augustine’s] philosophical notion of meaning has its place in a primitive 
idea of the way language functions. But one can also instead say that it is the 
idea of a language more primitive than ours. 
 
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is 
right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A 
and an assistant B. A is building with building stones; there are blocks, pillars, 
slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in 
which A needs them. For this purpose they make use a language consisting of 
the words “block, “pillar,” “slab,” “beam.” A calls them out; B brings the stone 
which he has leant to bring at such-and-such a call.  – Conceive of this as a 
complete primitive language.101 
 
More nouns. And now, in fact, a primitive language – a basic case – consisting only of 
nouns. If these four words really do encompass the builder’s language, then Augustine’s 
description – that the meaning of a word is the object in the world for which it stands – 
seems to be accurate.  
 But, as many critics have noted, I believe following Cavell, one question 
Wittgenstein wants us to ask is whether what the builders have – four words, and the 
ability to order and heed orders – is a “language.”102 The reference relation is still 
                                                        
101 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §2.  
102 An essay that is at the root of the “New Wittgenstein” reading and which most Wittgensteinians seem 
to cite without actually discussing in detail – as if it were too important and too foundational to be made 
explicit without distorting – is Warren D. Goldfarb’s “I Want You to Bring Me a Slab: Remarks on the 
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inscribed within something like a recognizably human purpose for them – labor – even 
if we can’t tell what the larger context is. And as soon as we start to imagine the builders 
as people, the question of whether this apparently “pure” exemplification of the 
Augustinian theory starts to crumble. For if we imagine the builders’ circumstances, 
wouldn’t we immediately wonder why the builders don’t also have words for greeting 
each other, for eating and for finding food, for cleaning – never mind for geometry, love, 
and painting? In other words, where are the builder’s other activities, practices, and 
human forms of life? Do the builders have these other practices and activities, and 
simply do not talk in them? (Would they then be human?) More fundamentally, is it 
even possible to imagine a group of humans who have been taught nothing more than 
the words for certain construction materials and how to follow and give orders? Of 
course, in some sense, it is. At one level Wittgenstein depicts a picture or allegory of 
forced labor. But in another sense, this could not be a complete (human) language, 
because for linguistic creatures like us, we would also need words to facilitate, improve 
upon, discuss, etc.; eating, cleaning, caring, etc.; for one another, with one another, etc. 
Even in the case of forced labor, one can imagine what laborers might have done when 
out of sight of their masters or employers – and this field of linguistic-conceptual 
human possibility is what makes the builders’ case distinct from a truly “human” one.  
We are still left with a question, however: why would Wittgenstein first give us a 
story – the “five red apples” – that purports to illustrate the Augustinian picture of 
                                                        
Opening Section of the Philosophical Investigations,” Synthese 56 (1983): 265–82. Goldfarb is concerned 
to show in that paper that various philosophical accounts we might give of the “metaphysical foundations” 
for language – that thinking is an independent process on top of which language lies, that there is a fully 
extended or perform form of every sentence of our language on top of which language lies, that language 
actually consists of contrasts between words and it is these contrasts which make meaningful use possible 
– are ultimately dissatisfying.  
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language, and then say that it doesn’t actually illustrate it? Why then follow it with 
another story, rather than giving us just the one? The answer, I think, is that 
Wittgenstein aims to unseat our sense of the profundity of Augustine’s theory of 
language and “relocate” it to a place where we haven’t thought to look.103 The way I read 
the two stories which open the Investigations is not that the “five red apples” story is a 
wrong or false illustration of the Augustinian picture of language while the “builders’ 
story is the right illustration. Rather, I think that Wittgenstein aims to show the 
Augustinian that his simplistic account of meaning as correspondence between word 
and world does not actually explain meaning, but merely restates, in a philosophical 
way, what is internal to social-linguistic practice or activity.104  
To understand this better, we can turn to a close reading of the key sentence 
which begins the passage quoted above, which marks the transition between the five red 
apples and builder stories. The sentence is very carefully composed and very complex. 
Even the revised Hacker and Shulte translation does not quite capture the German. 
Anscombe’s original translation is:  
That [Augustine’s] philosophical notion of meaning has its place in a primitive 
idea of the way language functions. 
 
The Hacker/Shulte translation gets it a little better, substituting “is at home” for “in its 
place.” 
That philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a primitive idea of the way 
language functions.  
 
But neither do justice to the carefully worded original: 
 
                                                        
103 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §52. 
104 Cavell, “Notes and Afterthoughts,” 266.  
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Jener philosophische Begriff der Bedeutung ist in einer primitiven Vorstellung 
von der Art und Weise, wie die Sprache funktioniert, zu Hause.105  
 
Translated literally, the sentence would be: 
 
That philosophical notion of meaning is in a primitive idea of the way language 
functions at home.  
 
What I want to bring out here, again, is the Cavellian idea that something – a 
“philosophical idea” – is at home somewhere, somewhere other than where the 
Augustinian thinks it is. This sentence, the very first sentence Wittgenstein writes after 
presenting the Augustinian picture, foreshadows the sentence made famous by Cavell, 
that “what we do is lead words from their metaphysical to their everyday use”106: the 
world of our ordinary life with concepts is other than where the philosopher thinks it is.  
 Let us try to understand this more clearly. With the German in view, it is easier to 
see the full complexity of the sentence. There are three layers, perspectives, or “forms of 
representation,” all of language: there is the (1) “philosophische Begriff” (translated as 
philosophical notion); but also the (2) “primitiven Vorstellung” (as primitive idea) and 
(3) “wie die Sprache funkioniert, zu Hause” (the way language functions at home). And 
what Wittgenstein says is that (1) is a consequence of (2)’s distortion of (3). In other 
words, there is something Wittgenstein thinks we have missed: the way language 
functions, at home. What has led us to miss it is “a primitive idea” of this homely 
function. The consequence, Wittgenstein suggests, is (3) – the philosophical idea that 
Augustine proposes, that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. In sum, 
then, we might say that the Augustinian theory of meaning – what we mean when 
entangled with metaphysics when we say that the meaning of a word is the object it 
                                                        
105 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §2. 
106 Ibid., §116. 
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corresponds with – has a role or function in our language which is quite different from 
the status we are inclined to give it while philosophizing. The Augustinian theory of 
meaning abstracts – and distorts – the reference relation from its heterogenous uses 
within various, social activities and practices. 
 What is the “primitive idea” of the way language functions which leads us to the 
philosophical notion of meaning? I suggest that it is precisely what the “builders” story 
shows us, namely, that we are the kinds of creatures who, for various purposes, are 
capable of pointing to, referring to, objects in the world with the same words. This very 
fact – that we are able to pick out particular slabs, rocks, people, and so forth, using 
words, in the course of practical activity – would be, on this reading, the “primitive idea” 
of correspondence. It is “primitive” because it has not gotten into view the fact that, or 
the way in which, this unusual, biologically unique capacity of ours – to refer to objects, 
to point to objects in the world, with words – is operationalized in particular human 
practices, interests, and activities. For example, the capacity to point to objects is part of 
the language games we play on a construction site. And it is part of – i.e., 
operationalized in – the language games we play when pointing things out to one 
another. The difficulty is that linguistic meaning is not dependent on a correspondence 
between word and world for its adequacy in the way we construe this dependency in our 
philosophizing; the correspondence relation is not the ground of meaning in the way we 
can be led to think it is.  
In the next section I try to clarify the claim that the philosophical notion of 
correspondence between world and world is a distortion of inherited, social practices 
which operationalize the natural fact of our capacity for reference. I will do so by letting 
the role of the correspondence relation show itself, free of philosophical requirements, 
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within our multifaceted, contingent, and social activities or “practices” with words – to 
follow, in other words, Wittgenstein’s guidance that philosophy “leaves everything as it 
is.”  
To do this – to look at the use of the correspondence relation in such a way as to 
leave that use as it is – I propose we look at two well-known sections of the Lectures on 
the Foundation of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s lectures given at Cambridge in 1939, 
during which Wittgenstein was also drafting what would become part I of the 
Investigations. The relations between the two texts, as we will see, are revealing.107             
 
Concept Use as a Technique or Practice  
In lecture seven of Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics (LFM), 
Wittgenstein is trying to connect the ordinary use of the words “proof” and “prove” to 
their use in mathematics. In the context of this discussion of what it means to “prove” a 
mathematical theorem, and whether such a proof is an invention or a discovery 
(Wittgenstein will lean toward the former), he at first seems to offer a deflationist or 
redundancy view of truth, in which “is true” means nothing more or less than “p”108: 
…To say proposition p is true is just the same as p.  
You might say, “Can’t we explain what we mean by ‘is true’? For example, to say 
that p is true means that it corresponds with reality, or that it is in accordance 
with reality.109  
 
                                                        
107 Thanks to Cora Diamond, we have a workable copy of these important lectures. Although an exact 
transmission of these lectures isn’t available, Diamond reconstructed an imperfect copy of them from the 
notes of those who were present, giving what is generally agreed to be a good enough, if imperfect, picture 
of what Wittgenstein was up to. In the audience were several faculty and students from around the 
university, including Norman Malcolm and Alan Turing. Turing, though, was away during the lecture 
from which the following passage comes. This is not the only place Wittgenstein discusses the 
correspondence theory of truth in these lectures, but it is a particularly rich discussion.  
108 Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, ed. Cora Diamond 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 67–68. Hereafter “LFM.” 
109 Ibid., p. 68 
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But whatever a deflationist view of truth might exactly amount to110, we can see from the 
way Wittgenstein continues in LFM that he is denying neither that the correspondence 
relation has a place in our language nor that we can ever expand on what we mean by “is 
true” by pointing to a correspondence or agreement between a statement or object and 
reality. I’ll quote the relevant passage in full here to show the transition Wittgenstein 
makes in his lecture: 
…To say proposition p is true is just the same as p.  
You might say, “Can’t we explain what we mean by ‘is true’? For example, to say 
that p is true means that it corresponds with reality, or that it is in accordance 
with reality. 
 
 Saying this [“is true” means “it corresponds with reality”] need not be futile at 
all. – “What is a good photograph [of a man]?” “One which resembles a man.” We 
explain the words “good photograph” by means of “resemble”, etc. This is all right 
if we know what “resemble” means. But if the technique of comparing the picture 
with reality hasn’t been laid down, if the use of “resembles” isn’t clear, then 
saying this is no use.111  
 
As we can see, it’s not always the case that “is true” cannot be further unpacked. There 
are cases, Wittgenstein writes, in which it makes perfect sense to emphasize a 
statement’s correspondence or accordance with reality. If this much is taken to be in 
conflict with a deflationary view of truth or meaning, then Wittgenstein did not hold 
(that sense of) a deflationary view of meaning. That much is clear. 
What is also clear is that Wittgenstein’s emphasis is on whether there is 
agreement in something he calls “technique.” This may seem straightforward enough, 
                                                        
110 From this passage it seems like Wittgenstein held a deflationist theory of truth – the view that to say, “p 
is true” is just to say “p.” And it’s sometimes claimed (for example in Misak 2016) that Frank Ramsey held 
a deflationist view of truth, and Wittgenstein inherited this view from Ramsey. Perhaps the deflationist 
view is taken to be a kind of quietism about what makes a true statement true; or perhaps it’s taken to 
mean that the predicate “is true” doesn’t add anything to our conviction in the truth of a statement. But as 
Cora Diamond (2003) has argued, and the following discussion makes clear, things are much less simple 
than simply saying that Wittgenstein inherited a redundancy or deflationist view of truth from Ramsey. 
He certainly learned a lot from Ramsey, but he also did not merely copy Ramsey’s views. 
111 Wittgenstein, LFM, 68–69. 
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like the question of whether we agree over the meaning of the term “resembles” in 
particular cases. If this were all Wittgenstein were saying – that the meaning of the term 
changes from context to context – he might be called a semantic contextualist or 
something similar. But this simplicity is misleading. It is not just a question of 
agreement about what is meant by “resemble” or about the dependence of meaning on 
context, but instead, the emphasis is on the nature and source of that agreement: 
something Wittgenstein’s use of the word “technique” is supposed to show. As we will 
see, the agreement in technique is social and practical; more like a tacit or implied 
agreement, similar to rules we “agree to” when playing a game, for example, than an 
explicit intellectual agreement such as a contract.112 As we might put it: there is 
agreement in language, but we have not agreed on that agreement.113  
Agreements are in a way relative to “practice,” but we have to be very clear not to 
think that all practices are the same.114 Within a practice, agreement in technique may 
be effectively established – checking IDs at an airport for example. When a TSA agent 
checks an ID, it is more or less fixed what “resemblance of the photograph to reality” 
means. (Agreement in technique, it bears mentioning, does not mean that everyone gets 
treated the same way by that technique.) But there are other things we might mean (not 
only by “resemblance to reality”) by asking whether an ID resembles a person, aside 
from what a TSA officer checking IDs might mean. We tend to find it fun to look at the 
                                                        
112 Andrew Norris’s recent book on Cavell has helped clarify this thought for me in a particularly useful 
way. See Andrew Norris, Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of 
Stanley Cavell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), and especially chapter 1.  
113 Perhaps we might say: concept of convention still seems propped up by an oppositional relation to a 
vague idea of what is natural, of what is not conventional. But if all we mean by “convention” is defined by 
the residue of this false opposition between nature and convention, we will still not get Wittgenstein’s 
point clearly in view.  
114 Cora Diamond’s response to Onora O’Neil in “Anything but Argument” is an inspiration for this 
important point. See her “Anything But Argument” and “Wittgenstein and Metaphysics” in The Realistic 
Spirit (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).  
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photos of people we know and love, for example, to compare the impression these 
pictures give to our sense of the person in real life. This is another “practice” in which 
the correspondence relation plays a role, but it is a very different kind of practice, and 
therefore one in which the correspondence relation will play a distinct role.  
“Agreement in technique” is not (just) a stipulated or “context-dependent” 
agreement about what resemblance means, but a social harmony of practice in which 
the philosophical concept has a home. While practices may be context dependent, it is 
not context itself, but rather the flow of human activities and practices which gives 
shape to the “technique” for understanding “resemblance.” What Wittgenstein is after is 
a recording of the register in which we encounter, in our own use of words, the kinds of 
agreement we find ourselves to have (and not to have) over the meaning of our words.   
There will be different uses and different kinds of correspondence relations as 
they show up in our everyday practices, from the TSA “ID” checking to looking at the 
photo of someone we love, and this reveals something important about the simple 
example which Wittgenstein offers. In the case of a general, abstract question about 
whether the photograph resembles reality, there is a noticeable lack of (explicit or 
contractual) agreement over what will “count” and what we will accept as the photo of 
the man “resembling” the real man (which is not to say we couldn’t convene on what will 
count in a particular context). This is Wittgenstein’s main point in the passage quoted 
above. 
 Now, a question we might ask is where, on a spectrum of indeterminacy to 
determinacy, rules or techniques for establishing the agreement of an object (in this 
case, a photograph) with reality fall. Are they “determinant” in the way that rules of 
arithmetic are determinate, appearing to allow for only one way of following the rule? Or 
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are they indeterminant in the way that a rule in sports is: purposefully circumscribing a 
field of permissible actions, to allow for the excitement and variation which 
characterizes competitive sports?  
 The answer to this (in a Wittgenstein spirit) would be a further question: which 
rules or techniques are being referred to? There is an enormous array of practices in 
which the technique of comparing, say, pictures to reality may be differently defined. 
Further, as we saw following Cavell, the undefined nature of this relation is part of what 
the beauty and challenge of criticism of photography amounts to – that the photograph 
reveals something about reality we may have missed. Ultimately, there are a great 
number of different rules or techniques which would need to be analyzed in order to get 
clear about the determinacy of rules.  
To see why these differences are important, imagine the following case: two 
people very much agree that a particular photograph resembles a particular person in 
one sense (a physical likeness to the real person) while disagreeing that it does in a 
second sense (a likeness to the character of the person, to “who that person is”). For 
example, one person finds the photographed man’s personality genuine and alluring, 
while the other finds it insincere and superficial. These two people could easily agree in 
the first sense while disagreeing in the second sense; they could be of different minds 
about the person, and therefore of different minds about what “resemblance” means. 
We thus might say that in the first sense, it is relatively clear what technique was used 
for comparing the picture with reality: physical likeness. In the second sense, concerned 
with likeness of character, the technique is not defined and perhaps in a certain way 
could not be defined, at least not until we had come to an agreement about what sort of 
person the person under discussion is. (And to complicate things further, our sense of a 
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person is connected to our history with that person, mingled with our own suspicions, 
our own personalities, and much more.) Thus, in the first case, the “technique” for 
comparing the photo to reality comes more or less easily to us, while in the second case 
– the case of comparing whether a photo resembles our sense of a person’s character – it 
might not be as simple to say what the technique or pattern would be for establishing 
“resemblance.”  
 One could argue that the physical-based and the character-based cases of 
comparing the photograph to reality lie closer to the determinacy end of the spectrum 
and closer to the indeterminacy end of the spectrum, respectively. In the case of asking 
whether the man resembles the photograph in the sense of physical appearance, then, 
we are closer to a technique which allows for only so much deviation in response. In the 
case of asking whether the man resembles the photograph in the sense of character, we 
are employing a technique which allows for much more variety.  
 But even this seems too general on a Wittgensteinian view, for the way in which 
the character-based sense of resemblance operates is not indeterminate in the same way 
that the rules which govern tennis are indeterminate. In tennis, the indeterminacy 
internal to the sense of rule-following allows for competition and varieties of strategies 
and styles. But the indeterminacy of rule-following internal to a discussion between two 
people who disagree about who a person is and about whether a photograph resembles 
that person, is not quite the same: the rules are not so much “permissive” (as in tennis) 
as “empty”; in other words, the rules are agreed upon, but there is no agreed-upon 
starting place for making use of those rules. For we might come to the conclusion that, if 
we agree about who this person is, then we could agree that the photograph resembles 
him. But the antecedent would remain unsatisfied; it’s very presence in the conversation 
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creates both a form of background agreement and a form of tension. This would be a 
very different kind of indeterminacy than the kind of indeterminacy which governs 
many rules in sports.  Similarly, simply stating that rules in mathematics are 
“determinate,” without specifying what determinateness in mathematics consists of, 
ought not to be satisfying if we are being responsible to what the way in which rules 
constrain our use of words (in mathematics).  
In lecture seven of LFM, just a few paragraphs after the passages we have already 
discussed, Wittgenstein tells his audience: 
     Sometimes what is meant by agreement with reality is quite clear. But in a 
certain number of cases it doesn’t determine what we are to do.  
 
     Collating the people in this room. – I may have a list, and I may look at each 
person in turn and tick off his name on the list. “So-and-so, so-and-so…The 
following people are in this room. Or “The following people are sitting, the 
following standing,” with a picture of sitting or standing, etc. This is the kind of 
case from which we get our picture.115  
 
Here, Wittgenstein takes an extraordinarily ordinary or banal example of taking roll or 
taking attendance and says: “this is the kind of case from which we get our picture.” Our 
picture of what, exactly? By way of response, I suggest that here, roll call is the kind of 
case from which we get our picture of the correspondence relation between word (names 
or pictures on paper) and world (who is actually in the room): in taking roll, we check to 
see whether the names or pictures on paper agree with the people actually sitting in the 
room. This ordinary act of checking – from paper to world, as it were – is the kind of 
activity or practice in which the correspondence relation has a home, in which a 
technique for evaluating the sign’s correspondence with the world has been established.   
                                                        
115 Wittgenstein, LFM, 69. 
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Yet, even here it is important to remember there are may exist many differences. 
How a set manager checks a prop list against the set-up of the stage, for example, is 
quite different than how a teacher checks an attendance list against the people in the 
classroom. The correspondence relation between words and world plays different roles 
within each of these activities or practices. Said better: in each and any of these different 
contexts, even within similar cases of collating, there will be a different (though similar) 
technique of “correspondence with reality”; agreement in these techniques is simply 
part of what it means to be a speaker of a common language. We did not convene or 
draw them ourselves, but they are present in our language, and we, as speakers, take 
them up.  
Wittgenstein, again, is not denying that there are correspondence relations in our 
language. He is denying that they are doing the kind of work, playing the kind of role, 
that the philosopher needs them (or “it”) to play. We might put it this way: if you must 
have mastered the correspondence relation to be able to mean “it is raining,” then you 
must be able to see that there is a relation of agreement between the weather and your 
expression. Similarly, you must have mastered the correspondence relation in order to 
take attendance. But neither technique – checking the weather or checking attendance – 
is dependent on “the correspondence theory of truth” for its adequacy in practice the 
way we want this dependency to function in our philosophizing. That is, the 
correspondence relation is governed neither by the correspondence theory nor by 
anything intrinsic to an abstract idea of “context.” What governs the correspondence 
theory is also what allows it to assume meaning for us: its place in the innumerably 
different activities and practices in which it has a function, use, and meaning.  
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The heterogeneous things which “agreement with reality” means for us are, for 
Wittgenstein, embodied and embedded in what we do with words. We may say that the 
truth of “it is raining” and “x, y, and z aren’t present” depends on a correspondence 
between the statement and the world, but what would saying this add to our 
understanding of the sentence? The first step is deflationary: to see that all we want to 
say about the correspondence relation is, as it were, already within the uses of words, 
and further that this is not a theoretical relation, but part of what we do. In the case of 
collating, we can say that “the list corresponds to reality,” but this merely states that 
taking attendance was successful, that the attendance list served its purpose, that the 
practice did what we wanted it to dos. Framed this way, “corresponds with reality” 
suddenly fails to take on the metaphysical, sublime hue it can take on in our thinking.  
In doing philosophy, we sometimes attempt to stand outside of any particular 
practice and claim, for example, that: 
A statement is true if there is a corresponding fact or set of facts in reality to which 
that statement corresponds.   
 
For Wittgenstein, if this is taken to be a sort of general summary of what, in every 
example we’ve analyzed so far, shows up for us as “agreement with reality,” then it now 
appears not so much false or wrong but empty – emptied of all descriptiveness, emptied 
of all use. Such a sentence may lead one to think that there is just “one relation” between 
facts and the world, as if there must be something in common to all of the ways in which 
signs like statements or photos or lists agree with reality. Such an idea is an example of 
what Wittgenstein calls “a preconception to which reality must correspond”: it is a 
preconception of the way what we mean by “correspondence with reality” must 
correspond with reality. 
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In the next and final section, I continue to unpack this criticism by arguing that 
the claim that “either a use of language is governed by the correspondence relation, or it 
is not” – an apparently straightforward application of the logical law of excluded middle 
– is itself confused. Said otherwise, the law of excluded middle does not apply to the 
philosophical claim that “the meaning of a word is its correspondence between word and 
world.” Under the spell of the Augustinian theory of meaning, we have lost grip on our 
concepts in such a way that we have also lost our grip on logical laws. Logic does not 
circumscribe what we can say in this way.  
 
Cavell at Criticism  
 Cavell puts the question of how to criticize the Augustinian picture of meaning 
like this: 
 
Again, Wittgenstein will speak of Augustine's description as containing a 
"philosophical concept of meaning" (PI, 2). Yet Augustine's words seem ordinary 
enough. They are arch and over-precise maybe, even pedantic. Why does 
Wittgenstein say "philosophical?” Wittgenstein records other responses he has to 
Augustine's words, but what interests me already is what Wittgenstein does not 
say about that passage, having singled it out as philosophically remarkable. He 
does not say, for example, that it is false, or that there is insufficient evidence for 
it, or that it contradicts something else Augustine says elsewhere, or that it is 
unclear, or that it contains an invalid argument. These are familiar terms of 
criticism in philosophy; and they are strong ones. If any of them does fit a 
statement, then that statement has been severely and importantly chastised.116 
 
 
What terms of criticism are appropriate for the Augustine’s philosophical notion of 
meaning? Cavell suggests here that, the problem is not an invalid, unclear, 
contradictory, or even false claim. In this section, I aim to unpack the Cavellian 
                                                        
116 Cavell, “Notes and Afterthoughts,” 265. 
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suggestion, made above, that, though the Augustinian picture has a hold on us, it is 
neither true nor false.   
 It can seem forced on us to either affirm or deny the philosophical notion that 
“the meaning of the word is the object for which it stands,” that meaning is 
“correspondence between word and world.” I have thus far tried to apply a form of 
Cavellian criticism to this philosophical notion: I have tried to show that the 
correspondence relation has an ordinary home in the way language functions, but that 
something has led us away from that function.  
Alice Crary, in the introduction to the volume The New Wittgenstein, writes that 
“abandoning the idea of an external standpoint on language only appears to threaten 
our entitlement to talk about full-blooded objectivity if it is assumed that we depend for 
any entitlement we enjoy on the existence of features of reality which transcend our 
forms of thought and speech…”117 If such an external vantage point is taken merely to be 
“out of reach,” in other words, then Wittgenstein would still preserve the idea that such 
an external stand point exists.118 What, then, might lead us to think that such “an 
external stand point” on language use was possible? What wish 119might incline us to 
construe meaning in the Augustinian way?  
                                                        
117 Alice Crary, “Introduction,” in The New Wittgenstein, eds. Alice Crary and Rupert Read, 1–18 (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 3.  
118 Ibid., 3.  
119 Freud famously defines illusion as a “belief caused by a wish.” And a way of understanding Cavell here, 
through the lens of psychoanalysis, would be to ask what wish is causing the belief in metaphysical 
foundations or skepticism – made in one another’s image – at work here. Jonathan Lear discusses this 
concept of illusion in Freudian terms in his Freud (New York: Routledge, 2005). Interestingly, in the 
glossary to that book, Lear provides this definition of a (Freudian) illusion: “a belief caused by a wish. We 
take our beliefs to be responsive to reality; thus when we are in the grip of an illusion we are misled about 
the source and authority of our belief.” The resonances of Cavell’s analysis of skepticism with this way of 
understanding “illusion” are deep and many.  
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One possible response is that such a picture elevates us as all-knowing observers 
of the meaning of words. We can rest “on the outside” as it were, and assess, from a 
perspective outside the messiness and the ongoing cares, commitments, and 
contingencies of human life – finally assess, and be finished with questioning – the 
correspondence between a word and its “object.” From such a comportment or posture, 
it may be easy to imagine the acquisition of language as the learning of the particular 
objects to which words correspond, rather than as the painful initiation, as children, into 
foreign, adult practices, activities, and institutions which existed before we were born, 
which we do not have any say in creating, and which we are often helpless to change, 
even in the face of extreme suffering of ourselves or others.   
At the beginning of this chapter, I compared the skeptic to the child, and we have 
now come full circle. But it no longer seems right to say that the skeptic, in rejecting the 
spheres of human work, action, activity, and interest, is merely recoiling from the idea 
that constraints make meaning possible or imagining, falsely, that these constraints are 
barriers to meaning. It seems rather that, under a certain conception of the 
correspondence relation of meaning, we reject, not just constraints, but something like 
the temporality, the everydayness, of human life as such; as if, beneath this picture, we 
hold out hope that one day, someday, we would reach a terminal point where we could 
be certain that our words or claims do really do “correspond with some ‘reality’ that 
exists outside of human interests, practices, cares and commitments.” A Cavellian 
“perfectionist” response to such a drive, if heard in the right way, might be: one day, the 
task of becoming human will be finished. But that will not be while we are alive.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Cavell and the Mixed Legacy of Skepticism   
 
 
It’s difficult to understand how the following two fundamental elements of the 
late Stanley Cavell’s philosophy hang together: 
 
(1) Cavell’s idea that following the temptation to skepticism will lead to 
psychological and philosophical grief;120 and 
 
 (2) The perspective on ordinary language and meaning which becomes 
discernible after skepticism denies that understanding or after metaphysics 
transcends it.  
 
These two elements strike me as incompatible in some as-yet not fully specified way. On 
the one hand, Cavell writes about the possibility of what he calls skepticism to destroy or 
deny “our sense of self, world, and others.” 121 But on the other hand, Cavell’s philosophy 
praises and enacts – arguably even actively seeks out – the philosophical understanding 
available when we “return” to the ordinary from wherever it is we had been while 
                                                        
120For one of Cavell’s representative formulations of the “cost of skepticism,” including “illusions of 
meaning,” “impossible privacies,” and even the “loss or forgoing of selfhood,” see Cavell, The Claim of 
Reason, 242. But as I aim to show in this chapter, the costs of skepticism are often also coupled with 
significant philosophical insight.  
121 In their introduction to Varieties of Skepticism, James Conant and Andrea Kern write that all the 
contributors to their volume share “the conviction that the problem of skepticism is not just any old 
philosophical puzzle” and that although skepticism is “first and foremost an intellectual puzzle, skepticism 
threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also – and fundamentally – our very sense of 
self, world, and other…” See James F. Conant and Andrea Kern “Introduction,” in Varieties of Skepticism: 
Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein and Cavell, eds. James F. Conant and Andrea Kern, 1–16 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2014), 1. This shared conviction about the disquieting nature of skepticism, but even more so, the 
differences which emerge out of this conviction, are an obvious starting point for this essay.  
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entangled with skepticism. The aim of this essay is to better understand the way these 
two key elements of Cavell’s philosophy fit together.122  
Two passages from a late lecture/essay, “The Wittgensteinian Event,” (2004) 
offer a preliminary formulation of these two elements, in Cavell’s own words. On the one 
hand Cavell testifies to the grief of skepticism: 
Philosophical Investigations…at a certain point comes upon what I think of as a 
counter-myth to that of Eden, a counter-interpretation of our present condition, 
meant at once to recognize the repetitive force of our temptation to leave it (as if 
our ordinary lives and language are limitations or compromises of the human) 
and at the same time to indicate that following the temptation will lead to grief.123  
 
But on the other hand, Cavell testifies to what we might call the mixed legacy of 
skepticism, suggesting that our understanding of skepticism and our understanding of 
the ordinary are inter-dependent in his philosophy:   
Wittgenstein gives very little direct development of the concept of the ordinary or 
everyday use of language, but without the concept, his greater development, or 
portraiture, of the metaphysical in language (or of skepticism, for Wittgenstein 
the intellectual twin of metaphysics) could not be undertaken…The ordinary 
occurs essentially in Philosophical Investigations as what skepticism denies, and 
metaphysics transcends...124 
 
The development of the concept of the “metaphysical” depends on the development of 
the concept of the ordinary, for Cavell’s Wittgenstein. So, is skepticism in Cavell’s 
philosophy something which brings us to grief or something which offers philosophical 
insight, or both? And if both – as I aim to show – what do we make of the mutual 
                                                        
122 Throughout this chapter, I follow the trend in the literature on Cavell that it isn’t always necessary or 
even possible to dis entangle “Cavell’s philosophy” Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Cavell returns 
to the Investigations again and again in his philosophy – regularly uncovering new insights. Of course, 
there is much about Cavell’s philosophy which is not a reading of the Investigations as well.  
123 Stanley Cavell, “The Wittgensteinian Event,” in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 192–213 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 196.  
124 Cavell, “The Wittgensteinian Event,” 195. 
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constitution of these two concepts; i.e., the sense in which the “ordinary occurs…as what 
skepticism denies?”125  
My plan, and way of offering a response to these questions, is this. In the first 
part of the chapter, I suggest that the disagreement between Stephen Mulhall and 
Stephen G. Affeldt regarding the role of criteria and rules in Cavell’s vision of language 
is in significant part a disagreement (not about rules but) about the fact that, and the 
way in which, a confrontation with skepticism leads to philosophical insight about 
language and meaning. I suggest that this disagreement is indicative of a widely made 
assumption – and an understandable one – that the dialectical space of skepticism, 
whether Kantian or Cartesian in nature, is just a bad place to be. To better spell out both 
why we are inclined to think this and why it misses fundamental parts of Cavell’s 
thought, in the second section I offer a few representative formulations of Cavell’s 
understanding of skepticism from different moments of his philosophical career. I trace 
some ways in which these formulations incline us to think of skepticism as something 
like a curse, something we ought simply to avoid, undercut, or defeat, in order to show, 
in the next section, that a fundamental part of Cavell’s vision of language is unveiled or 
clarified only through a confrontation with that very skeptical impulse we wished would 
disappear. More specifically, I try to unpack Cavell’s claim that what he calls “non-
criterial” differences in ordinary language “make skepticism possible,” in order to argue 
that the understanding of non-criterial differences which we find in Cavell’s philosophy 
is inseparable from a confrontation with skepticism. This gives me one specific sense in 
                                                        
125 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 171. Moreover, if Cavell is right and the skeptical plight of mind gives rise to a 
specific form of illusion or hallucination of meaning, then we must also have never actually left the 
ordinary. 
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which knowledge in Cavell’s philosophy of the ordinary (in language) is made possible 
only by working through the confrontation with skepticism, thus one specific sense in 
which skepticism is a mixed legacy.126 Or so this chapter tries to show.  
 
Affeldt and Mulhall on Linguistic Normativity  
 Many of Cavell’s best readers have picked up on the general fact I am 
commenting on here: the way in which key parts of Cavell’s philosophy are accessible 
(only?) from the vantage point of an encounter with skepticism. The debate between 
Stephen Mulhall and Steven G. Affeldt turns on precisely these grounds.  Affeldt  has 
criticized Stephen Mulhall’s account, in Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the 
Ordinary, of Cavellian criteria; in particular, Affeldt has criticized Mulhall’s operating 
assumption that criteria exist independently of language users and form an “always-
present ground of our intelligibility and linguistic competence.”127  One way in which 
Affeldt puts his criticism is that “Mulhall’s text fail[ed] to capture the way in which – 
and the depth at which – for Cavell, Wittgenstein’s vision of language is formed in 
response to the continuous threat of skepticism, understood as the human drive to 
transcend itself, make itself inhuman.”128 It is skepticism which makes criteria “visible” 
for us, Affeldt claims,129 implying that what Cavell means to express by criteria only play 
a role in his philosophy after the attunements in forms of life (which criteria are to 
                                                        
126 Cf. Thompson Clarke, “The Legacy of Skepticism” in The Journal of Philosophy 69, no. 20 (1972), 754–
69. Clarke ends his paper with the suggestion: “How radically that structure must differ from the standard 
type, if capable of permitting with the characteristics of Dream to be concepts, and the plain skeptical 
possibilities to be possibilities, is evident enough” (ibid., 769).  
127 Steven G. Affeldt, “The Normativity of the Natural,” in Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, 
Wittgenstein and Cavell, eds. James F. Conant and Andrea Kern, 311–62 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 323. 
See also Steven G. Affeldt, “The Ground of Mutuality: Criteria: Judgment and Intelligibility in Stephen 
Mulhall and Stanley Cavell,” European Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998), 1–31. 
128 Affeldt, “The Normativity of the Natural,” 311. 
129 Ibid., 343. 
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express or give a partial account of) have been broken. Thus Affeldt sees Cavell’s concept 
of criteria as rough expressions of the general fact that we share a language and as 
relevant less for giving an account of that general fact of a shared language – he 
arguably follows Wittgensteinians in eschewing that task – and relevant more for 
responding to the threat of skepticism.  
 In more recent scholarship, Mulhall acknowledges that, in his earlier, full-length 
book on Cavell, he sometimes interpreted criteria as existing independently of language 
users and as forming an “always-present ground of our intelligibility and linguistic 
competence.” 130 But it is worth noting that not everything Mulhall says in that earlier 
book gives this impression. For example, Mulhall writes that for Cavell “appeals to 
criteria and to grammar are not attempts to explain or prove that human beings are 
attuned with one another in their words…they are, when successful, exemplifications of 
[that attunement].”131 And the appeal to criteria, Mulhall writes, “tends to occur 
precisely when this attunement is threatened or lost, when we seem not to know our way 
around with respect to our words and the world to which they apply.”132 So Mulhall in 
places registers Cavell’s idea that appeals to criteria and to “what we say when” are a 
way of responding to a specific state in which intelligibility has been threatened or lost – 
suggesting, in this way, that the appeal to criteria is internally related to a response to 
the impulse to skepticism, and is not a solution or final defeat of skepticism.133 
                                                        
130 The quotation is from Affeldt, “The Normativity of the Natural,” 323. For Mulhall’s discussion 
of his earlier interpretation of Cavell, see Mulhall, “Inner Constancy, Outer Variation.” 
131 Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 92–93 
132 Ibid., 93. 
133 And in this vein Mulhall then writes that skepticism, for Cavell, “is not best characterized as a 
commitment to a body of beliefs or hypotheses which might be based upon inadequate evidence or invalid 
arguments and so might be open to refutation; it is rather an impulse to repudiate or deny the framework 
within which alone human speech is possible, and so exemplifies one way in which human beings attempt 
to deny their conditionedness (their condition)” (ibid., 113).  
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 Affeldt goes on to criticize Mulhall’s, or any scholar’s, appeal to a concept of rules 
to explain any aspect of Cavell’s vision of language. Even if an appeal to rules is only 
meant to account for the regularity or normativity across uses of a word and does not 
take on the ultra-rigid shape of rails extending indefinitely into the future.134 Affeldt still 
thinks that for Cavell and Cavell’s Wittgenstein, a comparison of meaning with rules is 
distorting. Affeldt does not think that the rule following passages in the Investigations 
are even meant to provide an account of linguistic meaning, neither for Wittgenstein nor 
for Cavell’s reading of him.135 To mount this criticism, Affeldt contrasts “human desires, 
interests, purposes, forms of life,” etc., with any and all concepts of rules, claiming that 
for Cavell the fragile and shifting ground of our shared language falls can only be 
accounted for by interests, purposes, forms of life, not by a conception of rules. As 
Affeldt writes: 
To possess a concept, to be able to go on with a concept, is to appreciate how its 
significant employment is bound up with our interests, desires, purposes, 
biological and social forms of life, facts about our social and natural world, and 
the like…[it] is to appreciate the weave of connections both among our concepts 
and between our concepts and our interests, desires, purposes, forms of life, 
natural reactions, facts about the world, and so on. It is in this sense that coming 
to possession of concepts is becoming an initiate of forms of life.136 
 
Well, Mulhall is also concerned to show how, for Cavell, concepts and beliefs do not 
stand alone, that there is significant interweaving between our concepts and beliefs. And 
Mulhall is also concerned to give an account of how “possessing a concept” requires 
being an initiate in the relevant forms of life. So, it is not with respect to these facts that 
Mulhall and Affeldt’s interpretation of Cavell differs. The apparent difference between 
                                                        
134 I borrow this from McDowell, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following.” 
135 For this way of putting the matter, I am indebted to Conant and Kern’s “Introduction,” in Varieties of 
Skepticism.  
136 Affeldt, “The Normativity of the Natural,” 344. 
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these two critics lies in their differing emphases on whether (1) some conception of rules 
or rather (2) interests, desires, purposes, etc. account at bottom for linguistic constancy 
or normativity. Neither Mulhall nor Affeldt think that the above disjunction is exclusive, 
but their interpretations place more emphasis on rules and forms of life respectively.   
But at certain points in Affeldt’s later essay, I find the contrast between rules and 
forms of life to be put too strongly, and I suspect that this is a consequence of Affeldt’s 
interest in displacing the concept of rules in his reading of Cavell and a consequence of 
his thinking that this displacement is necessary to unveil the metaphysical 
ungroundedness of ordinary occasions of use.137 It is true that for Cavell what we call 
rules are, as Affeldt notes, an expression of certain non-rule-giving capacities of human 
nature. But this does not mean that the appeal to rules is unimportant. I think it’s 
possible to both get the metaphysical ungroundedness of Cavell’s vision of language into 
view and still maintain a modified conception of rules – this is, for example, what a 
comparison between rules and games might accomplish, such as in the previous 
chapter.  Said otherwise, if we account for linguistic normativity (and creativity) by 
means of the concept of a rule, we do not automatically lose out on our ability to account 
for the fragility of mutual comprehension (which I take to be one of Mulhall’s points). 
But at the same time, the “terrifying” fragility of the ground of mutual comprehension is 
difficult to get into view from a perspective which tends to focus too much on rules 
(which I take to be one of Affeldt’s points).  
What I think follows is that we need to shift the “hinge” of the debate slightly: the 
question whether the concept of a rule can account for linguistic normativity isn’t the 
                                                        
137 Ibid., 318.  
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hinge on which Cavell’s vision of language hangs. In fact, part of what I think is really 
going on is that we do not have an adequate picture of the way in which, for Cavell, 
Wittgenstein’s vision of language is formed in response to the continuous threat of 
skepticism – which as we saw was a large part of Affeldt’s intent. As Cavell puts it in his 
1988 Tanner Lecture, The Uncanniness of the Ordinary, “I might epitomize 
Wittgenstein’s originality in this regard by saying that he takes the drift toward 
skepticism as the discovery of the everyday, a discovery of exactly what it is that 
skepticism would deny.”138 But the specific sense in which this is true – the sense in 
which the ordinary is constituted by the skeptic’s denial of it – is not well understood in 
Cavell’s philosophy; and it is not clarified simply by denying, as Affeldt does, that the 
concept of a rule has any role in Cavell’s thinking. At the conclusion of this chapter, we 
will return to the debate between Mulhall and Affeldt with a better understanding of the 
role of the threat of skepticism in Cavell’s philosophy.  
 
 
Cavellian Skepticism – An “Unconventional Idiom” 
 
In order to understand the insights of Cavell’s philosophy which come out of a 
confrontation with skepticism – even as Cavell argues that the skeptical bent of mind is 
so destructive – it would be useful to give some sort of working definition of what Cavell 
calls skepticism. Unfortunately, this turns out to be rather difficult to do. Cavell’s well-
known claim – that skepticism is a much wider, much deeper, and much more 
disquieting problem than philosophers have typically understood it to be – is still 
understood in a variety of ways. In part, this is because Cavell’s own understanding of 
                                                        
138 Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 171. 
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the problem, like any thinker’s, changes over time, as Andrew Norris, in his recent study 
of Thompson Clarke’s influence on Cavell, has recently mapped in detail.139 Accordingly, 
in this section I will try to give a few representative formulations of Cavell’s 
understanding of skepticism from different moments of his writing and show why these 
formulations incline us to think of skepticism as something like an inescapable curse, 
something we might wish we could defeat or avoid, in order to show, in the next section, 
a fundamental part of Cavell’s vision of language is unveiled or clarified only through a 
confrontation with it. Although this is not my primary concern, I’ll also highlight some 
bridges between the three primary forms of skepticism discussed in the literature on 
Cavell and on skepticism: (1) the possibility of knowledge of external world, (2) the 
possibility of knowledge regarding the meanings of words and mutual comprehension, 
and (3) the possibility of knowledge of others, or “other minds.”140  The aim is both to 
introduce key features of what Cavell calls skepticism and also to motivate the tension at 
the heart of this chapter: given that the skeptic threatens our sense of self, world and 
others, why engage with skepticism at all?141  
An increasingly well-known formulation142 of what skepticism is comes from part 
one of The Claim of Reason (1979): 
 
I do not…confine the term [skepticism] to those who wind up denying that we can 
ever know; I apply it to any view which takes the existence of the world to be a 
problem of knowledge. A crucial step for me, in calling an argument skeptical, is 
that it contain a passage running roughly, “So we don’t know (on the basis of the 
senses (or behavior) alone; then (how) do we know?”. It is at this stage that 
                                                        
139 Andrew Norris, Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley 
Cavell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). See especially ch. 2.  
140 Conant and Kern, “Introduction,” 1. 
141 See Richard Rorty, “Cavell on Skepticism,” in Contending With Stanley Cavell, ed. Russell B. 
Goodman, 10–21 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
142 Both Norris (2017) and Conant (2012) draw on this particular formulation to motivate their readings of 
Cavell.  
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philosophies break into Phenomenalism, Critical Realism, etc.…I hope it will not 
seem perverse that I lump views in such a way, taking the very raising of the 
question of knowledge in a certain form, or spirit, to constitute skepticism, 
regardless of whether a philosophy to have answered the question affirmatively 
or negatively. It is perspective from which skepticism and (what Kant calls) 
dogmatism are made in one another’s image, leaving nothing for choice.143  
 
Here it’s clear that skepticism as Cavell understood it is not confined to a particular 
denial or negative conclusion (we “do not know” such-and-such) but to something like 
the mode of thought which gives rise to that denial, implying that defenses or 
affirmations of what the skeptic seeks to question may also be infected by skepticism. 
Here is part of Conant’s (2012) gloss on or elaboration of this passage:  
…According to this unconventional idiom, the term skepticism…refers not just to 
one particular sort of philosophical position (i.e., that held by one or another sort 
of skeptic) but rather to the wider dialectical space within which philosophers 
occupying a range of apparently opposed philosophical positions (such as 
“realism, “idealism,” “coherentism” etc.) engage one another, while seeking a 
stable way to answer the skeptic’s question in the affirmative rather than (as the 
skeptic himself does) in the negative.144 
 
Thus skepticism in this Cavellian idiom refers not just to the negative philosophical 
position that denies that we can know anything about the external world, other minds, 
or semantic meaning, but to the wider dialectical space in which the affirmation or 
denial of the skeptical claim – in which so much seems at stake – can arise. To take the 
example of external world (Cartesian) skepticism, skepticism in this Cavellian idiom 
doesn’t just refer to the skeptic who claims that we have insufficient grounds for arriving 
at knowledge of the external world or the objects within it (because we only see part of 
objects, or because our brains have been shaped by a long process of evolution which 
has nothing to do with responsibility to reality, or because we only see on the visual 
                                                        
143 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 46.  
144James Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 2012, 3. Accessed at: 
https://humstatic.uchicago.edu/philosophy/conant/Conant%202012%20Two%20Varieties%20of%20Sk
epticism.pdf.  
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spectrum, etc. etc.) – but rather to a particular mood in which the human mind attempts 
to test the position or place of human knowledge as a whole.  
 If we understand skepticism as a “dialectical space,” then Cavell’s approach to 
skeptical questions starts to make a lot more sense.145 Generally speaking – and even as 
early as some of the essays in Must We Mean What We Say – Cavell is concerned to 
break through with some “third way” with skeptical questions, neither affirming nor 
denying the skeptical conclusion, but instead shifting the interest of, and our interest in, 
the skeptical problem.146 There are many different ways in which he does this, but for 
now my point is a general or methodological one. To the questions of whether I know 
with certainty of the existence of the external world and of myself others in it, for 
example, Cavell answers neither affirmatively nor negatively, but changes the way we 
understand the question, shifts our interest in it (often, as we will see, encouraging us to 
retrace the initial steps which lead to what felt like such a necessary skeptical question, a 
strategy he shares with some other Wittgensteinians).   
 But I think it’s also important to acknowledge something else about Cavell’s 
engagement with skepticism. If skepticism is understood as a “wider dialectical space” of 
philosophical questioning, and that space is framed pejoratively (putting aside for now 
exactly where that negative frame comes from), then it makes sense to think of 
skepticism in purely negative terms.  There appears to be good reason for thinking that 
what skepticism shows is that, to put it bluntly, we should avoid skepticism. And a 
perfectly reasonable response at this juncture seems to be: why engage with skeptical 
                                                        
145 This change over time would be philosophically worthwhile to chart in scholarly detail, as Andrew 
Norris has done with parts of Cavell’s early work, see Norris, Politics and Practical Philosophy in the 
Work of Stanley Cavell. 
146 Stanley Cavell, “Responses,” in Contending With Stanley Cavell, ed. Russell B. Goodman, 157–76 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 159. 
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questions at all? This question is encouraged both by some of Cavell’s ways of wording 
the encounter with skepticism (as we will see in the next section) and by some of Cavell’s 
critics. 
 Let me add another cautionary note here. It is often repeated that Cavell thinks 
that skepticism is inescapable or unavoidable. But “unavoidable” is one of those terms 
which seems to invite a “demand for absoluteness.” If something is unavoidable, we are 
inclined to think, then we just cannot avoid it. And that seems to give us a crystalline 
kind of clarity about the meaning of the concept. And yet if we think about the sorts of 
things we call “unavoidable,” if we ask ourselves what is at stake in the uses of this term, 
we quickly find that the super-hard or absolute sense of unavoidable seems not to clarify 
or even resonate with those ordinary instances.147 We say, for example, that taxes are 
unavoidable – and we don’t mean that you can’t pay your taxes but that if you don’t and 
if you get caught, you will probably be punished by the state. We say in idiomatic 
English that death, too, is unavoidable – and what exactly do we take ourselves to mean 
by that? Surely not just that everyone dies; for that assertion itself has not yet been fully 
specified. Thus, saying that “skepticism is unavoidable” does not answer the question of 
what Cavell’s sentence means, but is at best only an invitation to expand on the sense in 
which it is unavoidable.     
 
Skepticism’s Chagrin 
 
 If we add the idea of skepticism as an unavoidable dialectical space to other 
comments Cavell makes about the psychological distress, confusion, and intellectual 
                                                        
147 I mean to echo or paraphrase the dilemma James Conant brings out in his great essay, “Stanley Cavell’s 
Wittgenstein.” See James F. Conant, “Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein” in The Harvard Review of 
Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005), 51–65.  
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impotency associated with skepticism, especially as they surface in Cavell’s later works – 
for now we might simply call the post-Claim of Reason period “later works,” – then I 
think the inclination to say that skepticism is something we just better avoid becomes 
overwhelming. For example, Cavell repeatedly returns to the company he found in 
Emerson’s having written, in Self-Reliance, that:  
…conformity makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but 
false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real 
two, their four not the real four; so that every word they say chagrins us and we 
know not where to begin to set them right.148 
 
The experience of chagrin at every word others say is an experience Cavell repeatedly 
identifies as at the root of certain forms of skepticism – skepticism about the meaning of 
words, for example.  This an experience in which, as Cavell writes, “every word 
[Emerson] shares with others (which is essentially to say, his every word) is ready to 
cause him chagrin.”149 This irritation or irascibility at the mere sound of another’s voice, 
hiding perhaps a wish that this other person be silent, that they fail to be capable of 
being an opposing source or spring of desire, might lead one (it has lead me) to ask once 
again: “Why not just avoid this experience? What does it really have to teach us?” And 
for good reason. Who would court such psychological straits?  
 Yet another formulation of skepticism, in something akin to these latter terms, 
comes from Cavell’s book on Shakespeare. In his essay on Othello, Cavell more or less 
identifies with Othello’s dependence-turned-jealousy of Desdemona, and these pages 
contain some of the most vitriolic expressions of the despair, impotence, and 
                                                        
148 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Volume II: 
Essays: First Series, eds. by Joseph Slater, Alfred R. Ferguson, and Jean Ferguson Carr, 25–51 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
149 Stanley Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts From Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 
8. 
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desperation of skepticism in Cavell’s body of work. For example, while contributing to 
the tomes of scholarship on why Othello becomes so unraveled so quickly by someone so 
obviously beneath him as Iago, Cavell writes:  
What specifically for me is at stake epistemologically in the allegory of Othello 
and Desdemona is my finding that Othello’s radical, consuming doubt is not 
caused by Iago’s rumoring. Othello rather seizes upon Iago’s suggestions as 
effects or covers for something the object has itself already revealed, and claimed, 
despite its most fervent protestations to the contrary….He [Othello] seeks a 
possession that is not in opposition to another’s claim or desire but one that 
establishes an absolute or inalienable bonding to himself, to which no claim or 
desire could be opposed, could conceivably count; as if the jealousy is directed to 
the sheer existence of the other, its separateness from him. It is against the 
(fantasied) possibility of overcoming this hyperbolic separateness that the 
skeptic’s (disappointed, intellectualized, impossible, imperative, hyperbolic) 
demand makes sense. 
 
…With his jealousy, Othello’s violence studies the human use of knowledge under 
the consequence of skepticism.150 
 
I do not want to try and unpack this dense passage fully right now. What is important 
about it for our purposes is this. On Cavell’s reading of the tragedy, Othello murders 
Desdemona not because he is “jealous” of her alleged affair with Cassio but because that 
jealousy is itself the product of a skeptical denial or “annihilation” of her, an attempt at 
possession in a way which erases (so much as the possibility of) her opposition to his 
desire. Cavell glosses that wishful, masculine, skeptical impulse to exclude others from 
the realm of possible opposition as the “fantasized possibility of overcoming… 
separateness,” that is, the fantasized possibility of overcoming the fact that Desdemona 
may at any point withdraw her investment from him and from their shared world, that 
she may, for example, fail or disappoint him. If we were to write him new lines, Othello 
certainly could say that everything Desdemona says chagrins him, suggesting that “other 
                                                        
150 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge: In Seven Plays of Shakespeare (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 43–44 
 98 
 
mind” and “meaning” skepticism are deeply connected, at least as they are presented 
within Shakspearian tragedy. And the question I have asked myself at this juncture is 
again: isn’t this just a bad place to be? Isn’t the violent, masculine, skeptical fantasy of 
overcoming the space between people, like the skeptical fantasy of overcoming the space 
between the world and our faculties, just something we had better avoid? Or does the 
drive to overcome that space reveal certain features of it which, without that drive, 
would remain unclear and indistinct for us?   
 
 
Non-Criterial Differences and Other Invitations to Skepticism 
 
My aim in this section is to elucidate one sense in which it is true to say that if 
Cavell did not exactly “court” skepticism or seek it out, his philosophy or the insights 
which come from that philosophy would not have been possible without it. If this is 
right, I take two claims to follow: (1) that it’s too simplistic to see skepticism in purely 
pejorative terms within Cavell’s philosophy; and (2) skepticism makes possible “the 
eventual everyday” and the “actual everyday” makes skepticism possible.151 It is our 
disappointment with the everyday that leads us to depart from it, and upon our return 
we find much room for growth and creativity. Again, my approach is to effectively re-
describe Cavell’s description of the skeptical problematic, drawing on formulations of 
his which have mattered to me.152  
                                                        
151 This insight was clarified to me by reading Tyler Robert’s chapter “Criticism as a Conduct of Gratitude” 
in his Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Secularism After Skepticism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013).  
152 Here it may also be worth mentioning, since we have traveled this far in the essay together already, that 
I have been struck by a scandal of skepticism in my life, both personally and philosophically, and that 
Cavell’s philosophy has clarified both what it is which has struck me and how to philosophically engage 
with it. 
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Immediately before the following passage from his 1988 Tanner Lecture, “The 
Uncanniness of the Ordinary,” Cavell has just been arguing that what Wittgenstein, 
Emerson, and Thoreau all share is both an attention to Kantian conditions (but not 
limitations) on human knowledge and a “continuous response to the threat of 
skepticism.” Cavell goes on to say that: 
It seems to me that the originality of the Investigations [as opposed to Emerson 
or Thoreau] is a function of the originality of its response to skepticism, one that 
undertakes not to deny skepticism’s power…but to diagnose the source (or say 
the possibility) of that power – to ask, as I put it a while ago, what it is about 
human language that allows us, even invites us, in its own name, to repudiate its 
everyday functioning, to find it wanting.153 154  
 
One of the specific ways in which, in Cavell’s philosophy, the use of human language 
invites us to “repudiate it’s everyday functioning,” is Cavell’s idea of “non-criterial” 
differences.155 The role of non-criterial differences to Cavell’s philosophy is a paradigm 
case of the kind of philosophical insight about meaning and ordinary language which 
(only?) an encounter with skepticism can unveil. As Cavell puts it:  
I note for future reference that it is my claim, in The Claim of Reason, that it is 
the difference between Austinian criterial differences (for example, between 
goldfinches and goldcrests) and Wittgensteinian non-criterial differences (for 
example, between rain and the appearance of rain) that makes skepticism 
possible. The differences among excuses are criterial; the differences between 
imitation, pretending, and so on, and what they imitate or pretend (to be real, to 
be sincere, and so on) are non-criterial.156  
 
                                                        
153 Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 170. See also Cavell, “The Wittgensteinian Event,” 205. 
154 It is worth pointing out, for the sake of making connections between Cavell’s readers, that what Conant 
(2012) calls “The Wittgenstein Way with Skepticism” is an elaboration of the point Cavell is making here. 
Conant writes that Wittgenstein “not only follow[s] the skeptic’s presuppositions out to their ultimate 
consequences, but also examin[es] the initial steps in the Cartesian skeptic’s progress toward doubt, 
identifying how the skeptic passes from ordinary to philosophical doubt, from a claim to a non-claim 
context, pinpointing the decisive movement in the philosophical conjuring trick and diagnosing why it is 
the one that is bound to seem most innocent.”  
155 Cavell sometimes calls “non-criterial” differences “Wittgensteinian criteria,” which can be confusing. 
Cf. Cavell, “The Wittgeinsteinian Event,” 205. 
156 Stanley Cavell, Pitch Of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 92. 
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Austinian criterial differences are conceptual differences with traceable or detectable 
marks or features distinguishing them. As Hamawaki (2014) writes, Austinian criteria 
are “the sort of criteria that determine membership in a kind, such as the criteria for 
being a goldfinch.”157 The presence of Austinian criteria allow us, in Cavell’s philosophy, 
to point to marks or features which distinguish x from y, say a goldfinch from a robin. 
Non-criterial or “Wittgensteinian” differences, however, are conceptual differences 
between which Cavell argues there are no ascertainable marks or features which form a 
boundary. Examples of non-criterial differences discussed at different points in Cavell’s 
work include differences between something’s being animate and it’s being inanimate, 
between the appearance of real pain and a convincing faking of pain, between “real” rain 
and its appearance on a movie screen, for example. (Regardless the latter, a consistent 
move Cavell makes is not that we cannot say there is a difference between rain on the 
movie screen or television and non-filmic rain, for this would be obviously false, but that 
we do not know yet what this difference means to us, that its significance is as-yet 
unspecified, suggesting that there are distinctions between kinds of non-criterial 
differences). The difference between the two kinds of criteria, Austinian or 
Wittgensteinian, is the presence or absence of marks or features which allow us to 
clearly or meaningfully chart differences between objects. 
 Most critics, including Mulhall158 and Hamwaki159, have concentrated on the 
relation between Austinian and Wittgensteinian criteria and what Cavell calls specific 
and generic objects, the latter of which turns out to be, on Cavell’s understanding, a 
                                                        
157 Arata Hamawaki, “Cavell, Skepticism, and the Idea of Philosophical Criticism” in Varieties of 
Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, eds. James F. Conant and Andrea Kern, 389–
427 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 412. 
158 Mulhall, “Inner Constancy, Outer Variation,” 400–02; see also Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, 56.  
159 Hamakawi, “Cavell, Skepticism, and the Idea of Philosophical Criticism,” 412–13. 
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production of the skeptical straight of mind, and hence unable to bear the generalization 
onto all of specific objects.160 But what I want to bring out here has a different and 
underappreciated emphasis. I want to narrow in on Cavell’s claim that the difference 
between Austinian and Wittgensteinian criteria “makes skepticism possible.” 
 The contours of skepticism will be different in each particular case and in each 
general genre of non-criterial difference, and here we only have space for only one 
particular case. Let’s take a particularly striking genre of non-criterial difference which 
is central to Cavell’s philosophy – the nature of the boundary between the animate and 
inanimate. I know of no better figure for the nature of this boundary than the image of 
the magic spyglass Cavell takes from E.T.A. Hoffman’s short story, “The Sandman.” In 
Hoffman’s story, through Cavell’s description, the hero Nathaniel falls in love with “the 
beautiful automaton Olympia,” whom he sees “through a magic spyglass constructed by 
one of her constructors.”161 The spyglass turns the inanimate, animate. At first, other 
people mock Nathaniel’s infatuation an automaton, but slowly, as the story creeps 
forward, those same people start to feel that “they may be making the same error with 
their own beloveds,” seeing them as animate when they are secretly inanimate.162  
 When Nathaniel (the hero), after seeing the automaton Olympia torn into non-
living pieces by her creators, turns the spyglass on his loyal and longtime lover Clara, he 
goes mad. And as readers, we are left wondering why.  Cavell argues that it’s too simple 
to just say that the spyglass, which had previously turned the inanimate animate, simply 
reverses things and turns Clara into an automaton. What happens when he sees Clara 
                                                        
160 For what is to my mind the best recounting of Cavell’s moves here, see Gustaffson, “Perfect Pitch and 
Austinian Examples.” 
161 Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 155. 
162 Ibid. 
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through the eyeglass, Cavell thinks, is instead that Nathaniel realizes that it is within his 
responsibility to see or to understand others as animate or inanimate, which means, for 
Cavell, to see them in a way which is affirmative of their separate, opposing life, or fail 
to. Thus, the spyglass in Hoffman’s short story is a kind of figure for skepticism. But in 
what sense?  
In the case of his loyal companion Clara, Nathaniel realizes that he had been 
denying the possibility of distance between them, denying to “bear her separateness.” As 
in Freud’s concept of transference, the realization that one was relating to another 
person in a constricted or destructive way is only possible after one has emerged from it, 
and the fact that one recognizes what’s happening is itself a testament to the fact that it 
is no longer happening – Nathaniel’s realization is possible only after skepticism has left 
its mark. What this suggests with respect to this discussion of non-criterial differences is 
that, in Cavell’s philosophy, the presence or absence of the boundary between the 
animate and inanimate is not in principle discoverable or uncoverable in nature but is 
rather dependent on us in some fundamental way, and is therefore always in formation, 
for it is we who are forming it. This doesn’t mean for Cavell that we are machines of 
“incessant animation,” but only that the fact of animation is not a fact we can establish 
independently of our responsibility for deciding where that boundary should be. As 
Cavell so beautifully puts it: 
The moral of the [spyglass] machine I would draw provisionally in this way: 
There is a repetition necessary to what we call life, or the animate; and a 
repetition necessary to what we call death, or the inanimate, necessary for 
example to the mechanical; and there are no marks or features or criteria or 
rhetoric by means of which to tell the difference between them. From which let 
me simply claim, it does not follow that the difference is unknowable or 
undecidable. On the contrary, the difference is the basis of everything there is for 
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human being to know, or say decide…and to decide on no basis beyond or beside 
or beneath ourselves.163  
 
One thing Cavell brings attention to here is the element of choice or value in the 
boundary between the animate or inanimate.164 He also implies that we wish to shrink 
from this element of choice or value – we wish to locate in a realm “beyond or beside or 
beneath ourselves.” Thus a further significance of the non-criterial difference between 
the animate and inanimate is just this: the fact of a non-criterial boundary between 
important concepts in our ordinary language inclines us toward the imagination of a 
metaphysical or skeptical realm in which we take that boundary to be clear to us. But 
with regard to Cavell’s philosophy, we do not understand the non-criterial boundary or 
our desire to shrink from the responsibility of electing where it should be, until we have 
returned to the ordinary from which we wished to depart, returned to that non-
criterial boundary which made us wishful for something beyond ourselves. Only then 
can our restlessness strike us in the way Cavell’s philosophy needs it to.  
A beautiful way in which Cavell formulates the significance of non-criterial 
differences within his philosophy is that our ordinary language is vulnerable – to 
skepticism. From this perspective, skepticism is not identical with non-criterial 
differences between concepts but is rather a relation or response to non-criterial 
difference: a wish, as one might say, for a firmer grounding on which such an important 
concept like “animate” – our basis for identifying what is alive! – might fall. 
  Martin Gustaffson has said that, on Cavell’s understanding, what is truly 
terrifying about our responsibility to continue (or criticize) language use and cultural 
                                                        
163 Ibid., 158 
164 For this formulation and for a related pragmatist claim, see John Lachs, “The Element of Choice in 
Criteria of Death” in Freedom and Limits, ed. Patrick Shade, 231–50 (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2014). 
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practice isn’t just that we are tempted to search for a certain, secure, and justified 
ground, outside of human subjectivity, for those practices and projections. “What seems 
worth fearing,” Gustaffson writes, “is certainly not our propensity to engage in that kind 
of search, but the possibility that there is no justification of the sort we want to find.”165 
What “merits fear” is not that search itself (rechanneled, it is part of what makes us 
human) but “our inclination to disclaim responsibility for the maintenance of those 
human practices within which language has life.”166 The security we seek in skepticism is 
not just unattainable, it is one which (surely in part in virtue of its unattainability) 
attempts to absolves us of responsibility. At some level we want to be stripped of this 
responsibility.  
To take Gustaffson’s thought one step further: what happens to our actual 
ordinary, to our understanding of non-criterial differences, after we have as it were 
retraced our steps back to the point at which we started our flight? What happens to the 
fact of non-criterial differences after skepticism? Not only do we understand that it is up 
to us where to draw the boundary, but we also bring to consciousness our temptation to 
shirk from that responsibility through a search for something which would remove that 
responsibility for us. And I think what may follow from that point is, rather than a sense 
of disappointment in limitations, we find a kind of self-aware affirmation and 
experimentation in having a say in the conditions for the perception of what is animate. 
And – and I think this is a central point – the specifically philosophical sense of 
                                                        
165 Martin Gustaffson, “Familiar Words in Unfamiliar Surroundings: Davidson’s Malapropisms, Cavell’s 
Projections,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19, no. 5 (2011), 385. 
166 Ibid. 
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disappointment with the fact of non-criterial differences has dissolved, replaced with an 
acknowledgement of what lies within the sphere of our finite power.  
Thus I think what skepticism provides in Cavell’s philosophy is not only a sense 
of the contingency or “choice-inclusive” nature of those social practices and customs – 
protection of individual rights, freedom of religion, the right to pursue a meaningful life 
– which we wish to uphold, an idea which we can find in different forms in many 
philosophers. Cavell’s encounter with skepticism also shows us that there is something 
about this contingency which terrifies us, which lures us into thinking that such a 
responsibility is not ours, and which knows no limit on the number of disguises it takes.  
 
 
Conclusion – and a Return to Mulhall/Affeldt Debate 
 
What I have been saying is not that skepticism is necessary for identifying the 
fact of non-criterial differences. We can obviously identify that there are no marks or 
features between pain and the successful performance of pain with or without 
skepticism. But unless one has: 
(1) grown conscious of the dissatisfaction which, in some cases, accompanies the 
presence of non-criterial differences; and  
(2) become aware of a yearning or longing for a special kind of (“in virtue of”) fact 
which can settle the case, and then perhaps 
(3) followed out that yearning or longing to its skeptical conclusion (according to 
Conant, it will be a form of skeptical paradox); and then  
(4) returned to that ordinary non-criterial difference and seen it in a new light,  
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 – then the initial absence of marks or features remains, I think, disappointing to us. We 
have not encircled the actual ordinary with a philosophical or Cavellian investigation 
which reveals our responsibility to engage and (re)form that ordinary. But notice that it 
is the “same fact,” seen in two different lights, that marks the difference between non-
criterial differences (as that which gives rise the skeptical flight without our recognizing 
that that is what has happened) before skepticism, and non-criterial differences after 
returning to the ordinary after skepticism, where we can recognize what it is we have 
sought to flee from (the realization that drove Nathaniel mad).  
This bears on the disagreement between Mulhall and Affeldt on the locus of 
normativity in Cavell’s vision of language. In short, I think a new distinction becomes 
relevant: between (1) the pre-skeptical perspective on the normativity of language use; 
and (2) the post-skeptical perspective on that “same” normativity of language use. I 
suggest, with regard to (1), that there are a set “pre-skeptical” questions about language 
and meaning in Cavell’s philosophy where the concept of a rule has a place; for example, 
“passionate utterances” are defined in terms of a set of what Cavell explicitly calls, albeit 
using square quotes, “rules.”167  In this context, in which Cavell is trying to describe the 
marks and features of a kind of interpersonal moral encounter in which we take up the 
moral authority to question the conduct of another person, an authority we by default 
do not have, there is nothing fundamentally distorting about the concept of a rule to 
describe what language use looks like in these scenarios. Here, the concept of a “rule” is 
nothing more than a way of describing regularities in certain exemplary native speakers’ 
                                                        
167 Stanley Cavell, “Performative and Passionate Utterance,” in In Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 
155–92 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 182. 
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uses of language; the speakers’ use of language is not determined by or based on a body 
of rules. Or as we might say: use is prior rules.  
But I think there are also, with regard to (2), a range of post-skeptical questions 
we might ask about everyday “uses” of language, or a set of perspectives we might take 
toward language use, where the concept of a “rule” really does more harm than good. 
For example, as both Mulhall and Affeldt now agree, what Cavell calls criteria are not a 
substructure or foundational body of rules we can fall back on to counter or defeat 
skepticism; once entangled with skepticism the appeal to criteria can at best be a 
reminder about the kinds of things we do and say with words. In this sense the ordinary 
language philosopher is powerless to defeat the skeptic, since the very practices the 
ordinary language philosopher reminds the skeptic of are the very same ones the skeptic 
has found lacking. At this juncture, we require a different sort of response to the skeptic; 
for example, we need to be able to show the skeptic that she has inadvertently brought 
to the surface the responsibility to maintain value-laden forms of life and the human 
fear of that responsibility. Here, the appeal to rules will amount to more than describing 
regularities in native speakers’ uses of language; the appeal will rather seek to ground 
those regularities in rules, in precisely the way that Mulhall and Affeldt now agree is 
problematic, purporting that rules precede use.  
So, when Affeldt writes, “it is not equating ordinary language and a calculus with 
fixed rules that is distorting; it is the comparison itself that misdirects and distorts our 
thinking,” this is ambiguous. This may be true for the post-skeptical level (no concept of 
rule will show us how to go on after criteria have been put in question), but it is certainly 
not true for the pre-skeptical level, where I think for Cavell the notion of rule does have 
some place. Perhaps the debate could be clarified if this distinction was incorporated: 
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between the pre-skeptical set of question merely describing regularities in ordinary 
language use and the post-skeptical questions hinging on Cavell’s vertiginous vision of 
linguistic normativity as based in forms of life and shared practices.168 
Returning to the start, my aim in this chapter was to hold together these two 
elements of the late Stanley Cavell’s philosophy: 
 
(1) Cavell’s idea that following the temptation to skepticism will lead to 
psychological and philosophical grief,169 and 
(2) The perspective on ordinary language and meaning which becomes 
discernible (only?) after skepticism denies that understanding or after 
metaphysics transcends it.  
 
And to sum up the moral of the chapter now: it doesn’t do justice to Cavell’s 
confrontation with skepticism to think that the dialectical space of skepticism, whether 
Kantian or Cartesian in nature, is just a bad place to be. Psychologically speaking, this 
may be true – skepticism may lead us to all sorts of grief. But the philosophical terrain is 
much more complicated. While Cavell himself does often trace the contours, both felt 
and argumentative, of the dark side of skepticism, his philosophy is also vividly attentive 
to the insights which the skeptical bent of mind can help generate. For Cavell, the drive 
toward skepticism, when led in a different direction than the skeptic leads it, reveals 
boundaries as conditions rather than limitations on knowledge and reveals our 
ineliminable responsibility as speakers to criticize or uphold the forms of life which 
                                                        
168 Affeldt, “The Normativity of the Natural,” 311. 
169 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 242 
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make our language possible – even as it seeks to transcend or avoid them. Skepticism 
traces our finitude, but in relief, as if it were carving something which was always 
present but which we had not been able to see, revealing “language and the world as 
seen from the leaving of them.”170 Skepticism in Cavell’s philosophy is a mixed legacy, 
driving us to both despair and perspicuity, neither one without the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
170 Stanley Cavell, “What’s the Scandal of Skepticism?” in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 132–55 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 134. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Threat of Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy: Thinking with Cavell  
 
“…philosophy’s concern, through so much of its modern period, [is] with the crisis of 
knowledge associated with religion and scientific revolutions of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries…Modern philosophy is familiarly taken to begin with Descartes’s 
subjectifying of existence…showing the power of doubt to put into radical question the 
existence of the world and of myself and others in it…Much of subsequent philosophy – 
professional, academic philosophy at any rate – has retained the skepticism but lost the 
route to God, making the existence of the world a persistent, epistemological problem 
of knowledge perpetually unjustified.”171 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the revival of ancient skepticism, particularly Pyrrhonism, in the European 
early modern period, “skepticism” in philosophy has referred to a family of 
philosophical positions in which the possibility of knowledge – of God, of the self, of 
“things in themselves,” of the meaning of words – is denied.172 To skeptical questions 
like, “can I really know what the nature of external objects is like?” or “can I really know 
that the self exists?” the skeptic answers that I know nothing at all, or at least know 
much less than I believed I did. Leaving many nuances aside here, on this paradigmatic 
account of what skepticism is, it is the negative answer to questions like these, the denial 
that knowledge is possible, that in fact makes a skeptical position a skeptical one. So, for 
example, we understand Descartes’ ultimate position in the Meditations (or the position 
                                                        
171 Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 265. 
172 In The History of Skepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Richard Popkin famously argues that the 
translation and rediscovery of Greek skepticism was a pivotal part of the crisis of faith of the European 
Enlightenment. The ancient Greek text most influential, Popkin writes, was Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism. “Scepticism [sic] plays a special and different role in the period extending from the 
religious quarrels leading to the Reformation up to the development of modern metaphysical systems in 
the seventeenth century” (Richard Popkin, The History of Skepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003], xix).  
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that Descartes took himself to be in) – that knowledge of the world, self, and God is 
achievable – to be an anti-skeptical position precisely because he answers the skeptical 
question “is knowledge possible?” in the affirmative, rather than the negative. Of 
course, there may be significant debate about whether a philosopher has successfully 
defeated skepticism or not. But conceptually speaking, if a thinker successfully answers 
the skeptical question with a “yes, we can have (a certain sort of) knowledge of such-
and-such,” then they are not themselves a skeptic. Or so this framework – call it the 
“traditional framework” for thinking about skepticism – goes.   
This is not the way that Stanley Cavell came to understand “skepticism,” at least 
after finishing The Claim of Reason in 1979. Cavell’s well-known analysis of skepticism 
in The Claim of Reason radically expands, and shatters, what philosophers have called 
“skepticism” since the early modern period in Europe. Cavell, inspired by J.L. Austin, 
Thompson Clarke, and of course the later Wittgenstein, undermines the traditional 
framework of skepticism’s self-understanding: it’s motivations (to test our most 
fundamental beliefs), goals (to arrive at knowledge), philosophical significance, and 
what counts as instance of it in philosophy.173 One result – perhaps the result most often 
cited, and the least well understood – of Cavell’s investigation into skepticism in The 
Claim of Reason is that, after the publication of that text, Cavell begins to identify the 
presence of skepticism(s) both within and outside of professional philosophy, in 
alienated modes of being-in-the-world and in unjust social arrangements, as well as in 
Shakespearean tragedy, etc. Of course, this will require that we understand skepticism 
                                                        
173 As Cavell puts it in part one The Claim of Reason, “A formidable criticism of skepticism – as of any 
serious philosophy – will have to discover and alter its understanding of itself” (Cavell, The Claim of 
Reason, 48).  
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as marked by more than a denial that knowledge of a certain kind is possible. Indeed, we 
can find a hint of the surprising depth and breadth of Cavell’s vision of skepticism in the 
epigraph above, where Cavell writes that, since the period of modern European 
philosophy, “much of subsequent philosophy – professional, academic philosophy at 
any rate – has retained the skepticism but lost the route to God.”174 In philosophizing in 
the West since the European Enlightenment, Cavell suggests, we have retained the 
skepticism, but lost Descartes’ route out of skepticism through God. What does this 
mean? What is skepticism? 
In this chapter, I draw on the new, Cavell-inspired framework for thinking about 
skepticism provided by Jim Conant. Following Conant, I present Cavellian skepticism as 
a dialectical, conceptual space of philosophical questioning which we can come to 
recognize as having a recognizable structure or form, once we have learned to detect the 
presence of that space once we are in it.175 On this view of what skepticism is, it is a 
“dialectical space” because there is room for multiple, even competing philosophical 
positions (or perhaps only apparently competing positions) within the dialectical space 
of skepticism. This is one main point of contrast, which I draw out in various ways 
throughout this chapter, with what we just called the “traditional framework” for 
thinking about skepticism, in which skepticism is understood as and defined by the 
denial that knowledge of some philosophical kind or another is possible.176 Indeed I will 
say in this chapter that Hobbes participated in the dialectical space of skepticism – 
although he was by no means a skeptic or anti-skeptic by traditional lights. 
                                                        
174 Cavell, Cities of Words, 267. 
175 Conant has identified nine features and two varieties but has also suggested that there are others. 
176 I mean, and take Conant to mean, all of this as an expansion of comments in Cavell’s work such as this 
one: that Cavell “takes the very raising of the question of knowledge in a certain form, or spirit, to 
constitute skepticism” (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 46). 
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But this will take some explaining. How can a particular “anti-skeptical” 
affirmation that knowledge is indeed possible be even conceptually called “skepticism” 
– at least without radically changing or just stipulating the definition? To begin to see 
why skepticism is not defined by the simple affirmation or denial of a certain kind of 
philosophical knowledge, it may be useful to mark the difference between the Cavellian 
and the traditional frameworks for thinking about skepticism in another way. On the 
one hand, the skeptic’s denial that we ever know with certainty (the meanings of words, 
the nature of real objects or the self) may be understood as saying simply “that dogmatic 
certainty is not attainable, and that one should tolerate differing views because of 
this.”177 That’s how Richard H. Popkin, the great historian of skepticism of the European 
Early Modern period of philosophy, understood it: here, the skeptic’s model or degree of 
certainty appears conceptually stable and meaningful, but simply out of reach for us.178 
For Popkin skeptical doubts can bring us to a place of intellectual modesty. And there 
are of course significant ethical and practical benefits to a modesty about the certainty of 
one’s actions and beliefs. One way of thinking about this position, as I will put it later 
on, following Cavell, is that here skepticism threatens but does not overwhelm; we have 
made a certain kind of peace with the skeptical threat.  
On the other hand, if modern skepticism, at least since the European 
Enlightenment and the rise of the new science, can induce a form of intellectual 
modesty, it also has a much darker, even debilitating side.179  We might put it like this: 
                                                        
177 Richard Popkin, “Skepticism and Modernity” in The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension Between 
the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. Tom Sorrell, 15–32 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 20.  
178 See Popkin, “Introduction” and “The Intellectual Crisis of the Reformation” in The History of 
Skepticism. 
179 Recall Hume’s confession in his Treatise of Human Nature: “The intense [sic] view of these manifold 
contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I 
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under the cover of skepticism, “probabilistic” or fallible reasoning and judgements of the 
sort we must rely on each day may come to seem – well, not just those things – but 
inescapably unsatisfying, corrupted, or false.180 By these lights, the “spirit” in which the 
traditional skeptic denies that we know (that there are objects in front of us, that words 
are meaningful, that another is in pain) is both cause and effect of a rejection, and not 
just a modesty about, probabilistic reasoning. In Cavell’s philosophy, “skepticism” does 
not (just) remind us that the felt, ordinary life of our judgements and assertions are 
governed by probabilities, but also rejects, denies, or annihilates the very possibility of 
accepting or trusting that life – which is not to say blindly accepting it, but rather 
something like “giving our experience a voice,” “letting things matter to us,” as Cavell 
will often put it. Skepticism rejects, or wards off, the felt life of our ordinary perceptual, 
judging, and cognitive capacities, and the world of experience and thinking they give rise 
to.181 This second, darker aspect of skepticism, which to use yet another formulation of 
Cavell’s, takes probabilistic reasoning as a barrier rather than a condition for cognitive 
life, or sees those conditions as barriers – is what I think Conant’s Cavellian framework 
                                                        
am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion as more probable or likely than 
another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I 
return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me?” (David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton 
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007], 1.4.7). 
180 A deeply related essay to which I am indebted for these ideas is Andrea Kern, “Why Do Our Reasons 
Come to An End?” in Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, eds. James F. 
Conant and Andrea Kern, 81–104 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). Kern, among other things, makes a 
distinction in that essay between two kinds of finitude: finitude with respect to the ever-present possibility 
of error, and finitude with respect to being the sort of creature that must receive sensory impressions. 
Perhaps the above distinction between two kinds of skepticism maps somewhat onto Kern’s distinction 
between two kinds of finitude.  
181 Cf. Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984). Stroud writes, after rehearsing the argument from illusion in Descartes’s First Meditation: “With 
this thought, if he is right, Descartes has lost the whole world” (Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical 
Skepticism, 12).  
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teaches us to identify in philosophizing.182 It is not defined by a single philosophical 
position, affirmative or negative (or even a particular philosophical issue or topic, but 
that’s another story) – but by something like a rejection of the way in which the felt, 
ordinary life of our judgments and assertions partake of and help to constitute a human 
conceptual world.183  
But that kind of grand claim – that skepticism is marked by a rejection of an 
ability to let things matter to us, even “a rejection of the human,” as Cavell has said– will 
hardly be satisfying in a philosophical mood. So, the question may naturally arise for us: 
if skepticism is not marked or defined just by a negative response to the skeptic’s 
wondering “can we know?”, then how can we tell we’re in a skeptical space when we’re 
in one? What are some marks and features of being in what Cavell recognized as a 
skeptical space? Although some critics have attempted to analyze Cavell’s concept of 
“the truth of skepticism,”184 and others have analyzed Cavell’s idea that skepticism is a 
standing threat to the human mind and that writers as diverse as Wittgenstein and 
Emerson wrote in constant confrontation with (Cavellian) skepticism185 – there 
remains, in my view, despite the growing scholarship on Cavell, a poor understanding of 
what being in a skeptical space actually looks like, for Cavell, what its marks and 
                                                        
182 Wittgenstein “wishes an acknowledgement of human limitation which does not leave us chafed by our 
own skin, by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate beyond the conditions of knowledge. The limitations of 
knowledge are no longer barriers to a more perfect apprehension, but conditions of knowledge uberhaubt, 
of anything we should call ‘knowledge’” (Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, 63). 
183 These are preliminary formulations, of course. I take my cue from Cavell’s idea of skepticism as 
“annihilating” the world – an idea he explores in connection with Othello’s murdering of Desdemona in 
his work on Shakespeare, both at the end of The Claim of Reason and in his later book on Shakespeare 
and skepticism, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare.  
184 Two examples are Sanford Shieh’s difficult but rewarding “The Truth of Skepticism” in Reading Cavell, 
eds. Alice Crary and Sanford Shieh (New York: Routledge, 2006) and Part II of Stephen Mulhall’s Stanley 
Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).  
185 Steven G. Affeldt has very much tried to narrow in on the idea Cavell, and Cavell’s Wittgenstein, write 
in constant confrontation with skepticism. For a recent essay by Affeldt taking on this theme, see Affeldt, 
“The Normativity of the Natural.” 
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features are. For a foundational and difficult part of Cavell’s philosophy is that our 
entanglement with what he called “skepticism” may not be self-evident to us. If we want 
to do more than just emptily repeat or cite Cavell’s claim, after his death, that skepticism 
pervades modern thought, including modern philosophy, since the European 
Enlightenment, then we will want repeatable, consistent ways to identify that we’re in a 
skeptical space when we’re in one. And yet very little work has been done on this 
extremely significant point. 
A major exception in this regard is James Conant. In recent work, as I would 
interpret that work,186 Conant has helped make explicit Cavell’s implicit sensitivity to 
skepticism, uncovering a framework of marks and features by which one might learn to 
discern the presence of skepticism in (one’s) thinking as well as patterns by which 
philosophical entanglements with skepticism tend to proceed.187 One basic underlying 
thought is that engagements with (this broader sense of) skepticism have a consistent 
and recognizable shape; and yet until we become attuned to that shape, we may fail to 
recognize when we have become entangled with skepticism and thus fail to see what the 
consequences of that entanglement are.  
 In this chapter, I draw on Conant’s framework to argue that once we learn to 
recognize the structure or form of the dialectical space of skepticism, we can see it 
structuring foundational debates in natural philosophy and metaphysics in the Early 
Modern period of European Philosophy. Drawing out Cavell’s thought in the epigraph 
that early modern philosophy kicks off or intensifies a certain form of skepticism, this 
                                                        
186 I do not claim that Conant would necessarily agree that his work should be characterized in exactly this 
way. Although I might add that, in informal conversations, he has acknowledged Cavell’s deep influence 
on him, it is by no means  
187 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 3.  
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chapter applies Conant’s and Cavell’s analysis of skepticism to a key figure in the history 
of philosophy, someone who is not a “skeptic” according to the traditional paradigm of 
skepticism: Thomas Hobbes. I focus on Hobbes’ natural philosophy and metaphysics 
and argue that the form or spirit in which Hobbes raises questions about knowledge 
takes a skeptical shape, a shape that Cavell and Conant’s framework in fact predicts.  
This chapter offers the very first, to my knowledge, rigorous attempt to show that 
a canonical philosopher of European Enlightenment thought (who is not a skeptic 
according to the skepticism’ traditional or paradigmatic self-understanding) is deeply 
entangled in what Cavell called skepticism. Ultimately, I argue that the cause/effect 
relation plays, for Hobbes’ natural philosophy, an analogous role to God in Descartes’ 
Meditations, providing a materialist rather than divine response to the threat of 
skepticism, an attempt at a kind of theoretical reconstruction of the world of our 
ordinary faculties after skepticism has denied that world. In making this argument in 
this way I aim to (1) support Cavell’s proposal that (what he calls) skepticism pervades 
modern thought and modern philosophy; (2) to generally support Jim Conant’s 
framework for furthering Cavell’s project of identifying skeptical spaces as they occur in 
philosophizing; and (3) to transform our understanding of Hobbes’s natural philosophy 
by showing how the shape of Hobbes’s metaphysics of space and time can be predicted 
by Cavell and Conant’s framework.188 
 
 
                                                        
188 I thus aim to bridge two or three fairly well-established scholarly subfields: metaphysics in the 
European Early Modern period, especially metaphysics about space and time; Hobbes studies; and 
debates about skepticism and Cavellian skepticism. 
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Setting the Skeptical Scene  
Philosophers of the late scholastic and early modern periods in Europe generally 
debated space and time in tandem, often through a kind of argument by analogy: what 
applies to space also applies to time.189 We find this in Book One of Hume’s Treatise and 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic of Kant’s first critique, for example. 190 Canonical early 
modern thinkers, operating within a deeply Christian worldview, were arguably less 
interested in the qualities or features of space and time, however, than in a set of 
questions around what one might call the metaphysical status of space and time. 
Although Hobbes, Hume and Kant, for example were interested in questions such as 
whether space and time were composed of finite or infinite parts (or whether we should 
reserve the term “infinite” only for God), and whether each part of space and time was 
divisible or indivisible, these questions about the features of space and time were 
typically secondary concerns.191 They were more interested in questions like whether 
“the human” – taking their own experience as unproblematically authoritative – “idea” 
of space was relational and subjective or whether it was absolute and objective. They 
were more interested – especially the early modern empiricists and those who 
                                                        
189 Nicholas Jolley recently wrote that” "philosophers up to the time of Kant tended to debate the nature of 
space and time in tandem…philosophical theories that seem primarily tailored to space are often said to 
apply mutatis mutandis to the case of time” (Nicholas Jolley, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Donald Rutherford, 128–29 [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006], 128–29; quoted in Geoffrey Gorham, “Hobbes on the Reality of Time,” Hobbes 
Studies 27, no. 1 (2014), 80–81). Cees Leijenhorst makes the same point, but for different reasons. See 
Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas 
Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy (Boston: Brill, 200), 101–102.  
190 We also find the space/time analogy in other key texts in the history of philosophy – in Husserl’s The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, for example. “What is meant by the exclusion of 
Objective time will perhaps become still clearer if we draw a parallel with space, since space and time 
exhibit so many noted and significant analogies” (Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness, trans. James S. Churchill, ed. Martin Heidegger [Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1964], 23).  
191 All three thinkers, for example, did not question whether time was successive in nature. They assumed 
that time was inseparable from a sense of “before and after,” and therefore inseparable from motion.  
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responded to them – in the relation between our mental ideas of space and time and the 
nature of space and time “themselves.” They were interested, in other words, in the 
relationship between what is “internal” to the mind and what depends on the human 
mind for it’s being, on the one hand; and what is external to the mind and what does not 
depend on the mind for it’s being, on the other hand. Newton is famous for positing, in 
this sense, “absolute” space and time: container-like entities in which bodies and objects 
exist, while Kant understood space and time as mind-dependent Anschauungsformen 
or forms of Appearance, through which we cannot but perceive of bodies and objects.192  
As the core of what Hobbes called “the first grounds of natural philosophy,” then, 
the inquiry into space and time was a kind of entry way into broader questions about the 
relationship between thought and reality for many canonical early modern thinkers.193 
The position a given philosopher took on the “metaphysical status” of space and time – 
the relation between the ideas of space and time and reality – foreshadows the position 
they will take on the broader metaphysical question of the relation between mind and 
world. Hume’s Treatise, for example, proceeds from the idea of space, to the idea of 
time, to his much more general and famous claim about existence: that “the idea of 
existence… is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent” (that is, the 
difference between the idea of existence and the idea of “external existence” is a 
distinction “without any real difference.”)194 In other words it was Hume’s investigation 
of space which led him to claim that the concept of existence adds nothing to our 
                                                        
192 For this claim (as in much of my understanding Hobbes’s thought on space and time) I am indebted to 
Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation  of Arisotelianism, 101.  
193 I restrict my claim, for now, to being about the order and progression of these key philosophical texts: I 
haven’t tried to argue that it is something intrinsic to philosophical investigations of space and time which 
opens the door to metaphysics. But I do mean to suggest that claim for a site of future work which takes 
on current debates about the nature of space and time.  
194 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.2.6, at p. 48.  
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impressions and ideas. And Kant’s First Critique proceeds from the Transcendental 
Aesthetic (his investigation into space and time) – in which he claims that space and 
time are forms of appearance of bodies – to a more general inquiry into synthetic a 
priori propositions.195 In other words, the Transcendental Aesthetic lays out the first key 
domain of Kant’s transcendental idealism. And for Hobbes, too, space and time are the 
“first grounds of natural philosophy”; his philosophical investigation of the 
metaphysical status of, and our epistemic access to, space and time served as entry ways 
into broader questions about the gap between internal ideas and external bodies.196   
If it is right that space and time were gateways for broader metaphysical 
questions for these canonical early modern philosophers, then – and this is the key 
point – it also follows that a philosopher’s position on the metaphysical status of space 
and time played a key role in determining early modern philosophers’ positions on a 
(version of) idealism, realism, transcendental idealism, and so forth. That is, the 
metaphysical question about the subjective or objective nature of space and time and the 
relationship between these two spheres is deeply entwined in the disagreements 
between realism, idealism, anti-realism, and so forth. To simplify things a bit: If we 
think we have access only to ideas or mental representations of space and time, then we 
probably endorse a species of idealism or “phenomenalism.” If we concede that we not 
have access to the nature of externally existing things and also that those 
representations are fundamentally distorting, then we probably endorse, not only a 
                                                        
195 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), B73 (“Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic”). 
196 My point for now is just that inquiring into space and time was an entry way into inquiring about 
(different forms of) the gap which has opened up between the way the world appears to us and the way it 
actually is.  Of course, it’s a separate question what Hobbes’s (or anyone else’s) position within this 
dialectical space actually was. 
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species of idealism, but also a species of what is commonly called external world 
skepticism and/or anti-realism. (Thus the skeptic, as traditionally called, would have 
“won.”) And if we find a way to bridge the gap and gain access to things as they exist 
outside of the human representational schema – as it were strained and purified of 
human representational schema – then we probably endorse a version of realism.  
These are classical questions, one might even say foundational questions, for 
modern philosophy. And obviously I have left nearly all exegetical and theoretical 
questions unanswered, providing little more than a frame or structure.197 But the aim 
has not been to do justice to the complexity of any particular philosopher’s position. 
Rather, I have tried to show that for early modern European philosophers, space and 
time were entranceways for broader metaphysical questions. The following section 
suggests that these apparently opposed, arguably foundational metaphysical questions 
are entangled with what Conant, following Cavell, calls “the dialectical space” of 
skepticism.  
 
The “Dialectical Space” of Skepticism  
In discussing the “metaphysical status” of the ideas of space and time above, I 
have been discussing a conceptual space of philosophical questioning about the 
relationship between thought and reality that undergoes extensive analysis in the work 
of the later Wittgenstein and in the writings of Cavell. In other words, the thought is that 
this conceptual space of metaphysical perplexity about space and time is a paradigm 
historical case of what Cavell and his best critics have identified as the dialectical space 
                                                        
197 The sort of “realism” I have outlined is surely a caricature: no contemporary “realist” would insist that 
for an idea to connect up with reality, it must represent or picture reality perfectly. 
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of philosophical skepticism.  It’s a “dialectical” space because the concept of 
“skepticism” contains enough room for competing philosophical positions – one can be 
a “realist” or an “anti-realist” about space and time and still be entangled with this 
skeptical space – rather than just one abnegatory position; and it’s a conceptual kind of 
space rather than, say, the 3-dimensional kind of space whose presence to the mind is 
required for measuring the dimensions of a room. Finally, it’s a “paradigm” historical 
case because space and time mark, I have argued, “entranceways” into this form of 
metaphysical questioning for the early moderns.198 In other words, the claim is this: that 
all of these apparently different positions about the metaphysical status of space and 
time have something in common (though what that is remains to be seen), and that they 
are entangled with Cavell calls skepticism.  
Here is Jim Conant on the “dialectical space” of skepticism: 
According to this unconventional idiom, the term “skepticism” (and it’s variants, 
such as “Cartesian skepticism or “Kantian skepticism”) therefore refers not just to 
one particular sort of philosophical position (i.e., that held by one another sort of 
skeptic) but rather to the wider dialectical space within which philosophers 
occupying a range of apparently opposed philosophical positions (such as ‘realism,’ 
‘idealism, ‘coherentism’, etc.) engage one another, while seeking a stable way to 
answer the skeptic’s question in the affirmative rather than (as the skeptic himself 
does) in the negative.199  
 
Skepticism in this radically redefined sense thus refers to a particular mode or pitch of 
questioning the world and our relation in it – a mode of questioning “the relationship” 
between thought and reality – and not just to a particular denial that knowledge is 
                                                        
198 I am not denying that, in tandem with this view of Cavellian skepticism, one can make historical sense 
of this descent into skepticism. One way of making historical sense of the importance of space and time 
for European early modern philosophers would be to say that if you see philosophy as a foundation for the 
“new science” of Bacon and Galileo, then space and a time would be the “conceptual pair that function as 
the basis” of that philosophy, because all bodies are in space and time. So, it will be particularly important 
to understand the nature of space and time in order, as Descartes put it, for philosophy to supply the new 
science with a “firm foundation.” 
199 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 3. 
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possible. There is a phenomenological sense in which, when asking these metaphysical 
questions, we become “sealed” off from the world or the world “withdraws.” The 
thought, perhaps, as we might paraphrase it, is that certain questions, once raised, both 
perpetuate and are already an expression of this field or space that is called 
skepticism.200 And perhaps now we can say: for Cavell, all of this rich, dense, 
disciplinarily foundational philosophical work comes down to an attempt to recover the 
world lost through the skeptic’s way of questioning of whether we have knowledge of it, 
whether it connects up with “reality” or “the real.”  From a Cavellian perspective, 
European Early Modern philosophy can be seen as an attempt to reorient the relation to 
the world once that world has been lost by the decline of religious faith and the rise of 
the new science, and each philosopher would have their own method for recovering the 
world; the dialectical space of skepticism names the conceptual space in which this 
attempt takes place (in philosophy). Hobbes’s particular attempt to regain a world lost 
by skepticism is a particularly interesting one, I think, for reasons that Conant’s 
framework brings out.  
 
Hobbes’s Metaphysics of Space and Time  
In this section I argue that Hobbes’s infamous “world annihilation” thought 
experiment is effectively a portal for the dialectical space for skepticism – both 
historically and insofar as we, as philosophical readers of Hobbes, also enter that 
                                                        
200 This is one of the guiding ideas, as I understand it, behind many of the approaches to skepticism 
collected in Conant and Kern’s edited volume, Skepticism in Context (2014). Elek Lane has recently 
attempted to fill in this idea with regard to rule-following skepticism, writing that “Wittgenstein…aims to 
demonstrate the inevitability of being led to a particular kind of philosophical dead-end once one has 
begun the [rule-following] dialectic” (Elek Lane, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following 
Considerations,” The Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6, no. 1 [2017], 54).  
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space.201 And just to offer up an unfinished thought, if we think of Hobbes’s philosophy, 
like Descartes’s, as in some important respects marking a boundary into modernity, and 
modernity as in some ways saturated by skepticism, then the thought experiment 
catapults us into modernity and skepticism together. 
“In the teaching of natural philosophy,” Hobbes writes in Elements of 
Philosophy, “I cannot begin better…than from privation; that is, from feigning the 
world to be annihilated.”202 And if we were to “feign” the annihilation of the world 
except for one man whom “I except [sic]  from the universal annihilation,” Hobbes asks, 
then what would remain?  
I say, there would remain to that man ideas of the world, and of all such bodies as 
he had, before their annihilation… that is to say, the memory and imagination of 
magnitudes, motions, sounds, colours, &c. as also of their order and parts. All 
which things, though they be nothing but ideas of phantasms, happening 
internally to him that imagineth; yet they will appear as if they were external, and 
not at all depending upon any power of mind. And these are the things to which 
he would give names…if we do but observe diligently what it is we do when we 
consider and reason, we shall find, that though all things be still remaining in the 
world, yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms.203 
 
The thought experiment is supposed to astonish or shock us into a discovery; and both 
this peculiar form of philosophical “astonishment” and the corresponding sense of 
discovery are signs of entering a skeptical space.204 The skeptical astonishment, in this 
case, sets up a contrast between “what all men (including us in our non-philosophical 
moments) take to be so” and what really is so. More specifically, it looks like this: 
                                                        
201 Readers have Hobbes have long recognized the pivotal role that the thought experiment plays in 
Hobbes’s philosophy, but (in my view) fundamentally misconstrued what that role is. Cees Leijenhorst 
(Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 2002) tells us that the thought experiment “illustrates the point… 
[that] first philosophy deals with body qua understood or conceived,” that is, with “our conceptions of 
bodies, rather than with bodies themselves.” Geoffrey Gorham (“Hobbes on the Reality of Time,” 2014) 
tells us, additionally, that it is “a thought experiment that will later play an important role in his 
imaginary conceptions of space and time.” This is true – but what is the importance of that?  
202 Hobbes, De Corpore, 2.2.7. 
203 Ibid., 2.2.7. 
204 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 484. 
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although we speak of Bodies as if we were referring to their external, mind-independent 
existence, Hobbes says that what we actually refer to, when we ordinarily speak of 
bodies, are “nothing but Ideas & Phantasms” of those externally occurring things. We 
speak as if we were making claims about external, mind-independent, things, Hobbes 
thinks, but in fact all we have access to are subjective representations of those things. 
The thought experiment sets up an opposition between a mode of mere appearance 
(Ideas & Phantasms) and a mode of reality (bodies which are external to us).205 This 
opposition might seem to, but does not in fact, jeopardize (what Hobbes thinks of as) his 
materialism, for Hobbes understands “phantasms” in two senses, both of which are 
compatible with being mere “matter in motion” – a thought we will return to shortly.206  
The very first thing I would like to say about the “world annihilation” thought 
experiment which gets Hobbes’s philosophical investigation off the ground is that it 
maps uncannily well onto a description of skepticism which Cavell gives in part two 
of The Claim of Reason: 
Once a philosopher finds a Cartesian investigation to show that all we can be 
certain of is something other than the existence of objects…then the question 
arises in a new way as to how our claims about material objects are to be based, 
and this may lead to a reconvening of the meaning of our claims about them, a 
reconception of what a claim about an object is….207 
  
                                                        
205 As commentators such as Leijenhorst have noticed, in order for this to even potentially or seem to 
work, Hobbes needs his conception of memory as less vibrant and less immediately present sense 
impressions; that is, he needs his conception of memory as what he calls “decaying sense.” Only then can 
Hobbes establish the required sort of identity between past sensory impressions, which would remain the 
same even without an external world, and present ones, which accordingly would also remain the same 
even without an external world. 
206 For an excellent discussion of the two ways in which Hobbes views ideas or “phantasms,” see 
Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 53–55. The basic thought, as will become important 
later in the paper, is that ideas are both representations of external things and brain-states.  
207 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 232.  
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If we separate these claims and map them onto Hobbes’s way of doing things, what we 
find is an uncanny symmetry, although there is no indication that Cavell had Hobbes in 
mind: 
 
Cavell: “All we can be certain of is something other than the existence of objects” 
Hobbes: All we can be certain of, or all we have access to, are subjective representations 
of things. “Yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms.”  
 
Cavell: “The question arises in a new way as to how our claims about material objects 
are to be based.” 
Hobbes: Claims about material objects are based on nothing but these subjective 
representations of things, since they are all we have access to. “All which things, though 
they be nothing but Ideas & Phantasms…”  
  
Cavell: “This may lead to a reconvening of the meaning of our claims about them, a re-
conception of what a claim about an object is…” 
Hobbes: All we talk about, when we talk about things, are subjective ideas of things, not 
the external things themselves. The meaning of ordinary terms is nothing but these 
subjective ideas, even though all men think they are referring to something outside of 
the (or their) mind. “And these are the things to which he would give names…”  
 
At one level, if this right, Cavell’s passage from the Claim of Reason describes the shape 
of Hobbes’s thinking. At another level, however, it cannot really be a description of 
Hobbes because there is no textual evidence that Cavell had Hobbes in mind at all. So, it 
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would be better to say that Cavell’s analysis predicts Hobbes’s thinking here. But recall 
that according to the “traditional paradigm” the skeptic is someone who denies or 
doubts that knowledge of a certain sort is possible; the anti-skeptic is someone who 
answers that doubt and/or denial. Hobbes does not understand himself to be doing 
either of those two things: he neither affirms nor denies a skeptical question, for 
example, of the kind: “can I know of the existence of the external world?” And yet, if this 
analysis has so far been right, Hobbes’s natural philosophy, his metaphysics of bodies in 
space and time, insofar as he affirms that we can know nothing except for “the mere 
Phantasms” of those bodies, maps uncannily well onto Cavell’s descriptions of skeptical 
space. The fact that Cavell’s thinking predicts, or has understood, the shape of Hobbes’s 
thinking here even though Hobbes does not even understand himself to be engaging 
with “the skeptic,” lends support to and fills out Cavell’s claim, as in the epigraph to this 
chapter, that skepticism pervades, even sets the terms of, early modern European 
philosophy. But there is much more to be said about this.  
   
Conant’s Kantian and Cartesian Features of Skepticism in Hobbes’s Metaphysics About  
Space and Time 
 
In this section, Jim Conant’s diagnostic framework sharpens the focus on the 
signs of entering the dialectical space of skepticism as they appear in Hobbes’s thinking. 
Conant’s framework, like Cavell’s, not only predicts the shape of Hobbes’s thinking, but 
it also allows us to understand the peculiar role of the cause/effect relationship in 
Hobbes’s natural philosophy:  as a materialist response to the threat of skepticism, as a 
portal out of skepticism, as a spring which allows Hobbes to reconnect himself to, or 
regain, the world lost in skepticism.  
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But before we turn to Conant’s framework, I would like to offer a word about 
what it means to continue Cavell’s project of recognizing “skepticism,” in this broader 
sense of the word, in the history of Western or European-inherited philosophy. In 
Cavell’s work, I would argue that there is no clear way of proceeding from the point of 
reflective symmetry between Hobbes and Cavell identified in the last section. That is, 
Cavell did not offer, and he may not have thought it worthwhile to offer, a full-blooded 
set of diagnostic criteria for what skepticism actually looks like in philosophy, other than 
in occasional passages such as the one just pulled from The Claim of Reason. One way of 
thinking about why this might be would be to say that although Cavell developed in his 
philosophical practice (especially after The Claim) an exquisite and sometimes rather 
dramatic sensitivity to the appearance of a skeptical problem across different fields or 
areas of philosophy, this sensitivity remained mostly implicit (notwithstanding the 
occasional passage such as the one I just used to match Hobbes’s descent into 
skepticism). On my reading, it has been Conant, perhaps more than any other reader of 
Cavell, who has made explicit and expanded Cavell’s implicit sensitivity to skepticism, 
uncovering a set of features by which one might learn to discern the presence of 
skepticism in one’s philosophy and patterns by which skeptical entanglements tend to 
proceed, but also distinguishing between two different kinds or logics of skeptical 
problematics: “Cartesian” and “Kantian.” So, it is to that framework that we now turn, in 
order to show that Hobbes’s metaphysics about space and time exhibits, not just 
features of Cavellian skepticism as in the preceding section, but also “an intermingling 
of Cartesian and Kantian [skeptical] features within a single philosophical 
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problematic.”208 This just deepens, I think, the general claim of this chapter: that 
Cavellian skepticism pervades Early Modern thought and that a thinker like Hobbes can 
be usefully, richly, and accurately interpreted as developing a particular response to the 
threat of skepticism in and through their philosophy.  
To bring the dialectical space of skepticism into sharper focus, Conant offers us 
two different forms or varieties of skepticism with parallel sets of features. He calls these 
forms or varieties “Kantian Skepticism” and “Cartesian Skepticism” respectively; but the 
terminology can be confusing, and it is important to note that the claim is not that Kant 
and Descartes were themselves “skeptics” in something like the traditional sense of the 
term (which would imply that both of their respective projects of defeating skepticism 
simply failed, which is not what’s being argued here). The idea is rather that these two 
forms or problematics are labeled Kantian and Cartesian in order to mark “the historical 
moment at which their [these forms’] overall philosophical shape[s] first because 
visible.” 209 In other words, Conant’s thought is that these problematics are fully present 
in Descartes’ and Kant’s respective philosophies; he uses their texts as something like 
paradigm cases to help delineate the features of each, while affirming that bits and 
pieces of both skeptical spaces are present in other thinkers. Conant therefore notes that 
he does not denominate these problematics “Cartesian” and “Kantian” in order to mark 
“the point of their earliest philosophical inception” or the point of “their last 
philosophical flicker.”210 In this sense, the framework calls out for an analysis of a 
philosopher like Hobbes whose work precedes Kant chronologically but whose work 
                                                        
208 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 23.  
209 Ibid., 24  
210 Ibid.  
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contains Kantian skeptical features, like Hobbes, as it calls out for an analysis of a 
philosopher cotemporaneous with Descartes, like Hobbes, whose work contains 
Cartesian skeptical features but whose solution and response does not resemble 
Descartes’s. And as I hope to show, Hobbes was not only out of touch with the presence 
of a dialectical space of skepticism in his philosophizing, but he was also unaware of the 
distinction between forms of skepticism that Conant’s framework allows us to bring out 
– both of which Conant identifies as causes of philosophical obscurity and confusion.211  
With those prefatory remarks aside, let’s start with what Conant calls skepticism 
about perception.212 “The Cartesian skeptic…worries about the transition from a sensory 
experience to a judgement, from a thought to…its truth value.”213 That is, the Cartesian 
skeptic is concerned with the veridicality of ideas, thoughts, or perceptions. With regard 
to perception in particular, the Cartesian skeptic asks, “How can I know that [external] 
things are as my senses present them as being?”214 The Cartesian skeptic about 
perception comes to see that they can have experiences which are “indistinguishable 
from the one [I have]…such as when I am dreaming, and yet things are not as they 
appear.”215 The outer world – the way things are, the “nature of external things,” etc. – 
is hidden behind a veil of perception. The gap which the Cartesian skeptic therefore 
seeks to bridge is from their own perceptions to the outer world.216  
                                                        
211  “An intermingling of Cartesian and Kantian [skeptical] features within a single philosophical 
problematic,” Conant notes, is often a symptom of philosophical confusion (ibid., 23).  
212 Again, perception is just of many areas of philosophy in which Conant argues philosophers are engaged 
with skeptical questioning. 
213  Ibid., 5. 
214 Ibid., 8.  
215 Ibid., 8 
216 Ibid., 8. 
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The Cartesian gap is discernible in Hobbes’s basic starting point for natural 
philosophy, as we saw: that “we compute nothing but our own phantasms,” as Hobbes 
says, though “all men think” we compute the bodies which phantasms are phantasms 
of.217 And that there is such a gap in Hobbes’s philosophy no serious scholar of Hobbes 
work who I have read has denied. The two corresponding skeptical questions of a 
Cartesian variety which we find in Hobbes’s metaphysics of space and time – both of 
which constitute arenas of contemporary debate, though not as skeptical problems, 
among Hobbes scholars – are accordingly:   
 
(1) Cartesian Skepticism About Perception of Space 
Does Hobbes’ philosophy have a real/objective counterpart to the “phantasm” 
of space? If so, what is the nature of that real/objective counterpart?  
(2) Cartesian Skepticism About Perception of Time 
Does Hobbes’ philosophy have a real/objective counterpart to the “phantasm” 
of time? If so, what is the nature of that real/objective counterpart?  
 
Faced with these questions about the gap between our ideas or “phantasms” of space 
and time and the reality of space and time – questions which will extend, for Hobbes, to 
our phantasms of any particular body in space and time – Hobbes’s philosophy 
threatens to flower into what Conant would call a Cartesian kind of skeptical paradox. 
That is, in order to know that an “Idea or Phantasm,” as Hobbes calls it, is really as it 
                                                        
217 Hobbes, De Corpore, 2.7 Thus as Geoffrey Gorham (“Hobbes on the Reality of Time, 2014) writes, 
“there is always a legitimate question whether our spatial images correspond to their external causes,” or 
as Leijenhorst (Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 2002) puts it, first philosophy “occupies itself with our 
conceptions of bodies, rather than with bodies themselves.” The threat of collapsing into idealism, or even 
utter anti-realism, given this starting point, is palpable. 
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appears, Hobbes needs to convince himself that those ideas are veridical: he needs to be 
able to bridge what Conant calls “the Cartesian gap” between perception and knowledge. 
If Hobbes cannot find a way to bridge that gap, then he is left with a Cartesian form of 
skeptical solipsism and/or anti-realism – this is what Conant calls the Cartesian 
paradox in skepticism about perception.  
If we now turn to Kantian skepticism, the other, parallel logic or problematic of 
skepticism which Conant charts, we find that Hobbes, after the world-annihilation 
thought experiment, is equally and simultaneously trapped within what Conant calls a 
Kantian skeptical problematic. The Kantian skeptic is concerned less with the 
veridicality – the correlation with “the way things are” – than with the intelligibility of 
our ideas, thoughts, or perceptions. That is, the Kantian skeptic worries less about the 
accuracy of what is presented and more about “how the sensory apparatus of the mind 
can so much as present things as being a certain way.”218 With regard to perception in 
particular, the Kantian skeptic asks: “How is it possible that an external object’s 
impinging on the senses could appear as the sort of thing which is ‘about’ anything at all 
– let alone furnish “the sort of things which could provide anyone with a reason for 
believing anything?”219 The gap the Kantian skeptic about perception seeks to bridge is 
from a mechanistic and/or biological account of impact on the sensory organs to 
worldliness as such (or if you prefer, from mere sensory input to “sensory 
consciousness,” to the presence of so much as mental images of a “something.”) One of 
the many relations between these two problematics about skepticism is, Conant notes, 
that the Cartesian skeptic appears to take for granted something which the Kantian 
                                                        
218 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 14. 
219 Ibid., 14.  
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skeptic brings into question. The Cartesian skeptic asks, in brief, whether a perception is 
veridical, responsible to the way things are, whether it corresponds with reality, etc. The 
Kantian skeptic asks rather “how such an appearance is so much as possible,”220 how 
blind sensibility can turn into the sort of thing which we can form judgements about 
(how the conceptual nothingness of interactions with the sensory organs can become a 
discursive something). The very possibility of a perception’s being “non-veridical” or 
‘false” requires that perception be about something, inform a possible thought, in the 
first place. 
The two corresponding skeptical questions of a Kantian variety which we find in 
Hobbes’s natural philosophy – both of which are also under discussion, though not as 
skeptical problems, in contemporary scholarship on Hobbes – are accordingly:   
 
(3) Kantian Skepticism About Perception of Space 
How is it possible, in Hobbes’s philosophy, for the human mind to present so 
much as the appearance of space, as opposed to merely causal and blind 
impact on the senses? Doesn’t an outer object merely impinge on the senses – 
how does that interaction in nature come to take the form of even an 
appearance of space?  
(4)  Kantian Skepticism About Perception of Time 
How is it possible, on Hobbes’s account, for the human mind to present so 
much as the appearance of space, as opposed to merely causal and blind 
impact on the senses? Doesn’t an outer object merely impinge on the senses – 
                                                        
220 Ibid., 15. 
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how does that interaction in nature come to take the form of even an 
appearance of space?221  
 
Faced with these questions about the gap between the causal interactions of bodies on 
our sensory apparatus and the ideas or appearance of space and time – questions which 
will extend, for Hobbes, to our “Phantasms” of anything in space and time – Hobbes is 
entangled in a space of questioning that threatens to flower into another, different kind 
of skeptical paradox. Recall that the Cartesian paradox that Hobbes’s thinking 
encountered faced the threat of a lack of veridicality of those ideas, the threat of a 
failure of ideas to link up to the world. Now it seems as if what threatens is an absence of 
so much as any idea, an absence of so much as the unity of any thought whatsoever; the 
threat of skepticism here is a threat of utter nothingness. (A way of getting at this would 
be to imagine one’s own experience as caused by a series of random synaptic or 
neuronal transactions whose interplay remained mysterious.) In order to regain the 
ordinary worldliness threatened by Kantian skepticism, Hobbes needs to be able to 
bridge what Conant calls “the Kantian gap” from “sensory blindness to sensory 
consciousness.”222 If he cannot find a way to bridge that Kantian gap, then Hobbes is left 
entangled in a dialectical space of Kantian skepticism that is even worse than the threat 
of Cartesian skeptical solipsism and/or anti-realism. The Kantian paradox that 
                                                        
221These questions are also active areas of scholarly debate and conversation among Hobbes scholars. I 
will just give one example. A recent paper by Edward Slowik in Hobbes Studies frames its subject matter 
as interrogating “the manner by which Hobbes reckons that imaginary space is obtained from our 
experience of the world” (Edward Slowik, “Hobbes on the Phantasm of Space,” Hobbes Studies 27 
[2014]). The paper notes that the manner by which imaginary space is “obtained from our experience” 
(the Kantian gap) has “elicited many divergent interpretations” and gives three such interpretations. The 
paper concludes that “it is still unclear what specific cognitive functions are involved and how.” Slowik’s 
horizon of interpretation of Hobbes is entangled with Kantian skepticism about perception.  
222 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 15.  
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threatens Hobbes, once he asks the question of how causal interaction on the sensory 
organs comes to be an idea of or in space and time, is a kind of nothingness or 
lifelessness, in which the possibility that threatens is one in which Hobbes cannot give a 
satisfying philosophical account of how sensory input comes to have as the form of an 
appearance of anything at all.  
 
Cause and Effect as the “Bridge” Across Kantian and Cartesian Gaps  
Now what is interesting and perhaps most peculiar about Hobbes, this next 
section suggests, is not that he has failed to recognize that his philosophical thinking has 
taken on the features of a Cavellian, dialectical space of skepticism. Nor is it that Hobbes 
has not distinguished between the two different kinds of skeptical questions (the one 
about how appearances of the world are so much as possible, the other about whether 
appearances are just mere appearances.) If Cavell and Conant are correct, to have failed 
to recognize the shape of a skeptical problematic is quite common and has been 
common for literally hundreds of years of Western philosophy, and to have failed to 
recognize the difference between Kantian and Cartesian varieties is even more common. 
No, what is most interesting about Hobbes’s response to the threat of skepticism is that 
he tries – and fails – to cross both the Kantian and Cartesian gaps simultaneously, and 
with one weighty philosophical bridge: the cause/effect relationship.223 In a word, 
Hobbes sees “ideas or Phantasms” as effects of two causes: Real, external bodies, and 
Real, internal bodies. The relation of cause and effect here purports to close both the 
Kantian and Cartesian gaps – from world to idea and from brain to idea. I believe that 
                                                        
223 Hobbes, De Corpore, 1.1.2.  
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more sophisticated versions of Hobbes’s move, given how the period in which Hobbes 
was writing kicks off scientific modernity, still pervade much of contemporary thinking 
in philosophy of mind.  
In Hobbes’s natural philosophy, the simplistic, mechanistic cause-and-effect 
relationship, pictured sometimes as a link or chain of one event leading to the next with 
limited or no confounding variables, plays a fundamental role in Hobbes’ natural 
philosophy, as nearly every contemporary commentator on Hobbes’s metaphysics or 
natural philosophy has noted. In fact, in De Corpore, the first book of Elements of 
Philosophy, Hobbes even identifies philosophy with knowledge of cause and effect, 
writing: “Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true 
ratiocination from the knowledge we have we have of their first causes or generation.”224 
But Hobbes’s critics, even the most careful, have also noted something very 
confused or perhaps confusing about the role of the cause and effect relationship in 
Hobbes’s thinking;225 and here I present a new account of why this is, in relation to 
Cavell’s rich and expansive definition of skepticism. I think that what happens in 
Hobbes’s thinking is that he enters into a dialectical space of skepticism – without 
having thought through the overall shape of these problematics, and without having a 
philosophical strategy for how to escape it – and then must claw his way out. The 
cause/effect relationship is the breath of life again, the hinge or door through which 
Hobbes seeks to escape the dialectical space of skepticism.  
                                                        
224 Hobbes, De Corpore, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by Sir William 
Molesworth, Vol 1. (London: John Bohn, 1839) 2.2.7. 
225 For a recent example, Douglas Jesseph writes that “Hobbes’ treatment of the distinction [between real 
and imaginary] is not as clear or extensive as one might wish” (Douglas M. Jesseph, “Hobbes on the 
Foundations of Natural Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, eds. Al. P. Martinich and Kinch 
Hoekstra, 134–48 [New York: Oxford University Press, 2016],  2–3). Leijenhorst notes a related confusion 
at least twice in his text. See Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, p. 54 and p. 123. 
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In a sense, to map or chart Hobbes’s thinking here from a Cavellian perspective is 
quick. Here is what it looks like. If “ideas are mere phantasms of matter in motion,” as 
Hobbes thinks the world annihilation thought experiment demonstrates, as we saw, 
then not only does his philosophy appear trapped at the level of mere materiality 
(confronting him with the Kantian gap between sensory data and appearance of the 
world). But it would also appear trapped at the level of mere appearance (confronting 
him with the Cartesian gap between appearance and reality). The cause/effect 
relationship, however, links ideas to externally existing things (purportedly closing the 
Cartesian gap) and ideas to the materiality of the brain (purportedly closing the Kantian 
gap). And so by conceptualizing “ideas” as effects of Real things, Hobbes attempts to 
achieve some kind of (re)connection between those ideas and “Reality,” some Cartesian 
bridge between mind and world – albeit a thin bridge, and only through a particular 
picture of the cause/effect relation. Similarly, by conceptualizing ideas as effects of 
internal motions of the body, Hobbes attempts to achieve some kind of (re)connection 
between those motions and the world of ideas, some Kantian bridge between material 
sensory input and worldliness as such. Thus, the two kinds of “Real Bodies” – the 
external and the internal – which act as causes in Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy purport 
to close the Cartesian gap between phantasms and the world and the Kantian gap 
between the brain and phantasms respectively.  
One way of proceeding from here would be to question whether Hobbes 
successfully averts the threat of skeptical paradox through the cause/effect relationship. 
I think he does not. There are obvious Cartesian questions still lingering about whether 
being an effect of a “Real Body” is enough for an idea to resemble or correspond to that 
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Real Body. 226 Likewise there are the problems for any broadly emergentist philosophy 
of mind – in a few words, the theory that the mind emerges from the brain’s physical 
processes – that merely asserting that such a process is formed by a mechanical 
cause/effect relationship cannot solve.227  
From a Cavellian perspective, however, the fact that Hobbes could not defeat the 
skeptic is no surprise; and in fact, it is not even all that interesting. From a Cavellian 
perspective, the skeptic cannot be defeated, but only lived with, coped with; and the 
philosophers who understand skepticism best, such as Wittgenstein, had alternative 
ways of responding to the skepticism, ways which are still the subject of philosophical 
debate. But in any case, if we read history of philosophy with Cavell, the aim of reading 
Hobbes’s confrontation with skepticism shifts: instead of learning from Hobbes 
particular strategies for defeating or affirming the skeptic, we might come to understand 
how Hobbes’s thinking is shaped by a confrontation with skepticism – why, for example, 
he places philosophical weights where he does. Applying Conant’s framework, we might 
learn to notice the particular shape or form of a skeptical entanglement in a 
philosopher’s work, and then be able to recognize commonalities between that shape 
and other philosophers, even writing on different subjects.   
The really interesting conclusion, from the perspective of something like a 
“Cavellian history of philosophy,” therefore, is not that Hobbes fails to close the Kantian 
and Cartesian gaps and avert these skeptical paradoxes. Those paradoxes remain a 
threat. The interesting conclusion is that the cause/effect relation returns Hobbes to the 
world, or returns the world in Hobbes’s philosophy, which abandoned him in the 
                                                        
226 Gorham “Hobbes on the Reality of Time,” 90. 
227 Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, 89. 
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dialectical space of skepticism. Thus understood in a Cavellian way, there is a parallel 
between Descartes’s theological approach and Hobbes’s material cause/effect relation: 
they both purport to provide a kind of assurance that there is a connection (of both the 
Kantian and Cartesian varieties) between ideas and the world, between what Hobbes 
calls “Phantasms” and “Real” things. They both play the purported role of ensuring that 
our concepts reach all the way to the world. But whereas Descartes attempts to 
reestablish this connection through God, Hobbes sought to reestablish his connection 
through cause and effect. 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
In the conclusion I would just like to raise one issue that comes up with thinking 
about Kantian skepticism about perception and also offer one insight about human 
mindedness that I think comes from learning to recognize the shape of skeptical 
problematic in one’s thinking.  
There is a sense in which the Kantian gap between the nothingness of 
unorganized causal impact on the sensory organs and the “world of appearances” of 
human cognitive life, unlike the Cartesian gap between that “world of appearances” and 
the real world as such, is not even a theoretically stable thought: there is a sense in 
which one cannot really think this thought through. Conant expresses this difficult idea, 
at one point, like this: 
But it is not clear what it would be to acquiesce in the existence of [a Kantian] 
gap. It must already be bridged (as evidenced by his present ability to exercise his 
capacities for perception…); and yet; as long as the threat of Kantian paradox has 
yet to be averted, it also appears that there is no way to bridge the gap.228   
 
                                                        
228 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 35.  
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In Kantian skepticism, Conant writes, the mind turns with a particular violence on itself: 
we are questioning the mind’s very capacity to form representations.229 And yet in order 
to perform that questioning we require those very capacities – the mind’s capacity to 
form representations – in question. The relationship between possibility and actuality 
gets twisted. We are not only questioning the mind’s (actual) capacity to form 
representations, but also questioning the possibility of the very capacity exercised in 
asking the question. This is why, as I read him, Conant says that there is a sense in 
which philosophers in the grip of Kantian skepticism both acquiescence to the gap and – 
at the same time – fail to. What reason questions is “its own possibility.”230 We seem to 
be plagued with a question, as Kant himself will put it, that reason cannot answer and 
yet cannot dismiss.  
 Hobbes’s apparent thought that “Meere Phantasms” or ideas are effects of motion 
in the brain/sensory organ exhibits, I think, this kind of “theoretical instability” 
symptomatic of an entanglement with Kantian skepticism. The suggestion, both Hobbes 
and modern, that ideas are nothing but neural events “inside” the brain, that they are 
mere “effects” of internal physical events – this is not, I think, a theoretically stable 
thought. Part of what thinking about skepticism through Cavell and Conant’s 
frameworks allows us to understand, in other words, is that it isn’t possible to affirm a 
strong reductionist or physicalist theory of mind, for not only does such a theory 
crumble as soon as we engage in practical, ordinary life, but such a standpoint cannot 
                                                        
229 Ibid., 33. “Kant says (concerning what he calls) skepticism, that it is a “way of thinking, in which 
reason moves against itself with such violence, that it could never have arisen except in volliger 
Verzweiflung of achieving satisfaction with respect to reason’s most important aspiration” (Conant 
quoting Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 4:271). 
230 Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” 34. 
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even be maintained – at least not without patent assumption or assertion of what must 
be the case, namely, that everything we feel, think, touch, is ultimately reducible to 
events inside of the head. For the reductionist/physicalist, the Kantian gap remains 
unbridged; he merely asserts that a bridge has been formed, since something must 
bridge it; the world of experience cannot just be given to us as meaningful.231  Hobbes’ 
specific form of materialism about ideas, like contemporary theories of mind which 
reduce ideas to neural events, is a response to the appearance of the Kantian skeptical 
gap; and if Conant is right, any such response will display a peculiar form of theoretical 
instability which must both employ and seek to account for the very cognitive capacities 
being exercised in posing the question, and yet as long as the gap remains unbridged, 
such an account cannot be given. And so the world, or world of appearances, shows up 
as meaningful for us, and – surprise! – we are born into experience, in media res, which 
we did not create.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
231 See Alva Noe, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010).  
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Conclusion 
 
Cavell’s Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow 
 
 I sought to show, in the first three chapters of this dissertation, the “same fact” 
from a variety of different perspectives: that the philosophical skeptic (in us) runs up 
against various human forms of life – the fact of our separateness, the fact that not all 
meaningful concepts are “criterial,” that is, are differentiated by marks and features, the 
ubiquity and necessity of human cares and commitments in meaningful conceptual life, 
the fact that we inherit a language whose embedded meanings we did not decide on – 
and, interpreting these conditions as limitations, seeks to transcend them. But the 
absence of human forms of life does not amount to objectivity, but rather to a loss of 
accountability to (human) reality, to emptiness in our use of language. That is, I think, a 
central thread in the philosophy of Stanley Cavell.  
 In the fourth chapter, I sought to build on the first three to begin a different sort 
of task: the task of thinking with Cavell, of taking Cavell more as a means of 
interpretation than as an object of interpretation, to identify the role that the threat of 
skepticism played, in shaping the questions asked and the possible range of satisfactory 
answers, in European Early Modern philosophy and in Hobbes’s thought in particular. 
Moving to a conclusion, another central thread in Cavell’s writing, from his first 
book of interrelated essays, Must We Mean What We Say (1969), to his last published 
book of essays, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (2005), is that “nothing 
guarantees” that a piece of philosophical work will “succeed”; i.e., will succeed in 
unfreezing the habitual flow of ordinary concepts to reveal aspects of “experience” we 
had missed. In other words: “philosophy” for Cavell is not a purely descriptive term – a 
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word for an engagement with a particular figure, text, or problem – but a term of 
achievement or praise. Cavell even suggested that those writers or artists most likely to 
leave their historical trace as “philosophers” would be least likely to be convinced, in 
advance of any given endeavor, that what they were doing counted as philosophy.  
 In 1969, understandably, given the intellectual environment at Harvard and in 
the culture at large in which he was engaged, Cavell frames a version of this thought 
about the achievement of philosophy in terms of the presence of modernism in the arts. 
At that time, though conversations with his friend and the art critic Michael Fried, 
Cavell begins to conceive of artistic “modernism” as a form of disruption of continuity 
with the past of the tradition of the art form; but in contrast to many other theorists of 
modernism and perhaps most notably Arthur Danto, this “disruption of continuity with 
the tradition” did not amount to radical break, a throwing away of the past. Rather, 
modernism in the Cavellian and in the Friedian sense amounts to a continual, open-
ended questioning about whether, and on what grounds, a work counts or does not 
count as a continuation of the tradition – as if this question which had perennially 
driven a particular artistic canon had suddenly, in 1969, become a pressing one for both 
critics and artists. Among many other things, this Cavellian-Friedian conception of 
modernism implies and entails a certain kind of leveling of the distinction between 
“categorization” and “evaluation” – such that only an achievement of the form of artistic 
medium counts as an instance of it.232 Of course, saying this is not to deny that we can 
classify anything with paint sprayed on it, any piece of writing that takes up a 
                                                        
232 See, for example, Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), esp. “Automatisms,” Ch. 14. A version of this thought runs though Must We Mean 
What We Say?  
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philosophical theme, as a “painting” or as “philosophy.” The thought is rather, among 
other things, (1) that the reception or criticism of a work of philosophy or art is part of 
what constitutes its worth; and (2) that we are “endlessly responsible” for the question 
of whether what we are doing counts as – for example – philosophy; and (3) that 
categorization, in the arts, has now become tied up with the role of evaluation.  
Will Cavell’s text count as “philosophy” then – and for whom, and when? This 
question is not yet, according to Cavell’s own thinking about this question in other 
contexts, a very good one. Because if it is true that the meaning of a text is inextricably 
bound up with the criticism of that text, and vice versa, then in order to know whether 
Cavell’s texts count as philosophy there would first have to be criticism of those texts. 
But if we bracket the question of the status of a thinker whose reputation never leaves 
the confines of the university, and concentrate instead on Cavell’s desire to be read (at 
least for many of his texts) also by those who did not have a training in professional 
philosophy, then for Cavell such criticism would have to come from something like a 
non-academic philosophical readership, something like a “philosophical culture.”  But 
in the United States, as opposed to, say, France, where Cavell currently enjoys a much 
more publicly accepted reputation as a philosopher, there is no culturally recognized 
tradition of philosophy in the sense that we have a tradition of, say, literature, or poetry; 
outside of humanities departments at universities, there is no concept of “American 
philosophy” in the sense that we have such a concept as “American literature” or 
“American poetry.”  
Of course one might very well argue that we do have such a tradition; it has just 
not yet been recognized. But for this claim to be true one would have to elevate the 
scholar and professor of philosophy above the general (interested, thoughtful) public in 
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a way that Cavell did not agree with and that was not congenial to his philosophical 
thinking. Or alternatively one might argue that the search for anything like a national 
identity for philosophy is outdated and misplaced. But regardless of the national borders 
in which Cavell’s philosophy could be received, the real here question is just thus: Where 
is the philosophical culture and the philosophical audience(s) which will determine 
whether Cavell’s work – or inheritance and scholarship of his work – will be worth the 
personal, social, and institutional investment that such work requires? It is certainly not 
enough, Cavell thinks, following Thoreau in this regard as in others, that we have 
professors of philosophy. But to have philosophers we must have an audience for 
philosophy. If such an audience does not yet exist, it seems that we cannot even ask the 
question of Cavell’s future yet. 
It is only in the context of the question of whether there is such a thing as an 
audience for “American philosophy,” and if there is such an audience, why it has not yet 
been recognized in the way that audiences for other art forms or media have been 
recognized, that one can understand Cavell’s complex discussions of Emerson and 
Thoreau and his discussions of Hollywood film. The Transcendentalists’ work and 
certain works of Hollywood film, Cavell thinks, carry within them a particular vision of 
the evolving conversation about what constitutes justice and what constitutes a good 
life, a conversation in which any interested person ought to be an equal member of – in 
short, a dimension of the ethical life that Cavell will come to call “Emersonian 
perfectionism.” As is well known, far from aiming at a particular “perfected” state of 
being, Emersonian perfectionism calls us back to the necessity of a continuing 
conversation about how to live together well; perfectionism remind us, in the face of 
particular challenges to the justice of our laws, institutions, and distributions of wealth, 
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that in a democracy one is never “above reproach.” Skepticism or metaphysics, in this 
region of Cavell’s philosophical solar system at any rate, is in part the effort to transcend 
or wash one’s hands of this ongoing conversation about justice and the good human life 
– to place oneself outside of that conversation, to transcend the unfinished self in that 
way. And so, Cavell thinks, a proper democratic or “American” tradition of philosophy 
would develop, not only a vision of that finite and ongoing conversation of justice and 
the good life, but also a set of responses to the human desire to transcend that ongoing 
conversation.  
But here is the rub. Cavell finds such a confrontation with skepticism and an 
embrace of Emersonian perfectionism in Thoreau and Emerson’s texts and even, in 
their own way, in certain key moments of Hollywood film. Yet those texts and films have 
not yet been recognized – despite all of their apparent acclaim and high school fan clubs 
-- as cultural artefacts with something philosophical to say. This suggests to Cavell, not 
that he is wrong that these texts offer such a vision of Emersonian perfectionism and 
establish a forgotten tradition of philosophical thought in the United States, but that the 
audience has not been formed which can judge as he judges, dig as he digs. If Cavell is 
right, then to understand his texts and the texts and films and plays that matter most to 
him, we would first have to come to terms with our own drive toward skepticism or 
metaphysics; and if this has not yet been done, then we are not yet prepared for the 
significance of these texts and films.  
  It is in something like this sense, I think, that by the end of his life, Cavell saw 
himself as a philosopher for the day after tomorrow. Especially in the 1990s, 
intellectually lonely as ever, Cavell continued to attempt to search for an audience for 
his own writing with his writing. He felt his audience had not yet come; but that when it 
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ever did come, they would understand a series of philosophical texts and films in a fresh 
light, perhaps most notably the Transcendentalists, whose full significance had not yet 
been unpacked.  
 To conclude, here is an initial attempt at a formulation of Cavellian philosophy 
that could have broad appeal. If it is correct to say that perception, sensory experience 
more generally, and even rational thought itself are “historically conditioned” – and by 
this mean we mean that in learning language, the human being is a being that is 
initiated into the cultural-biological forms of life embedded in a language – then we are 
inclined to think that in affirming historicity we are denying something about the 
accuracy of perception, sensory experience and rational thought. But this need not be 
so. Cavell’s philosophy is about living with and thinking about perception and cognition 
which are not in tension with the idea of their being historically conditioned. And if that 
way of living as coping with finitude is possible, then the impression that we are denying 
something -- the possibility of accuracy in our judgements and claims – when we affirm 
the fact of our inheritance of culture and language dissolves. Said otherwise, only from 
within the fantasy that rational thought requires ahistorical conditions of accuracy do 
we experience a tension between historicity and accuracy; but this is a not a tension it is 
easy to walk out of. And if Cavell is right, it is a tension, in philosophizing the day after 
tomorrow, that there is a never a solution to, never a final path out of, in the sense that 
we mistakenly think we must choose between the possibility of accuracy and the reality 
of historicity. Cavell’s philosophy walks a tightrope between objectivity, philosophy, and 
history.  
I have been waiting to end on this note. Since his death this past summer, Stanley 
Cavell’s posthumous life, both within and outside of professional philosophy, has begun 
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to snake its way down a long and undetermined trail. And although we might think we 
understand this trail, since we know it must in some sense exist, in fact we do not have 
an adequate picture of it, because it is still in formation. We are forming it. 
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